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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1518.001: Security Software Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, reg query with Reg, dir with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.

Adversaries may also utilize the Cloud API to discover cloud-native security software installed on compute infrastructure, such as the AWS CloudWatch agent, Azure VM Agent, and Google Cloud Monitor agent. These agents may collect metrics and logs from the VM, which may be centrally aggregated in a cloud-based monitoring platform.

EnterpriseT1518.001Sub-techniqueObject v1.5Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

Security Software Discovery matters because it is often a decision point for an intruder: after learning what endpoint, host, or cloud monitoring tools are present, they can choose whether to continue, change tooling, or avoid actions likely to be observed. For leaders, this is less about one command and more about whether security monitoring itself is visible as an asset attackers can inventory across Windows, macOS, Linux, and IaaS environments.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as an early-warning and coverage-validation behavior. It helps answer whether SOC and incident response teams can see adversaries probing defensive controls before follow-on activity. The cloud element is important for resilience and audit readiness: if cloud monitoring agents and VM agents are discoverable, organizations should confirm that API activity and agent inventory are governed, logged, and reviewed. ATT&CK relationships show this behavior is associated with multiple campaigns and groups, so it should be treated as a broadly relevant discovery behavior rather than a niche platform issue.

Technical view

This is a Discovery sub-technique of Software Discovery covering IaaS, Linux, macOS, and Windows. MITRE provides no official detection text, so teams should validate against the related detection strategy DET0016, Security Software Discovery Across Platforms, and test whether endpoint and cloud telemetry can identify attempts to enumerate security tools, configurations, sensors, antivirus, local firewall-related information, and cloud monitoring agents. Detection engineering should focus on process, registry, filesystem, task/process listing, and cloud API evidence rather than a single command name, because MITRE notes that indicators vary by the security product or sensor being queried.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry for discovery-oriented utilities such as netsh, reg query, dir, and tasklist where available
  • Windows registry query activity related to installed software or security configurations
  • Filesystem directory listing activity targeting security software locations or tool names
  • Process and task listing telemetry that may reveal attempts to identify running defensive tools
  • macOS endpoint telemetry for checks referencing security tools such as LittleSnitch or KnockKnock

Detection direction

  • Validate whether DET0016-aligned analytics exist for Windows, macOS, Linux, and IaaS rather than only traditional Windows antivirus discovery.
  • Correlate suspicious security-tool enumeration with broader Software Discovery activity under T1518 and with subsequent behavior, because discovery alone can overlap with legitimate administration.
  • Tune for context: administrator inventory scripts, endpoint management tools, and compliance scans may produce similar evidence and should be baselined rather than blindly suppressed.
  • Do not rely only on explicit command names; MITRE notes indicators may be specific to the software or security system being sought.
  • For cloud, confirm that Cloud API telemetry is collected and searchable for attempts to identify monitoring agents on compute infrastructure.

Mitigation priorities

  • First, confirm visibility: ensure endpoint and cloud logs needed to observe security software enumeration are retained and available to the SOC.
  • Second, maintain accurate inventories of deployed security agents, sensors, and cloud monitoring components so unexpected enumeration can be compared against normal administrative activity.
  • Third, review access to cloud APIs and compute inventory functions so only appropriate identities can query security-relevant agent and monitoring information.
  • Fourth, incorporate this technique into incident response playbooks as an early discovery indicator that may precede evasive or follow-on actions.
  • Finally, use detection test results as compliance and control-evidence inputs: demonstrate that security monitoring can observe attempts to discover the monitoring stack itself.
Additional notes and limits

This object replaces revoked technique T1063 and is a sub-technique of T1518 Software Discovery. The relationship set includes one detection strategy, DET0016, and multiple campaigns and groups using the technique; those relationships support broad defensive relevance but do not prove current activity in any specific environment. The supplied ATT&CK fields emphasize both endpoint and cloud contexts, including cloud monitoring agents and Cloud API-based discovery.

MITRE does not provide official detection guidance for this technique in the supplied object. Practical detection depends on local telemetry quality, endpoint logging configuration, cloud API logging, naming of deployed security tools, and the organization’s baseline for legitimate inventory or administrative activity. No platform or control coverage should be assumed without validation.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Security Software Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, reg query with Reg, dir with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.

Adversaries may also utilize the Cloud API to discover cloud-native security software installed on compute infrastructure, such as the AWS CloudWatch agent, Azure VM Agent, and Google Cloud Monitor agent. These agents may collect metrics and logs from the VM, which may be centrally aggregated in a cloud-based monitoring platform.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1063Security Software DiscoverySecurity Software Discovery revoked by this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0012: Darkhotel

Darkhotel is a suspected South Korean threat group that has targeted victims primarily in East Asia since at least 2004. The group's name is based on cyber espionage operations conducted via hotel Internet networks against traveling executives and other select guests. Darkhotel has also conducted spearphishing campaigns and infected victims through peer-to-peer and file sharing networks.[1][2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G0121: Sidewinder

