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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0032: Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]

North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]

EnterpriseG0032GroupObject v5.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0032: Lazarus Group describes [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) (Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbust...

Executive priority

G0032: Lazarus Group is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0032: Lazarus Group by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0032: Lazarus Group appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]

North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

64 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Lazarus Group malware uses cmd.exe to execute commands on a compromised host.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster Destructive MalwareCitationMcAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018CitationUS-CERT SHARPKNOT June 2018CitationQualys LolZarus A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group uses a batch file mechanism to delete its binaries from the system.CitationMcAfee GhostSecret

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Lazarus Group has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.CitationMcAfee BankshotCitationKaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021CitationLazarus APT January 2022CitationQualys LolZarus

EnterpriseT1202Indirect Command Execution

Lazarus Group persistence mechanisms have used forfiles.exe to execute .htm files.CitationQualys LolZarus

EnterpriseT1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolSub-technique

Lazarus Group malware SierraBravo-Two generates an email message via SMTP containing information about newly infected victims.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster RATs

EnterpriseT1001.003Protocol or Service ImpersonationSub-technique

Lazarus Group malware also uses a unique form of communication encryption known as FakeTLS that mimics TLS but uses a different encryption method, potentially evading SSL traffic inspection/decryption.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster Destructive MalwareCitationMcAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018CitationMcAfee-GhostSecret-fixurl

EnterpriseT1584.004ServerSub-technique

Lazarus Group has compromised servers to stage malicious tools.CitationKaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Lazarus Group has downloaded files, malware, and tools from its C2 onto a compromised host.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster Destructive MalwareCitationNovetta Blockbuster LoadersCitationSentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020CitationTrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020CitationKaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021CitationGoogle TAG Lazarus Jan 2021CitationLazarus APT January 2022CitationQualys LolZarusCitationESET Twitter Ida Pro Nov 2021

EnterpriseT1218.005MshtaSub-technique

Lazarus Group has used mshta.exe to execute HTML pages downloaded by initial access documents.CitationLazarus APT January 2022CitationQualys LolZarus

EnterpriseT1010Application Window Discovery

Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia obtains and sends to its C2 server the title of the window for each running process. The KilaAlfa keylogger also reports the title of the window in the foreground.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster LoadersCitationNovetta Blockbuster Tools

EnterpriseT1587.001MalwareSub-technique

Lazarus Group has developed custom malware for use in their operations.CitationCISA AppleJeus Feb 2021CitationGoogle TAG Lazarus Jan 2021

EnterpriseT1134.002Create Process with TokenSub-technique

Lazarus Group keylogger KiloAlfa obtains user tokens from interactive sessions to execute itself with API call CreateProcessAsUserA under that user's context.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster Tools

EnterpriseT1021.004SSHSub-technique

Lazarus Group used SSH and the PuTTy PSCP utility to gain access to a restricted segment of a compromised network.CitationKaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021

EnterpriseT1098Account Manipulation

Lazarus Group malware WhiskeyDelta-Two contains a function that attempts to rename the administrator’s account.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware

EnterpriseT1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique

Lazarus Group has used a VBA Macro to set its file attributes to System and Hidden and has named files with a dot prefix to hide them from the Finder application.CitationMcAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018CitationSentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020CitationTrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020CitationLazarus APT January 2022

EnterpriseT1485Data Destruction

Lazarus Group has used a custom secure delete function to overwrite file contents with data from heap memory.[3]

EnterpriseT1591Gather Victim Org Information

Lazarus Group has studied publicly available information about a targeted organization to tailor spearphishing efforts against specific departments and/or individuals.CitationKaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Lazarus Group has used the Windows API ObtainUserAgentString to obtain the User-Agent from a compromised host to connect to a C2 server.CitationMcAfee Lazarus Jul 2020 Lazarus Group has also used various, often lesser known, functions to perform various types of Discovery and Process Injection.CitationLazarus APT January 2022CitationQualys LolZarus

EnterpriseT1078Valid Accounts

Lazarus Group has used administrator credentials to gain access to restricted network segments.CitationKaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021

EnterpriseT1027.009Embedded PayloadsSub-technique

Lazarus Group has distributed malicious payloads embedded in PNG files.CitationMicrosoft DiamondSleet 2023

