S1124: SocGholish
SocGholish is a JavaScript-based loader malware that has been used since at least 2017. It has been observed in use against multiple sectors globally for initial access, primarily through drive-by-downloads masquerading as software updates. SocGholish is operated by Mustard Tempest and its access has been sold to groups including Indrik Spider for downloading secondary RAT and ransomware payloads.[1][2][3][4]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1124: SocGholish describes [SocGholish](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1124) is a JavaScript-based loader malware that has been used since at least 2017. It has been observed in use against multiple sectors globally for initial access, primarily through drive-by-downloads masquerading as software updates. SocGholish is operated by [Mustard Tempest](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1020) and its access has been sold to groups including [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) for downloading secondary RAT and ransomware payl...
Executive priority
S1124: SocGholish is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1124: SocGholish by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1124: SocGholish appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
SocGholish
SocGholish is a JavaScript-based loader malware that has been used since at least 2017. It has been observed in use against multiple sectors globally for initial access, primarily through drive-by-downloads masquerading as software updates. SocGholish is operated by Mustard Tempest and its access has been sold to groups including Indrik Spider for downloading secondary RAT and ransomware payloads.[1][2][3][4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | SocGholish has the ability to enumerate system information including the victim computer name.[2][3][4] |
| Enterprise | T1614 | System Location Discovery | SocGholish can use IP-based geolocation to limit infections to victims in North America, Europe, and a small number of Asian-Pacific nations.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | SocGholish has used WMI calls for script execution and system profiling.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | SocGholish can download additional malware to infected hosts.[3][4] |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | SocGholish has single or double Base-64 encoded references to its second-stage server URLs.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1482 | Domain Trust Discovery | SocGholish can profile compromised systems to identify domain trust relationships.[2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1059.007 | JavaScriptSub-technique | The SocGholish payload is executed as JavaScript.[2][1][3][4] |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | SocGholish has been named `AutoUpdater.js` to mimic legitimate update files.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1566.002 | Spearphishing LinkSub-technique | SocGholish has been spread via emails containing malicious links.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | SocGholish can use `whoami` to obtain the username from a compromised host.[2][3][4] |
| Enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | SocGholish has been distributed through compromised websites with malicious content often masquerading as browser updates.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1204.001 | Malicious LinkSub-technique | SocGholish has lured victims into interacting with malicious links on compromised websites for execution.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1518 | Software Discovery | SocGholish can identify the victim's browser in order to serve the correct fake update page.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | SocGholish can list processes on targeted hosts.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data StagingSub-technique | SocGholish can send output from `whoami` to a local temp file using the naming convention `rad<5-hex-chars>.tmp`.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1048.003 | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolSub-technique | SocGholish can exfiltrate data directly to its C2 domain via HTTP.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1102 | Web Service | SocGholish has used Amazon Web Services to host second-stage servers.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | SocGholish has the ability to enumerate the domain name of a victim, as well as if the host is a member of an Active Directory domain.[2][3][4] |
| Enterprise | T1027.015 | CompressionSub-technique | The SocGholish JavaScript payload has been delivered within a compressed ZIP archive.[3][4] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1020: Mustard Tempest
Mustard Tempest is an initial access broker that has operated the SocGholish distribution network since at least 2017. Mustard Tempest has partnered with Indrik Spider to provide access for the download of additional malware including LockBit, WastedLocker, and remote access tools.[1][2][3][4]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 8aa64baaedb0… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 8aa64baaedb0… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]SentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022
Milenkoski, A. (2022, November 7). SocGholish Diversifies and Expands Its Malware Staging Infrastructure to Counter Defenders. Retrieved March 22, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]SocGholish-update
Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]Red Canary SocGholish March 2024
Red Canary. (2024, March). Red Canary 2024 Threat Detection Report: SocGholish. Retrieved March 22, 2024.
Open source URL - [4]Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile
Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD PRELUDE . Retrieved March 22, 2024.
Open source URL - [5]FakeUpdates
(Citation: Red Canary SocGholish March 2024)
- [6]mitre-attackS1124Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.