Sidewinder is a suspected Indian threat actor group that has been active since at least 2012. They have been observed targeting government, military, and business entities throughout Asia, primarily focusing on Pakistan, China, Nepal, and Afghanistan.[1][2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G1008: SideCopy

SideCopy is a Pakistani threat group that has primarily targeted South Asian countries, including Indian and Afghani government personnel, since at least 2019. SideCopy's name comes from its infection chain that tries to mimic that of Sidewinder, a suspected Indian threat group.[1]

GroupEnterprise

G0112: Windshift

Windshift is a threat group that has been active since at least 2017, targeting specific individuals for surveillance in government departments and critical infrastructure across the Middle East.[1][2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G0082: APT38

APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1] Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which APT38 stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext [2] and Banco de Chile [2]; some of their attacks have been destructive.[1][2][3][4]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

GroupEnterprise

G0061: FIN8

FIN8 is a financially motivated threat group that has been active since at least January 2016, and known for targeting organizations in the hospitality, retail, entertainment, insurance, technology, chemical, and financial sectors. In June 2021, security researchers detected FIN8 switching from targeting point-of-sale (POS) devices to distributing a number of ransomware variants.[1][2][3][4]

GroupEnterprise

G1044: APT42

APT42 is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts cyber espionage and surveillance.[1] The group primarily focuses on targets in the Middle East region, but has targeted a variety of industries and countries since at least 2015.[1] APT42 starts cyber operations through spearphishing emails and/or the PINEFLOWER Android malware, then monitors and collects information from the compromised systems and devices.[1] Finally, APT42 exfiltrates data using native features and open-source tools.[2]

APT42 activities have been linked to Magic Hound by other commercial vendors. While there are behavior and software overlaps between Magic Hound and APT42, they appear to be distinct entities and are tracked as separate entities by their originating vendor.

GroupEnterprise

G1018: TA2541

TA2541 is a cybercriminal group that has been targeting the aviation, aerospace, transportation, manufacturing, and defense industries since at least 2017. TA2541 campaigns are typically high volume and involve the use of commodity remote access tools obfuscated by crypters and themes related to aviation, transportation, and travel.[1][2]

GroupEnterprise

G0089: The White Company

The White Company is a likely state-sponsored threat actor with advanced capabilities. From 2017 through 2018, the group led an espionage campaign called Operation Shaheen targeting government and military organizations in Pakistan.[1]

GroupEnterprise

G0019: Naikon

Naikon is assessed to be a state-sponsored cyber espionage group attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020).[1] Active since at least 2010, Naikon has primarily conducted operations against government, military, and civil organizations in Southeast Asia, as well as against international bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).[1][2]

While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[3]

GroupEnterprise

G0080: Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted financial institutions since at least 2016. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. Cobalt Group has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The group has been known to target organizations in order to use their access to then compromise additional victims.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7] Reporting indicates there may be links between Cobalt Group and both the malware Carbanak and the group Carbanak.[8]

GroupEnterprise

G0047: Gamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group that has targeted military, law enforcement, judiciary, non-profit, and non-governmental organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name Gamaredon Group derives from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon," found in early campaigns.[1][2][3][4][5]

In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed Gamaredon Group to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18, an assessment later supported by multiple independent cybersecurity researchers. [6][5]

MalwareEnterprise

S1130: Raspberry Robin

Raspberry Robin is initial access malware first identified in September 2021, and active through early 2024. The malware is notable for spreading via infected USB devices containing a malicious LNK object that, on execution, retrieves remote hosted payloads for installation. Raspberry Robin has been widely used against various industries and geographies, and as a precursor to information stealer, ransomware, and other payloads such as SocGholish, Cobalt Strike, IcedID, and Bumblebee.[1][2][3] The DLL componenet in the Raspberry Robin infection chain is also referred to as "Roshtyak."[4] The name "Raspberry Robin" is used to refer to both the malware as well as the threat actor associated with its use, although the Raspberry Robin operators are also tracked as Storm-0856 by some vendors.[5]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0611: Clop

Clop is a ransomware family that was first observed in February 2019 and has been used against retail, transportation and logistics, education, manufacturing, engineering, automotive, energy, financial, aerospace, telecommunications, professional and legal services, healthcare, and high tech industries. Clop is a variant of the CryptoMix ransomware.[1][2][3]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S1228: PUBLOAD

PUBLOAD is a stager malware that has been observed installing itself in existing directories such as `C:\Users\Public` or creating new directories to stage the malware and its components.[1] PUBLOAD malware collects details of the victim host, establishes persistence, encrypts victim details using RC4 and communicates victim details back to C2. PUBLOAD malware has previously been leveraged by China-affiliated actors identified as Mustang Panda. PUBLOAD is also known as “NoFive” and some public reporting identifies the loader component as CLAIMLOADER.[2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0455: Metamorfo

Metamorfo is a Latin-American banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that has been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses on targeting banks and cryptocurrency services in Brazil and Mexico.[1][2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0650: QakBot

