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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1130: Raspberry Robin

Raspberry Robin is initial access malware first identified in September 2021, and active through early 2024. The malware is notable for spreading via infected USB devices containing a malicious LNK object that, on execution, retrieves remote hosted payloads for installation. Raspberry Robin has been widely used against various industries and geographies, and as a precursor to information stealer, ransomware, and other payloads such as SocGholish, Cobalt Strike, IcedID, and Bumblebee.[1][2][3] The DLL componenet in the Raspberry Robin infection chain is also referred to as "Roshtyak."[4] The name "Raspberry Robin" is used to refer to both the malware as well as the threat actor associated with its use, although the Raspberry Robin operators are also tracked as Storm-0856 by some vendors.[5]

EnterpriseS1130MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1130: Raspberry Robin describes [Raspberry Robin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1130) is initial access malware first identified in September 2021, and active through early 2024. The malware is notable for spreading via infected USB devices containing a malicious LNK object that, on execution, retrieves remote hosted payloads for installation. [Raspberry Robin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1130) has been widely used against various industries and geographies, and as a precursor to information stealer, ransomware, and other payloads suc...

Executive priority

S1130: Raspberry Robin is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1130: Raspberry Robin by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1130: Raspberry Robin appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Raspberry Robin

Raspberry Robin is initial access malware first identified in September 2021, and active through early 2024. The malware is notable for spreading via infected USB devices containing a malicious LNK object that, on execution, retrieves remote hosted payloads for installation. Raspberry Robin has been widely used against various industries and geographies, and as a precursor to information stealer, ransomware, and other payloads such as SocGholish, Cobalt Strike, IcedID, and Bumblebee.[1][2][3] The DLL componenet in the Raspberry Robin infection chain is also referred to as "Roshtyak."[4] The name "Raspberry Robin" is used to refer to both the malware as well as the threat actor associated with its use, although the Raspberry Robin operators are also tracked as Storm-0856 by some vendors.[5]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

41 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

Raspberry Robin attempts to identify security software running on the victim machine, such as BitDefender, Avast, and Kaspersky.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

Raspberry Robin can add an exception to Microsoft Defender that excludes the entire main drive from anti-malware scanning to evade detection.[3]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Raspberry Robin performs several system checks as part of anti-analysis mechanisms, including querying the operating system build number, processor vendor and type, video controller, and CPU temperature.[3]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

Raspberry Robin contains multiple payloads that are packed for defense evasion purposes and unpacked on runtime.[1]

EnterpriseT1102Web Service

Raspberry Robin second stage payloads can be hosted as RAR files, containing a malicious EXE and DLL, on Discord servers.[3]

EnterpriseT1480Execution Guardrails

Raspberry Robin will check for the presence of several security products on victim machines and will avoid UAC bypass mechanisms if they are identified.[1] Raspberry Robin can use specific cookie values in HTTP requests to command and control infrastructure to validate that requests for second stage payloads originate from the initial downloader script.[3]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Raspberry Robin will use a Registry key to achieve persistence through reboot, setting a RunOnce key such as: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce {random value name} = “rundll32 shell32 ShellExec_RunDLLA REGSVR /u /s “{dropped copy path and file name}”” .[1]

EnterpriseT1559Inter-Process Communication

Raspberry Robin contains an embedded custom Tor network client that communicates with the primary payload via shared process memory.[1]

EnterpriseT1571Non-Standard Port

Raspberry Robin will communicate via HTTP over port 8080 for command and control traffic.[2]

EnterpriseT1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Raspberry Robin contains real and fake second-stage payloads following initial execution, with the real payload only delivered if the malware determines it is not running in a virtualized environment.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique

Raspberry Robin will execute its payload prior to initializing command and control traffic by impersonating one of several legitimate program names such as dllhost.exe, regsvr32.exe, or rundll32.exe.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.010Regsvr32Sub-technique

Raspberry Robin uses regsvr32.exe execution without any command line parameters for command and control requests to IP addresses associated with Tor nodes.[2]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Raspberry Robin determines whether it is successfully running on a victim system by querying the running account information to determine if it is running in Session 0, indicating running with elevated privileges.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Raspberry Robin retrieves its second stage payload in a variety of ways such as through msiexec.exe abuse, or running the curl command to download the payload to the victim's %AppData% folder.[3][2]

EnterpriseT1574Hijack Execution Flow

Raspberry Robin will drop a copy of itself to a subfolder in %Program Data% or %Program Data%\\Microsoft\\ to attempt privilege elevation and defense evasion if not running in Session 0.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.008Masquerade File TypeSub-technique

Raspberry Robin has historically been delivered via infected USB drives containing a malicious LNK object masquerading as a legitimate folder.[2]

