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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0112: Windshift

Windshift is a threat group that has been active since at least 2017, targeting specific individuals for surveillance in government departments and critical infrastructure across the Middle East.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseG0112GroupObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0112: Windshift describes [Windshift](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0112) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2017, targeting specific individuals for surveillance in government departments and critical infrastructure across the Middle East.(Citation: SANS Windshift August 2018)(Citation: objective-see windtail1 dec 2018)(Citation: objective-see windtail2 jan 2019)

Executive priority

G0112: Windshift is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0112: Windshift by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0112: Windshift appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Windshift

Windshift is a threat group that has been active since at least 2017, targeting specific individuals for surveillance in government departments and critical infrastructure across the Middle East.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

19 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Windshift has used malware to enumerate active processes.CitationBlackBerry Bahamut

EnterpriseT1189Drive-by Compromise

Windshift has used compromised websites to register custom URL schemes on a remote system.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

Windshift has used Visual Basic 6 (VB6) payloads.CitationBlackBerry Bahamut

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

Windshift has used malware to identify installed AV and commonly used forensic and malware analysis tools.CitationBlackBerry Bahamut

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Windshift has sent spearphishing emails with attachment to harvest credentials and deliver malware.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

Windshift has used links embedded in e-mails to lure victims into executing malicious code.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceSub-technique

Windshift has used fake personas on social media to engage and target victims.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Windshift has created LNK files in the Startup folder to establish persistence.CitationBlackBerry Bahamut

EnterpriseT1518Software Discovery

Windshift has used malware to identify installed software.CitationBlackBerry Bahamut

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

Windshift has sent spearphishing emails with links to harvest credentials and deliver malware.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.001Invalid Code SignatureSub-technique

Windshift has used revoked certificates to sign malware.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

Windshift has used string encoding with floating point calculations.CitationBlackBerry Bahamut

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Windshift has used tools that communicate with C2 over HTTP.CitationBlackBerry Bahamut

EnterpriseT1036Masquerading

Windshift has used icons mimicking MS Office files to mask malicious executables.[2] Windshift has also attempted to hide executables by changing the file extension to ".scr" to mimic Windows screensavers.CitationBlackBerry Bahamut

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Windshift has used tools to deploy additional payloads to compromised hosts.CitationBlackBerry Bahamut

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

Windshift has used WMI to collect information about target machines.CitationBlackBerry Bahamut

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Windshift has used malware to identify the username on a compromised host.CitationBlackBerry Bahamut

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Windshift has used malware to identify the computer name of a compromised host.CitationBlackBerry Bahamut

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Windshift has used e-mail attachments to lure victims into executing malicious code.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1189: Drive-by CompromiseEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1518.001: Security Software DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.001: Malicious LinkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.003: Spearphishing via ServiceEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0466: WindTailEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1518: Software DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.002: Spearphishing LinkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.001: Invalid Code SignatureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036: MasqueradingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1047: Windows Management InstrumentationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
54e514c0c6ac9db0...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle54e514c0c6ac…
19.11.1Older bundledc022417c5a1…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    SANS Windshift August 2018

    Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    objective-see windtail1 dec 2018

    Wardle, Patrick. (2018, December 20). Middle East Cyber-Espionage analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail (part 1). Retrieved October 3, 2019.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    objective-see windtail2 jan 2019

    Wardle, Patrick. (2019, January 15). Middle East Cyber-Espionage analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail (part 2). Retrieved October 3, 2019.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Bahamut

    (Citation: SANS Windshift August 2018)

  5. [5]
    mitre-attackG0112
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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