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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0019: Naikon

Naikon is assessed to be a state-sponsored cyber espionage group attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020).[1] Active since at least 2010, Naikon has primarily conducted operations against government, military, and civil organizations in Southeast Asia, as well as against international bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).[1][2]

While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[3]

EnterpriseG0019GroupObject v2.0Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Naikon matters as an espionage-focused intrusion set because the ATT&CK record links it to long-running activity against government, military, civil, and international organizations in Southeast Asia, including UNDP and ASEAN references. For leaders, the decision value is not a single exploit or product gap; it is whether the organization can recognize post-compromise discovery, credential/domain-account abuse, Windows administration-tool misuse, scheduled-task persistence, and custom backdoor activity before sensitive information or operational relationships are exposed.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as a readiness and assurance question for organizations with government, diplomatic, defense, regional, or international-body exposure. Executives should ask whether SOC, identity, endpoint, and network teams can prove visibility into domain account misuse, remote execution through administrative tooling, suspicious scheduled tasks, Office add-in persistence, network/service discovery, FTP-based transfer, and Windows backdoor indicators. The ATT&CK entry provides no official detection guidance, so coverage should be validated through local telemetry, threat-informed testing, and incident response playbooks rather than assumed from tool ownership.

Technical view

ATT&CK does not specify platforms or tactics on the Naikon group object, but the relationships point defenders toward Windows-heavy tradecraft and discovery/persistence behaviors: PsExec, Net, Tasklist, Systeminfo, Ping, netsh, ftp, WMI, Scheduled Task, Domain Accounts, Office Add-ins, masquerading, and network/system discovery. Related Naikon malware includes RARSTONE, SslMM, WinMM, Sys10, HDoor, Aria-body, RainyDay, and Nebulae, all described in the supplied relationships as Windows malware/backdoors where platforms are specified. SOC and IR teams should validate correlation across endpoint process creation, Windows service/task changes, WMI activity, domain authentication, command-line use of built-in utilities, network scanning/discovery, FTP traffic, and malware/backdoor detections tied to the cited software relationships.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry for PsExec, Net, Tasklist, Systeminfo, Ping, netsh, ftp, schtasks/Task Scheduler, and WMI-related execution
  • Windows service creation/modification and remote administration events associated with PsExec-like behavior
  • Scheduled task creation, modification, and execution records
  • Active Directory/domain authentication logs, including unusual use of domain accounts across systems
  • WMI operational logs and remote WMI activity where collected

Detection direction

  • Because MITRE provides no official detection text for this group object, start with the related techniques and software rather than a single group-level analytic.
  • Tune for suspicious combinations: domain-account logon followed by discovery commands, WMI or PsExec remote execution, scheduled-task creation, service/task masquerading, and outbound transfer activity such as FTP.
  • Baseline legitimate administrator use of PsExec, Net, netsh, WMI, Task Scheduler, and system discovery tools; these are dual-use utilities and will create false positives without role, host, and maintenance-window context.
  • Review coverage for masqueraded task/service names and files placed to resemble legitimate resources, especially where endpoint logging records names but not full paths, hashes, parent processes, or signer metadata.
  • Validate whether Office add-in persistence is monitored; many environments inventory Office macros but miss COM/VSTO/XLL/WLL or Outlook add-in persistence paths.

Mitigation priorities

  • Harden and monitor domain accounts first: least privilege, privileged-access separation, strong authentication where applicable, and rapid review of unusual account use across hosts.
  • Restrict and audit remote administration pathways such as PsExec-style execution, WMI, SMB/admin shares, and scheduled-task based execution to known administrators and management systems.
  • Improve endpoint logging for process command lines, parent/child process relationships, service/task creation, file paths, hashes, and signer information.
  • Control persistence surfaces by auditing Windows services, scheduled tasks, and Office add-ins; remove unauthorized entries and require change control for administrative persistence mechanisms.
  • Limit unnecessary FTP use and monitor approved transfer channels, especially from sensitive networks or hosts handling government, diplomatic, military, or regulated information.
Additional notes and limits

The supplied ATT&CK description assesses Naikon as state-sponsored and attributed to the PLA Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, active since at least 2010, with reported targeting of government, military, civil, and international organizations in Southeast Asia. The strongest practical signal in the supplied data is the relationship set: Windows-oriented custom backdoors plus living-off-the-land utilities and techniques for discovery, remote execution, persistence, masquerading, and domain account abuse.