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia checks Registry keys within HKCU and HKLM to determine if certain applications are present, including SecureCRT, Terminal Services, RealVNC, TightVNC, UltraVNC, Radmin, mRemote, TeamViewer, FileZilla, pcAnyware, and Remote Desktop. Another Lazarus Group malware sample checks for the presence of the following Registry key:HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Bitcoin\Bitcoin-Qt.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster LoadersCitationMcAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018

EnterpriseT1090.002External ProxySub-technique

Lazarus Group has used multiple proxies to obfuscate network traffic from victims.CitationUS-CERT FALLCHILL Nov 2017CitationTrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Lazarus Group has used multiple types of encryption and encoding for their payloads, including AES, Caracachs, RC4, XOR, Base64, and other tricks such as creating aliases in code for Native API function names.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster LoadersCitationNovetta Blockbuster RATsCitationMcAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018CitationTrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020CitationLazarus APT January 2022CitationQualys LolZarus

EnterpriseT1104Multi-Stage Channels

Lazarus Group has used multi-stage malware components that inject later stages into separate processes.CitationLazarus APT January 2022

EnterpriseT1046Network Service Discovery

Lazarus Group has used nmap from a router VM to scan ports on systems within the restricted segment of an enterprise network.CitationKaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

Lazarus Group has collected data and files from compromised networks.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster LoadersCitationNovetta Blockbuster RATsCitationKaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021

EnterpriseT1489Service Stop

Lazarus Group has stopped the MSExchangeIS service to render Exchange contents inaccessible to users.CitationNovetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia obtains and sends to its C2 server information about the first network interface card’s configuration, including IP address, gateways, subnet mask, DHCP information, and whether WINS is available.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster Loaders

EnterpriseT1588.004Digital CertificatesSub-technique

Lazarus Group has obtained SSL certificates for their C2 domains.CitationCISA AppleJeus Feb 2021

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Several Lazarus Group malware families encrypt C2 traffic using custom code that uses XOR with an ADD operation and XOR with a SUB operation. Another Lazarus Group malware sample XORs C2 traffic. Other Lazarus Group malware uses Caracachs encryption to encrypt C2 payloads. Lazarus Group has also used AES to encrypt C2 traffic.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster Destructive MalwareCitationMcAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018CitationMcAfee GhostSecret

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Several Lazarus Group malware families collect information on the type and version of the victim OS, as well as the victim computer name and CPU information.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster Destructive MalwareCitationNovetta Blockbuster LoadersCitationMcAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018CitationMcAfee GhostSecretCitationLazarus APT January 2022

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Various Lazarus Group malware enumerates logged-on users.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster Destructive MalwareCitationNovetta Blockbuster LoadersCitationNovetta Blockbuster RATsCitationMcAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018CitationSentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020CitationLazarus APT January 2022

EnterpriseT1620Reflective Code Loading

Lazarus Group has changed memory protection permissions then overwritten in memory DLL function code with shellcode, which was later executed via KernelCallbackTable hijacking. Lazarus Group has also used shellcode within macros to decrypt and manually map DLLs into memory at runtime.CitationLazarus APT January 2022CitationQualys LolZarus

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Lazarus Group has exfiltrated data and files over a C2 channel through its various tools and malware.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster LoadersCitationMcAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018

EnterpriseT1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationSub-technique

Lazarus Group has used GitHub as C2, pulling hosted image payloads then committing command execution output to files in specific directories.CitationLazarus APT January 2022

EnterpriseT1560Archive Collected Data

Lazarus Group has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR and used RomeoDelta malware to archive specified directories in .zip format, encrypt the .zip file, and upload it to C2. CitationNovetta Blockbuster LoadersCitationNovetta Blockbuster RATsCitationMcAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018

EnterpriseT1203Exploitation for Client Execution

Lazarus Group has exploited Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2018-4878 for execution.CitationMcAfee Bankshot

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

Lazarus Group has used PowerShell to execute commands and malicious code.CitationGoogle TAG Lazarus Jan 2021

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

Lazarus Group has sent malicious links to victims via email.CitationKaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is saved in the %TEMP% directory, then compressed, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster Loaders

EnterpriseT1036.003Rename Legitimate UtilitiesSub-technique

Lazarus Group has renamed system utilities such as wscript.exe and mshta.exe.CitationQualys LolZarus

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

Lazarus Group has used WMIC for discovery as well as to execute payloads for persistence and lateral movement.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster RATsCitationKaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021CitationQualys LolZarus

