G1008: SideCopy

SideCopy matters because ATT&CK describes it as a threat group focused on South Asian countries, including Indian and Afghani government personnel, with activity reported since at least 2019. The relationship context points to a practical pattern defenders can validate: targeted attachments leading to user-driven execution, Windows malware such as Action RAT and AuTo Stealer, discovery of host/network/security context, and follow-on tool transfer or evasive execution methods.

Executive priority

Prioritize this object when the organization has government, diplomatic, South Asia, contractor, or personnel-risk exposure. The business question is not simply “are we targeted by SideCopy,” but whether email security, endpoint visibility, user reporting, and incident response can handle targeted attachment-based intrusion attempts that may progress into reconnaissance and remote access. It is also useful for audit and readiness discussions because coverage depends on proving telemetry exists across mail, endpoint, DNS/network, and response workflows.

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no official detection text and no group-level platforms or tactics, so validation should be built from the relationships. Focus on coverage for spearphishing attachments and malicious file execution, followed by suspicious use of Visual Basic, mshta.exe, Native API-related execution, DLL abuse, system/network/software/security software/location discovery, and ingress tool transfer. Relationship software includes Action RAT and AuTo Stealer, both described as Windows malware used by SideCopy, so Windows endpoint process, file, module-load, and network telemetry are especially relevant where those software relationships are in scope.

Likely telemetry

Email security logs for targeted messages, attachments, attachment detonation results, and user interaction evidence
Endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry, especially for mshta.exe, script/VB execution, and unusual child-process chains from opened files
File creation, download, quarantine, and execution events for attachments, payloads, DLLs, and transferred tools
DLL/module load telemetry and execution from unusual names or locations that resemble legitimate resources
Host discovery evidence such as system, network configuration, installed software, security software, locale, timezone, or location checks

Detection direction

Because MITRE provides no official detection guidance for this group object, map detections to the related techniques rather than relying on group-name matching.
Validate the full chain: suspicious attachment delivery, user opening a malicious file, execution through script or trusted Windows utilities, payload placement, discovery activity, and outbound transfer or command-and-control-related traffic.
Tune detections for mshta.exe, Visual Basic/script execution, and DLL abuse to account for legitimate administrative or business software usage; prioritize unusual parent processes, user context, file origin, and uncommon paths/names.
Review blind spots around pre-execution email telemetry, attachment detonation retention, endpoint command-line logging, DLL load visibility, and proxy/DNS retention, since missing any one layer can break reconstruction.
Use Action RAT and AuTo Stealer relationships as threat-intelligence pivots where allowed by local tooling, but do not treat tool-name matching alone as sufficient detection coverage.

Mitigation priorities

Strengthen attachment controls, sandboxing, and user reporting workflows for targeted phishing scenarios.
Reduce unnecessary execution paths for script interpreters and trusted utilities such as mshta.exe where operationally feasible, and monitor exceptions.
Apply application control, least privilege, and endpoint hardening to limit malicious file execution, DLL abuse, and unauthorized tool transfer.
Ensure egress filtering, DNS/proxy monitoring, and endpoint containment procedures are ready for payload retrieval or remote access tooling.
Maintain IR playbooks that connect email triage, endpoint investigation, malware containment, and credential/access review after suspected attachment-driven compromise.

Additional notes and limits

This take is based on the official SideCopy ATT&CK group description, the MalwareBytes external reference listed by ATT&CK, and the supplied uses relationships. The strongest defensive value comes from relationship-driven behavior mapping rather than from the group object itself, because the group-level platforms, tactics, and detection fields are not specified.

Do not infer local exposure or active exploitation from this object alone. ATT&CK does not provide official detection text for SideCopy here, and several related techniques have broad platform descriptions that should not be treated as confirmed SideCopy operating platforms. Local telemetry, asset exposure, geography, business relationships, and incident evidence are required to assess relevance.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

SideCopy

SideCopy is a Pakistani threat group that has primarily targeted South Asian countries, including Indian and Afghani government personnel, since at least 2019. SideCopy's name comes from its infection chain that tries to mimic that of Sidewinder, a suspected Indian threat group.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques16 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1614	System Location Discovery	SideCopy has identified the country location of a compromised host.[1]
Enterprise	T1518.001	Security Software DiscoverySub-technique	SideCopy uses a loader DLL file to collect AV product names from an infected host.[1]
Enterprise	T1584.001	DomainsSub-technique	SideCopy has compromised domains for some of their infrastructure, including for C2 and staging malware.[1]
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	SideCopy has delivered trojanized executables via spearphishing emails that contacts actor-controlled servers to download malicious payloads.[1]
Enterprise	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	SideCopy has identified the IP address of a compromised host.[1]
Enterprise	T1608.001	Upload MalwareSub-technique	SideCopy has used compromised domains to host its malicious payloads.[1]
Enterprise	T1106	Native API	SideCopy has executed malware by calling the API function `CreateProcessW`.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.005	Visual BasicSub-technique	SideCopy has sent Microsoft Office Publisher documents to victims that have embedded malicious macros that execute an hta file via calling `mshta.exe`.[1]
Enterprise	T1518	Software Discovery	SideCopy has collected browser information from a compromised host.[1]
Enterprise	T1566.001	Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique	SideCopy has sent spearphishing emails with malicious hta file attachments.[1]
Enterprise	T1574.001	DLLSub-technique	SideCopy has used a malicious loader DLL file to execute the `credwiz.exe` process and side-load the malicious payload `Duser.dll`.[1]
Enterprise	T1204.002	Malicious FileSub-technique	SideCopy has attempted to lure victims into clicking on malicious embedded archive files sent via spearphishing campaigns.[1]
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	SideCopy has identified the OS version of a compromised host.[1]
Enterprise	T1598.002	Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique	SideCopy has crafted generic lures for spam campaigns to collect emails and credentials for targeting efforts.[1]
Enterprise	T1036.005	Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique	SideCopy has used a legitimate DLL file name, `Duser.dll` to disguise a malicious remote access tool.[1]
Enterprise	T1218.005	MshtaSub-technique	SideCopy has utilized `mshta.exe` to execute a malicious hta file.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

S1029: AuTo Stealer

AuTo Stealer is malware written in C++ has been used by SideCopy since at least December 2021 to target government agencies and personnel in India and Afghanistan.[1]

Windows

S1028: Action RAT

Action RAT is a remote access tool written in Delphi that has been used by SideCopy since at least December 2021 against Indian and Afghani government personnel.[1]

Windows

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.1
Object version: 1.0
Created: Aug 7, 2022, 13:52 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 16, 2025, 20:37 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: bc0bc90651d7e62a...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 16, 2025, 20:37 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`bc0bc90651d7…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[2]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[3]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[4]
mitre-attackG1008
Open source URL
[5]
mitre-attackG1008
Open source URL
[6]
mitre-attackG1008
Open source URL
[7]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[8]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[9]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[10]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[11]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[12]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[13]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[14]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[15]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[16]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[17]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[18]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[19]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[20]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[21]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[22]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[23]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[24]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[25]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[26]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[27]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[28]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[29]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[30]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[31]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[32]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[33]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[34]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[35]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL
[36]
MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL

Source and licensing

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