S9033: Fooder

Fooder is a custom 64-bit C/C++ loader used by MuddyWater that can decrypt and reflectively load embedded payloads such as a go-socks5 proxy utility, the open-source HackBrowserData infostealer, or the MuddyViper backdoor. Fooder has frequently masqueraded as an entertainment executable, such as the Snake game (e.g., `Snake_Game.exe`).[1]

EnterpriseS9033MalwareObject v1.0ModifiedApr 23, 2026, 03:31 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S9033: Fooder describes [Fooder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9033) is a custom 64-bit C/C++ loader used by [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) that can decrypt and reflectively load embedded payloads such as a go-socks5 proxy utility, the open-source HackBrowserData infostealer, or the [MuddyViper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9032) backdoor. [Fooder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9033) has frequently masqueraded as an entertainment executable, such as the Snake game (e.g., `Snake_Game.exe`).(Citation: ES...

Executive priority

S9033: Fooder is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S9033: Fooder by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S9033: Fooder appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Fooder

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques7 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1027	Obfuscated Files or Information	Fooder has stored its embedded payload in encrypted form within the binary, using a hardcoded key modified at runtime to produce the AES decryption key.[1]
Enterprise	T1134.001	Token Impersonation/TheftSub-technique	Fooder has used the `DuplicateTokenEx` API to duplicate the token of a specified process, and `CreateProcessAsUserA` to execute its payload.[1]
Enterprise	T1106	Native API	Fooder has used the WinCrypt API for payload decryption, `DuplicateTokenEx` to duplicate the token of a specified process, and `CreateProcessAsUserA` for payload execution.[1]
Enterprise	T1620	Reflective Code Loading	Fooder has reflectively loaded a payload into memory.[1]
Enterprise	T1036.005	Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique	Fooder has frequently masqueraded as the Snake game, using strings such as “Welcome to snake Game” and mutexes such as “SNAKE_G.”[1]
Enterprise	T1678	Delay Execution	Fooder has used a custom delay function (`delayExecution(integer)`) and Sleep API calls (`Sleep(integer)`) to slow code execution.[1]
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Fooder has decrypted payloads using the WinCrypt API and the AES key.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0069: MuddyWater

MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East (specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia), Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. MuddyWater has reused domains dating back to October 2025, and has a preference for NameCheap and Hosterdaddy Private Limited (AS136557). In late 2025 and early 2026, MuddyWater used commercial satellite internet (i.e., Starlink) for command and control (C2) communication. [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0069: MuddyWaterEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1134.001: Token Impersonation/TheftEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1620: Reflective Code LoadingEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1678: Delay ExecutionEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterprise

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.0
Created: Apr 20, 2026, 21:28 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 23, 2026, 03:31 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: b79bf2b6ed372fad...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 23, 2026, 03:31 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`b79bf2b6ed37…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 23, 2026, 03:31 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`b79bf2b6ed37…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
ESET_MuddyWater_Dec2025
ESET Research. (2025, December 2). MuddyWater: Snakes by the riverbank. Retrieved February 17, 2026.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS9033
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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