EnterpriseT1091Replication Through Removable Media

Raspberry Robin has historically used infected USB media to spread to new victims.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Raspberry Robin uses outbound HTTP requests containing victim information for retrieving second stage payloads.[2] Variants of Raspberry Robin can download archive files (such as 7-Zip files) via the victim web browser for second stage execution.[3]

EnterpriseT1055.012Process HollowingSub-technique

Raspberry Robin will execute a legitimate process, then suspend it to inject code for a Tor client into the process, followed by resumption of the process to enable Tor client execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1583.001DomainsSub-technique

Raspberry Robin uses newly-registered domains containing only a few characters for command and controll purposes, such as "v0[.]cx".[2]

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

Raspberry Robin can use legitimate, signed EXE files paired with malicious DLL files to load and run malicious payloads while bypassing defenses.[3]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Raspberry Robin can identify processes running on the victim machine, such as security software, during execution.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

Raspberry Robin can execute via LNK containing a command to run a legitimate executable, such as wmic.exe, to download a malicious Windows Installer (MSI) package.[1]

EnterpriseT1559.001Component Object ModelSub-technique

Raspberry Robin creates an elevated COM object for CMLuaUtil and uses this to set a registry value that points to the malicious LNK file during execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Raspberry Robin will check to see if the initial executing script is located on the user's Desktop as an anti-analysis check.[3]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Raspberry Robin uses cmd.exe to read and execute a file stored on an infected USB device as part of initial installation.[2]

EnterpriseT1218.008OdbcconfSub-technique

Raspberry Robin uses the Windows utility odbcconf.exe to execute malicious commands, using the regsvr flag to execute DLLs and bypass application control mechanisms that are not monitoring for odbcconf.exe abuse.[2]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

Raspberry Robin uses rundll32 execution without any command line parameters to contact command and control infrastructure, such as IP addresses associated with Tor nodes.[2]

EnterpriseT1548Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism

Raspberry Robin implements a variation of the ucmDccwCOMMethod technique abusing the Windows AutoElevate backdoor to bypass UAC while elevating privileges.[1]

EnterpriseT1204User Execution

Raspberry Robin execution can rely on users directly interacting with malicious LNK files.[5]

EnterpriseT1622Debugger Evasion

Raspberry Robin leverages anti-debugging mechanisms through the use of ThreadHideFromDebugger.[1]

EnterpriseT1583.008MalvertisingSub-technique

Raspberry Robin variants have been delivered via malicious advertising items that, when interacted with, download a malicious archive file containing the initial payload, hosted on services such as Discord.[3]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Raspberry Robin can delete its initial delivery script from disk during execution.[3]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Raspberry Robin contains several layers of obfuscation to hide malicious code from detection and analysis.[1]

EnterpriseT1497.001System ChecksSub-technique

Raspberry Robin performs a variety of system environment checks to determine if it is running in a virtualized or sandboxed environment, such as querying CPU temperature information and network card MAC address information.[3]

EnterpriseT1070.009Clear PersistenceSub-technique

Raspberry Robin uses a RunOnce Registry key for persistence, where the key is removed after its use on reboot then re-added by the malware after it resumes execution.[5]

EnterpriseT1071Application Layer Protocol

Raspberry Robin is capable of contacting the TOR network for delivering second-stage payloads.[2][1][3]

EnterpriseT1548.002Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique

Raspberry Robin will use the legitimate Windows utility fodhelper.exe to run processes at elevated privileges without requiring a User Account Control prompt.[2]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

Raspberry Robin uses mixed-case letters for filenames and commands to evade detection.[2]

EnterpriseT1218.007MsiexecSub-technique

Raspberry Robin uses msiexec.exe for post-installation communication to command and control infrastructure.[2] Msiexec.exe is executed referencing a remote resource for second-stage payload retrieval and execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1059Command and Scripting Interpreter

Raspberry Robin variants can be delivered via highly obfuscated Windows Script Files (WSF) for initial execution.[3]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
e206131517da85cb...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundlee206131517da…
19.11.0Older bundlee206131517da…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    TrendMicro RaspberryRobin 2022

    Christopher So. (2022, December 20). Raspberry Robin Malware Targets Telecom, Governments. Retrieved May 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    RedCanary RaspberryRobin 2022

    Lauren Podber and Stef Rand. (2022, May 5). Raspberry Robin gets the worm early. Retrieved May 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    HP RaspberryRobin 2024

    Patrick Schläpfer . (2024, April 10). Raspberry Robin Now Spreading Through Windows Script Files. Retrieved May 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Avast RaspberryRobin 2022

    Jan Vojtěšek. (2022, September 22). Raspberry Robin’s Roshtyak: A Little Lesson in Trickery. Retrieved May 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Microsoft RaspberryRobin 2022

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2022, October 27). Raspberry Robin worm part of larger ecosystem facilitating pre-ransomware activity. Retrieved May 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    mitre-attackS1130
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.