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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0112: Windshift

Windshift is a threat group that has been active since at least 2017, targeting specific individuals for surveillance in government departments and critical infrastructure across the Middle East.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseG0112GroupObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Windshift is documented by ATT&CK as a surveillance-focused threat group active since at least 2017, targeting specific individuals in government departments and critical infrastructure across the Middle East. The business significance is not broad commodity compromise; it is targeted collection against people whose roles may expose sensitive policy, operational, or infrastructure information. Leaders should treat this as a reminder that executive, diplomatic, operational, and mobile-user security controls need evidence-based validation, not just perimeter coverage.

Executive priority

Prioritize questions around high-risk individuals and sensitive functions: who would be most damaging to surveil, what devices and accounts do they use, and can the organization prove monitoring coverage for endpoint, mobile, web, and identity-adjacent activity? Because ATT&CK links Windshift to surveillance tooling and discovery, user-execution, web command-and-control, and mobile collection behaviors, this object is useful for executive protection planning, incident-response readiness, compliance evidence around monitoring, and cyber-physical risk discussions for critical infrastructure personnel.

Technical view

ATT&CK does not provide a group-level detection section or group platforms, so defenders should validate coverage through the listed relationships. Windshift is linked to WindTail, a macOS surveillance implant, and to techniques covering drive-by compromise, malicious links/files, Visual Basic, WMI, discovery of users/processes/system/software/security tools, masquerading and invalid code signatures, web-protocol command and control, ingress tool transfer, and mobile surveillance behaviors such as runtime code download, keylogging, file/device discovery, audio capture, location tracking, and video capture. SOC and IR teams should test whether telemetry can connect initial user interaction, suspicious execution, discovery, network callbacks, payload transfer, and mobile permission abuse into a single investigation timeline.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process execution and command-line/activity logs for discovery behaviors such as user, process, system, software, and security-tool enumeration.
  • macOS endpoint telemetry, including application execution, file creation/modification, code-signing validation results, and suspicious masquerading indicators relevant to WindTail context.
  • Web proxy, DNS, firewall, and EDR network telemetry for unusual HTTP/S or web-protocol command-and-control patterns and external file transfers.
  • Email, browser, and web gateway evidence for malicious links, malicious files, and drive-by compromise investigation paths.
  • Windows telemetry for WMI activity where Windows systems are in scope of the related technique set.

Detection direction

  • Do not rely on a single indicator or malware name; validate behavior chains across user interaction, execution, discovery, masquerading, C2 over web protocols, and tool transfer.
  • For macOS coverage, confirm that invalid or suspicious code-signing states, misleading application names/locations, and surveillance-implant-like behaviors are visible to the SOC.
  • Tune discovery detections to account for legitimate administration and inventory tools; prioritize unusual parent processes, rare execution paths, sensitive-user devices, and sequences that combine discovery with outbound web traffic.
  • For mobile, validate whether the organization can detect or investigate excessive permissions, runtime code download, audio/video/location access, keylogging-like behavior, and suspicious file/device discovery; many environments have weaker mobile telemetry than endpoint telemetry.
  • Use relationship-driven context to build threat-informed hunts, but avoid assuming every listed technique will appear in every incident.

Mitigation priorities

  • Identify high-risk individuals in government, critical infrastructure, executive, legal, policy, or operational roles and apply enhanced endpoint, mobile, and account monitoring where appropriate.
  • Harden user-execution paths with secure email/web controls, attachment and link handling, browser protections, and user reporting workflows.
  • Strengthen macOS security baselines, including application control, code-signing validation, endpoint visibility, and rapid triage of suspicious applications or files.
  • Maintain endpoint and mobile patching, application inventory, and security-tool health monitoring so discovery and evasion attempts are more visible.
  • Control and monitor web egress and external file transfer paths, especially from sensitive-user devices.
Additional notes and limits

The most decision-useful aspect of this object is the surveillance and individual-targeting context. Windshift is also linked to WindTail, a macOS surveillance implant, which makes Apple endpoint visibility especially relevant where such devices are used by sensitive personnel. The listed mobile techniques broaden the defensive conversation to phones and tablets, where audio, video, location, keyboard, and runtime-code behaviors may be material but are often under-instrumented.

ATT&CK provides no official detection text, no group-level tactics, and no group-level platforms for this intrusion set. Platform and behavior guidance above is derived from the supplied relationships and related technique/software descriptions, not from a complete Windshift procedure list. Local asset mix, telemetry availability, legal constraints for mobile monitoring, and regional threat exposure must determine final prioritization.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Windshift

Windshift is a threat group that has been active since at least 2017, targeting specific individuals for surveillance in government departments and critical infrastructure across the Middle East.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

19 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Windshift has used malware to enumerate active processes.[4]

EnterpriseT1189Drive-by Compromise

Windshift has used compromised websites to register custom URL schemes on a remote system.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

Windshift has used Visual Basic 6 (VB6) payloads.[4]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

Windshift has used malware to identify installed AV and commonly used forensic and malware analysis tools.[4]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Windshift has sent spearphishing emails with attachment to harvest credentials and deliver malware.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

Windshift has used links embedded in e-mails to lure victims into executing malicious code.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceSub-technique

Windshift has used fake personas on social media to engage and target victims.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Windshift has created LNK files in the Startup folder to establish persistence.[4]

EnterpriseT1518Software Discovery

Windshift has used malware to identify installed software.[4]