QakBot is a modular banking trojan that has been used primarily by financially-motivated actors since at least 2007. QakBot is continuously maintained and developed and has evolved from an information stealer into a delivery agent for ransomware, most notably ProLock and Egregor.[1][2][3][4]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0330: Zeus Panda

Zeus Panda is a Trojan designed to steal banking information and other sensitive credentials for exfiltration. Zeus Panda’s original source code was leaked in 2011, allowing threat actors to use its source code as a basis for new malware variants. It is mainly used to target Windows operating systems ranging from Windows XP through Windows 10.[1][2]

Windows
CampaignEnterprise

C0014: Operation Wocao

Operation Wocao was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted organizations around the world, including in Brazil, China, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The suspected China-based actors compromised government organizations and managed service providers, as well as aviation, construction, energy, finance, health care, insurance, offshore engineering, software development, and transportation companies.[1]

Security researchers assessed the Operation Wocao actors used similar TTPs and tools as APT20, suggesting a possible overlap. Operation Wocao was named after an observed command line entry by one of the threat actors, possibly out of frustration from losing webshell access.[1]

CampaignEnterprise

C0001: Frankenstein

Frankenstein was described by security researchers as a highly-targeted campaign conducted by moderately sophisticated and highly resourceful threat actors in early 2019. The unidentified actors primarily relied on open source tools, including Empire. The campaign name refers to the actors' ability to piece together several unrelated open-source tool components.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.5
Created
Modified
Raw hash
a2db245560cc40b5...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.5Current bundlea2db245560cc…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

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    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

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    TrendMicro RaspberryRobin 2022

    Christopher So. (2022, December 20). Raspberry Robin Malware Targets Telecom, Governments. Retrieved May 17, 2024.

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    Patrick Schläpfer . (2024, April 10). Raspberry Robin Now Spreading Through Windows Script Files. Retrieved May 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Trend Micro Tick November 2019

    Chen, J. et al. (2019, November). Operation ENDTRADE: TICK’s Multi-Stage Backdoors for Attacking Industries and Stealing Classified Data. Retrieved June 9, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024

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    Open source URL
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    Rewterz. (2020, April 20). Sidewinder APT Group Campaign Analysis. Retrieved January 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Zhang, X. (2020, February 4). Another Metamorfo Variant Targeting Customers of Financial Institutions in More Countries. Retrieved July 30, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019

    ESET Research. (2019, October 3). Casbaneiro: peculiarities of this banking Trojan that affects Brazil and Mexico. Retrieved September 23, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Zscaler PAKLOG CorkLog SplatCloak Splatdropper April 2025

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    Trend Micro Mustang Panda Earth Preta Toneshell February 2025

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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Kuzmenko, A. et al. (2021, September 2). QakBot technical analysis. Retrieved September 27, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.

    Open source URL
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    Huss, D. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016.

    Open source URL
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    Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved September 2, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Talos Zeus Panda Nov 2017

    Brumaghin, E., et al. (2017, November 02). Poisoning the Well: Banking Trojan Targets Google Search Results. Retrieved November 5, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    Ebach, L. (2017, June 22). Analysis Results of Zeus.Variant.Panda. Retrieved November 5, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    BlackBerry Bahamut

    The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    ESET Research. (2025, December 2). MuddyWater: Snakes by the riverbank. Retrieved February 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
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    CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020

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    Open source URL
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    SEONGSU PARK. (2022, December 27). BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW. Retrieved February 6, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024

    Anthony Galiette, Doel Santos. (2024, January 11). Medusa Ransomware Turning Your Files into Stone. Retrieved October 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016

    Elovitz, S. & Ahl, I. (2016, August 18). Know Your Enemy: New Financially-Motivated & Spear-Phishing Group. Retrieved February 26, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    Mandiant APT42-untangling

    Rozmann, O., et al. (2024, May 1). Uncharmed: Untangling Iran's APT42 Operations. Retrieved October 9, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Korean FSI TA505 2020

    Financial Security Institute. (2020, February 28). Profiling of TA505 Threat Group That Continues to Attack the Financial Sector. Retrieved July 14, 2022.

    Open source URL
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    Kasuya, M. (2020, January 8). Threat Spotlight: Amadey Bot Targets Non-Russian Users. Retrieved July 14, 2022.

    Open source URL
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    Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022

    Larson, S. and Wise, J. (2022, February 15). Charting TA2541's Flight. Retrieved September 12, 2023.

    Open source URL
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    Palo Alto Comnie

    Grunzweig, J. (2018, January 31). Comnie Continues to Target Organizations in East Asia. Retrieved June 7, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019.

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    Cybereason Bazar July 2020

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    Yair Herling. (2023, April 4). From ChatGPT to RedLine Stealer: The Dark Side of OpenAI and Google Bard. Retrieved September 17, 2025.

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    Morphisec ShellTea June 2019

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    Singh, S. et al.. (2018, March 13). Iranian Threat Group Updates Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in Spear Phishing Campaign. Retrieved April 11, 2018.

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    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Project TajMahal – a sophisticated new APT framework. Retrieved October 14, 2019.

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