S0363: Empire
Empire is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure PowerShell for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. Empire was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.[1][2][3]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0363: Empire describes [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely us...
Executive priority
S0363: Empire is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0363: Empire by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Linux, macOS, Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0363: Empire appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Empire
Empire is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure PowerShell for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. Empire was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.[1][2][3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1125 | Video Capture | |
| Enterprise | T1021.003 | Distributed Component Object ModelSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1557.001 | Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB RelaySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1482 | Domain Trust Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1056.001 | KeyloggingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027.010 | Command ObfuscationSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1136.001 | Local AccountSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | |
| Enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1552.001 | Credentials In FilesSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1560 | Archive Collected Data | |
| Enterprise | T1484.001 | Group Policy ModificationSub-technique | Empire can use |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1115 | Clipboard Data | |
| Enterprise | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | |
| Enterprise | T1020 | Automated Exfiltration | Empire has the ability to automatically send collected data back to the threat actors' C2.CitationTalos Frankenstein June 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1546.008 | Accessibility FeaturesSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1119 | Automated Collection | Empire can automatically gather the username, domain name, machine name, and other information from a compromised system.CitationTalos Frankenstein June 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1555.001 | KeychainSub-technique | Empire uses the command `/usr/bin/security dump-keychain -d` to read the keychain credential.CitationEmpire Keychain Decrypt |
| Enterprise | T1615 | Group Policy Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1087.002 | Domain AccountSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1547.005 | Security Support ProviderSub-technique | Empire can enumerate Security Support Providers (SSPs) as well as utilize PowerSploit's |
| Enterprise | T1021.004 | SSHSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1558.003 | KerberoastingSub-technique | Empire uses PowerSploit's |
| Enterprise | T1134.005 | SID-History InjectionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1574.009 | Path Interception by Unquoted PathSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1135 | Network Share Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1574.008 | Path Interception by Search Order HijackingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1558.001 | Golden TicketSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1569.002 | Service ExecutionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1567.001 | Exfiltration to Code RepositorySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1056.004 | Credential API HookingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1574.007 | Path Interception by PATH Environment VariableSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | |
| Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | |
| Enterprise | T1550.002 | Pass the HashSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1217 | Browser Information Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1127.001 | MSBuildSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1552.004 | Private KeysSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1567.002 | Exfiltration to Cloud StorageSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | Empire can use PowerSploit's |
| Enterprise | T1040 | Network Sniffing | |
| Enterprise | T1114.001 | Local Email CollectionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1102.002 | Bidirectional CommunicationSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1555.003 | Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1087.001 | Local AccountSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1574.004 | Dylib HijackingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1049 | System Network Connections Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1003.001 | LSASS MemorySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1573.002 | Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1134.002 | Create Process with TokenSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0119: Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider is a Russia-based cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2014. Indrik Spider initially started with the Dridex banking Trojan, and then by 2017 they began running ransomware operations using BitPaymer, WastedLocker, and Hades ransomware. Following U.S. sanctions and an indictment in 2019, Indrik Spider changed their tactics and diversified their toolset.[1][2][3]
G0096: APT41
APT41 is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, APT41 has been observed targeting various industries, including but not limited to healthcare, telecom, technology, finance, education, retail and video game industries in 14 countries.[1] Notable behaviors include using a wide range of malware and tools to complete mission objectives. APT41 overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and Winnti Group.[2][3]
G0069: MuddyWater
MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East (specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia), Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. MuddyWater has reused domains dating back to October 2025, and has a preference for NameCheap and Hosterdaddy Private Limited (AS136557). In late 2025 and early 2026, MuddyWater used commercial satellite internet (i.e., Starlink) for command and control (C2) communication. [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
G0034: Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]
In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]
G0065: Leviathan
Leviathan is a Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attributed to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan State Security Department and an affiliated front company.[1] Active since at least 2009, Leviathan has targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime, and transportation across the US, Canada, Australia, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.[1][2][3][4]
G0010: Turla
Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.[1][2][3][4][5]
G0140: LazyScripter
LazyScripter is threat group that has mainly targeted the airlines industry since at least 2018, primarily using open-source toolsets.[1]
G0091: Silence
Silence is a financially motivated threat actor targeting financial institutions in different countries. The group was first seen in June 2016. Their main targets reside in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Poland and Kazakhstan. They compromised various banking systems, including the Russian Central Bank's Automated Workstation Client, ATMs, and card processing.[1][2]
G0052: CopyKittens
CopyKittens is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2013. It has targeted countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S., Jordan, and Germany. The group is responsible for the campaign known as Operation Wilted Tulip.[1][2][3]
G0102: Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of TrickBot since at least 2016. Wizard Spider possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.[1][2][3]
G1040: Play
Play is a ransomware group that has been active since at least 2022 deploying Playcrypt ransomware against the business, government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, and media sectors in North America, South America, and Europe. Play actors employ a double-extortion model, encrypting systems after exfiltrating data, and are presumed by security researchers to operate as a closed group.[1][2]
G1001: HEXANE
HEXANE is a cyber espionage threat group that has targeted oil & gas, telecommunications, aviation, and internet service provider organizations since at least 2017. Targeted companies have been located in the Middle East and Africa, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, and Tunisia. HEXANE's TTPs appear similar to APT33 and OilRig but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as a separate entity.[1][2][3][4]
C0001: Frankenstein
Frankenstein was described by security researchers as a highly-targeted campaign conducted by moderately sophisticated and highly resourceful threat actors in early 2019. The unidentified actors primarily relied on open source tools, including Empire. The campaign name refers to the actors' ability to piece together several unrelated open-source tool components.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.8 | Current bundle | f6ddcf771a4e… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.8 | Older bundle | f6ddcf771a4e… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]NCSC Joint Report Public Tools
The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NZ NCSC), CERT New Zealand, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (UK NCSC) and the US National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). (2018, October 11). Joint report on publicly available hacking tools. Retrieved March 11, 2019.
Open source URL - [2]Github PowerShell Empire
Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
Open source URL - [3]GitHub ATTACK Empire
Stepanic, D. (2018, September 2). attck_empire: Generate ATT&CK Navigator layer file from PowerShell Empire agent logs. Retrieved March 11, 2019.
Open source URL - [4]EmPyre
(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)
- [5]PowerShell Empire
(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)
- [6]mitre-attackS0363Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