The Naikon group object has no official detection text, no group-level platforms or tactics, and the supplied relationship snippets are partial for some techniques. This take does not assert current activity, customer exposure, guaranteed detection, or complete Naikon tradecraft. Local asset criticality, identity architecture, logging depth, network controls, and regional mission exposure are required to determine actual risk and coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Naikon

Naikon is assessed to be a state-sponsored cyber espionage group attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020).[1] Active since at least 2010, Naikon has primarily conducted operations against government, military, and civil organizations in Southeast Asia, as well as against international bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).[1][2]

While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1078.002Domain AccountsSub-technique

Naikon has used administrator credentials for lateral movement in compromised networks.[4]

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

Naikon has used a netbios scanner for remote machine identification.[4]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Naikon has modified a victim's Windows Run registry to establish persistence.[4]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

Naikon uses commands such as netsh advfirewall firewall to discover local firewall settings.[2]

EnterpriseT1046Network Service Discovery

Naikon has used the LadonGo scanner to scan target networks.[4]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

Naikon has used WMIC.exe for lateral movement.[4]

EnterpriseT1137.006Add-insSub-technique

Naikon has used the RoyalRoad exploit builder to drop a second stage loader, intel.wll, into the Word Startup folder on the compromised host.[5]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Naikon uses commands such as netsh interface show to discover network interface settings.[2]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Naikon has disguised malicious programs as Google Chrome, Adobe, and VMware executables.[4]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Naikon has used malicious e-mail attachments to deliver malware.[5]

EnterpriseT1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique

Naikon renamed a malicious service taskmgr to appear to be a legitimate version of Task Manager.[4]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Naikon has used schtasks.exe for lateral movement in compromised networks.[4]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Naikon has convinced victims to open malicious attachments to execute malware.[5]

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

Naikon has used DLL side-loading to load malicious DLL's into legitimate executables.[5]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

ToolEnterprise

S0095: ftp

ftp is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data.[1][2]

LinuxWindowsmacOS
ToolEnterprise

S0039: Net

The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. [1]

Net has a great deal of functionality, [2] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through SMB/Windows Admin Shares using net use commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as net1 user.

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0097: Ping

Ping is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections. [1]

ToolEnterprise

S0108: netsh

netsh is a scripting utility used to interact with networking components on local or remote systems. [1]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · ToolS0095: ftpEnterpriseuses · ToolS0039: NetEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1078.002: Domain AccountsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1018: Remote System DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · ToolS0097: PingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1518.001: Security Software DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · ToolS0108: netshEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0059: WinMMEnterpriseuses · ToolS0096: SysteminfoEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1046: Network Service DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1047: Windows Management InstrumentationEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0629: RainyDayEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1137.006: Add-insEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0630: NebulaeEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0055: RARSTONEEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0061: HDoorEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.004: Masquerade Task or ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0060: Sys10Enterpriseuses · MalwareS0058: SslMMEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
f18c598ef368c82b...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.12.0Current bundlef18c598ef368…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    CameraShy

    ThreatConnect Inc. and Defense Group Inc. (DGI). (2015, September 23). Project CameraShy: Closing the Aperture on China's Unit 78020. Retrieved December 17, 2015.

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    Baumgartner Naikon 2015

    Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019.

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    Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015

    Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May 14). The Naikon APT. Retrieved January 14, 2015.

    Open source URL
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    Bitdefender Naikon April 2021

    Vrabie, V. (2021, April 23). NAIKON – Traces from a Military Cyber-Espionage Operation. Retrieved June 29, 2021.

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    CheckPoint. (2020, May 7). Naikon APT: Cyber Espionage Reloaded. Retrieved May 26, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May 14). The Naikon APT. Retrieved January 14, 2015.

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    (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)(Citation: CameraShy)(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)

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