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

Windshift has sent spearphishing emails with links to harvest credentials and deliver malware.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.001Invalid Code SignatureSub-technique

Windshift has used revoked certificates to sign malware.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

Windshift has used string encoding with floating point calculations.[4]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Windshift has used tools that communicate with C2 over HTTP.[4]

EnterpriseT1036Masquerading

Windshift has used icons mimicking MS Office files to mask malicious executables.[2] Windshift has also attempted to hide executables by changing the file extension to ".scr" to mimic Windows screensavers.[4]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Windshift has used tools to deploy additional payloads to compromised hosts.[4]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

Windshift has used WMI to collect information about target machines.[4]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Windshift has used malware to identify the username on a compromised host.[4]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Windshift has used malware to identify the computer name of a compromised host.[4]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Windshift has used e-mail attachments to lure victims into executing malicious code.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1189: Drive-by CompromiseEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1518.001: Security Software DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.001: Malicious LinkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.003: Spearphishing via ServiceEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0466: WindTailEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1518: Software DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.002: Spearphishing LinkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.001: Invalid Code SignatureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036: MasqueradingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1047: Windows Management InstrumentationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
dc022417c5a1ca81...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.1Current bundledc022417c5a1…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    SANS Windshift August 2018

    Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    objective-see windtail1 dec 2018

    Wardle, Patrick. (2018, December 20). Middle East Cyber-Espionage analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail (part 1). Retrieved October 3, 2019.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    objective-see windtail2 jan 2019

    Wardle, Patrick. (2019, January 15). Middle East Cyber-Espionage analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail (part 2). Retrieved October 3, 2019.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    BlackBerry Bahamut

    The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Bahamut

    (Citation: SANS Windshift August 2018)

  6. [6]
    Bahamut

    (Citation: SANS Windshift August 2018)

  7. [7]
    Bahamut

    (Citation: SANS Windshift August 2018)

  8. [8]
    SANS Windshift August 2018

    Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    SANS Windshift August 2018

    Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    mitre-attackG0112
    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    mitre-attackG0112
    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    mitre-attackG0112
    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    objective-see windtail1 dec 2018

    Wardle, Patrick. (2018, December 20). Middle East Cyber-Espionage analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail (part 1). Retrieved October 3, 2019.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    objective-see windtail1 dec 2018

    Wardle, Patrick. (2018, December 20). Middle East Cyber-Espionage analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail (part 1). Retrieved October 3, 2019.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    objective-see windtail2 jan 2019

    Wardle, Patrick. (2019, January 15). Middle East Cyber-Espionage analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail (part 2). Retrieved October 3, 2019.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    objective-see windtail2 jan 2019

    Wardle, Patrick. (2019, January 15). Middle East Cyber-Espionage analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail (part 2). Retrieved October 3, 2019.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    BlackBerry Bahamut

    The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    objective-see windtail1 dec 2018

    Wardle, Patrick. (2018, December 20). Middle East Cyber-Espionage analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail (part 1). Retrieved October 3, 2019.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    objective-see windtail1 dec 2018

    Wardle, Patrick. (2018, December 20). Middle East Cyber-Espionage analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail (part 1). Retrieved October 3, 2019.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    BlackBerry Bahamut

    The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    BlackBerry Bahamut

    The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    BlackBerry Bahamut

    The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    BlackBerry Bahamut

    The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    SANS Windshift August 2018

    Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    SANS Windshift August 2018

    Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    SANS Windshift August 2018

    Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    SANS Windshift August 2018

    Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    SANS Windshift August 2018

    Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    SANS Windshift August 2018

    Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    SANS Windshift August 2018

    Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    SANS Windshift August 2018

    Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    objective-see windtail1 dec 2018

    Wardle, Patrick. (2018, December 20). Middle East Cyber-Espionage analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail (part 1). Retrieved October 3, 2019.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    objective-see windtail1 dec 2018

    Wardle, Patrick. (2018, December 20). Middle East Cyber-Espionage analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail (part 1). Retrieved October 3, 2019.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    objective-see windtail2 jan 2019

    Wardle, Patrick. (2019, January 15). Middle East Cyber-Espionage analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail (part 2). Retrieved October 3, 2019.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    objective-see windtail2 jan 2019

    Wardle, Patrick. (2019, January 15). Middle East Cyber-Espionage analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail (part 2). Retrieved October 3, 2019.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    BlackBerry Bahamut

    The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    BlackBerry Bahamut

    The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    BlackBerry Bahamut

    The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    BlackBerry Bahamut

    The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    SANS Windshift August 2018

    Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    SANS Windshift August 2018

    Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    SANS Windshift August 2018

    Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    SANS Windshift August 2018

    Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    objective-see windtail1 dec 2018

    Wardle, Patrick. (2018, December 20). Middle East Cyber-Espionage analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail (part 1). Retrieved October 3, 2019.

    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    BlackBerry Bahamut

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    Open source URL
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    BlackBerry Bahamut

    The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    BlackBerry Bahamut

    The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    BlackBerry Bahamut

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    Open source URL
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    BlackBerry Bahamut

    The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    BlackBerry Bahamut

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    Open source URL
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    BlackBerry Bahamut

    The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    BlackBerry Bahamut

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    Open source URL
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    BlackBerry Bahamut

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    Open source URL
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    BlackBerry Bahamut

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    Open source URL
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    BlackBerry Bahamut

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    Open source URL
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    BlackBerry Bahamut

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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    SANS Windshift August 2018

    Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
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