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Lazarus Group has conducted C2 over HTTP and HTTPS.CitationMcAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018CitationSentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020CitationTrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020CitationLazarus APT January 2022CitationQualys LolZarusCitationESET Twitter Ida Pro Nov 2021

EnterpriseT1557.001Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB RelaySub-technique

Lazarus Group executed Responder using the command [Responder file path] -i [IP address] -rPv on a compromised host to harvest credentials and move laterally.CitationKaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Several Lazarus Group malware families gather a list of running processes on a victim system and send it to their C2 server. A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group also gathers process times.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster LoadersCitationMcAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018CitationMcAfee GhostSecretCitationTrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020CitationLazarus APT January 2022

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Lazarus Group has maintained persistence by loading malicious code into a startup folder or by adding a Registry Run key.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster RATsCitationMcAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018CitationLazarus APT January 2022

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

Lazarus Group malware TangoDelta attempts to terminate various processes associated with McAfee. Additionally, Lazarus Group malware SHARPKNOT disables the Microsoft Windows System Event Notification and Alerter services.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster LoadersCitationNovetta Blockbuster ToolsCitationUS-CERT SHARPKNOT June 2018.

EnterpriseT1589.002Email AddressesSub-technique

Lazarus Group collected email addresses belonging to various departments of a targeted organization which were used in follow-on phishing campaigns.CitationKaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021

EnterpriseT1561.001Disk Content WipeSub-technique

Lazarus Group has used malware like WhiskeyAlfa to overwrite the first 64MB of every drive with a mix of static and random buffers. A similar process is then used to wipe content in logical drives and, finally, attempt to wipe every byte of every sector on every drive. WhiskeyBravo can be used to overwrite the first 4.9MB of physical drives. WhiskeyDelta can overwrite the first 132MB or 1.5MB of each drive with random data from heap memory.CitationNovetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware

EnterpriseT1491.001Internal DefacementSub-technique

Lazarus Group replaced the background wallpaper of systems with a threatening image after rendering the system unbootable with a Disk Structure Wipe.CitationNovetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

Lazarus Group has obtained a variety of tools for their operations, including Responder and PuTTy PSCP.CitationKaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021

EnterpriseT1547.009Shortcut ModificationSub-technique

Lazarus Group malware has maintained persistence on a system by creating a LNK shortcut in the user’s Startup folder.CitationMcAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

Lazarus Group has used VBA and embedded macros in Word documents to execute malicious code.CitationLazarus APT January 2022CitationQualys LolZarus

EnterpriseT1542.003BootkitSub-technique

Lazarus Group malware WhiskeyAlfa-Three modifies sector 0 of the Master Boot Record (MBR) to ensure that the malware will persist even if a victim machine shuts down.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

Lazarus Group has used rundll32 to execute malicious payloads on a compromised host.CitationESET Twitter Ida Pro Nov 2021

EnterpriseT1583.006Web ServicesSub-technique

Lazarus Group has hosted malicious downloads on Github.CitationCISA AppleJeus Feb 2021

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

Lazarus Group malware KiloAlfa contains keylogging functionality.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster Tools

EnterpriseT1571Non-Standard Port

Some Lazarus Group malware uses a list of ordered port numbers to choose a port for C2 traffic, creating port-protocol mismatches.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster RATs

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

A Lazarus Group malware sample encodes data with base64.CitationMcAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018

EnterpriseT1189Drive-by Compromise

Lazarus Group delivered RATANKBA and other malicious code to victims via a compromised legitimate website.CitationRATANKBACitationGoogle TAG Lazarus Jan 2021

EnterpriseT1110.003Password SprayingSub-technique

Lazarus Group malware attempts to connect to Windows shares for lateral movement by using a generated list of usernames, which center around permutations of the username Administrator, and weak passwords.[3]CitationNovetta Blockbuster RATs

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Lazarus Group has attempted to get users to launch a malicious Microsoft Word attachment delivered via a spearphishing email.CitationMcAfee BankshotCitationKaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021CitationLazarus APT January 2022CitationQualys LolZarus

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

Lazarus Group has digitally signed malware and utilities to evade detection.CitationLazarus APT January 2022

EnterpriseT1218System Binary Proxy Execution

Lazarus Group lnk files used for persistence have abused the Windows Update Client (wuauclt.exe) to execute a malicious DLL.CitationLazarus APT January 2022CitationQualys LolZarus

EnterpriseT1560.002Archive via LibrarySub-technique

Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is compressed with Zlib, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.CitationNovetta Blockbuster RATsCitationMcAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

ToolEnterprise

S0364: RawDisk

RawDisk is a legitimate commercial driver from the EldoS Corporation that is used for interacting with files, disks, and partitions. The driver allows for direct modification of data on a local computer's hard drive. In some cases, the tool can enact these raw disk modifications from user-mode processes, circumventing Windows operating system security features.[1][2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0238: Proxysvc

Proxysvc is a malicious DLL used by Lazarus Group in a campaign known as Operation GhostSecret. It has appeared to be operating undetected since 2017 and was mostly observed in higher education organizations. The goal of Proxysvc is to deliver additional payloads to the target and to maintain control for the attacker. It is in the form of a DLL that can also be executed as a standalone process. [1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0181: FALLCHILL

FALLCHILL is a RAT that has been used by Lazarus Group since at least 2016 to target the aerospace, telecommunications, and finance industries. It is usually dropped by other Lazarus Group malware or delivered when a victim unknowingly visits a compromised website. [1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0366: WannaCry

WannaCry is ransomware that was first seen in a global attack during May 2017, which affected more than 150 countries. It contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploit EternalBlue.[1][2][3][4]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S1182: MagicRAT

MagicRAT is a remote access tool developed in C++ and exclusively used by the Lazarus Group threat actor in operations. MagicRAT allows for arbitrary command execution on victim machines and provides basic remote access functionality.[1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0567: Dtrack

Dtrack is spyware that was discovered in 2019 and has been used against Indian financial institutions, research facilities, and the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant. Dtrack shares similarities with the DarkSeoul campaign, which was attributed to Lazarus Group. [1][2][3][4][5]

Windows
CampaignEnterprise

C0022: Operation Dream Job

Operation Dream Job was a cyber espionage operation likely conducted by Lazarus Group that targeted the defense, aerospace, government, and other sectors in the United States, Israel, Australia, Russia, and India. In at least one case, the cyber actors tried to monetize their network access to conduct a business email compromise (BEC) operation. In 2020, security researchers noted overlapping TTPs, to include fake job lures and code similarities, between Operation Dream Job, Operation North Star, and Operation Interception; by 2022 security researchers described Operation Dream Job as an umbrella term covering both Operation Interception and Operation North Star.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
5.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
be6d182f08eebd85...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.25.0Current bundlebe6d182f08ee…
19.15.0Older bundlefe9e411a7ca5…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017

    US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019

    US Treasury . (2019, September 13). Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups. Retrieved September 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Novetta Blockbuster

    Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Mandiant DPRK Laz Org Breakdown 2022

    Michael Barnhart, Michelle Cantos, Jeffery Johnson, Elias fox, Gary Freas, Dan Scott. (2022, March 23). Not So Lazarus: Mapping DPRK Cyber Threat Groups to Government Organizations. Retrieved September 9, 2025.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Mandiant DPRK Groups 2023

    Michael Barnhart, Austin Larsen, Jeff Johnson, Taylor Long, Michelle Cantos, Adrian Hernandez. (2023, October 10). Assessed Cyber Structure and Alignments of North Korea in 2023. Retrieved August 25, 2025.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    JPCert Blog Laz Subgroups 2025

    佐々木勇人 Hayato Sasaki. (2025, March 25). Tempted to Classifying APT Actors: Practical Challenges of Attribution in the Case of Lazarus’s Subgroup. Retrieved August 25, 2025.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019

    US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    CrowdStrike Labyrinth Chollima Feb 2022

    CrowdStrike. (2022, February 1). CrowdStrike Adversary Labyrinth Chollima. Retrieved February 1, 2022.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Diamond Sleet

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  10. [10]
    Guardians of Peace

    (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)

  11. [11]
    HIDDEN COBRA

    The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019)

  12. [12]
    Labyrinth Chollima

    (Citation: CrowdStrike Labyrinth Chollima Feb 2022)

  13. [13]
    Lazarus Group

    (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)

  14. [14]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017

    Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    NICKEL ACADEMY

    (Citation: Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017)

  17. [17]
    Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017

    Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    ZINC

    (Citation: Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017)

  19. [19]
    mitre-attackG0032
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.