S0650: QakBot

QakBot matters because ATT&CK describes it as a long-running, modular Windows banking trojan that evolved into a delivery agent for ransomware, including ProLock and Egregor. For leaders, the key decision value is not just “malware prevention”; it is whether the organization can quickly recognize a Windows endpoint moving from infection into discovery, credential collection, persistence, command-and-control, and potential ransomware staging behavior.

Executive priority

Prioritize QakBot as a resilience and incident-readiness test case for Windows environments. The supplied relationships connect it to financially motivated activity, email-based distribution context through TA551, initial access broker context through TA577, and ransomware-linked ecosystem context through Storm-1811. Executives should ask whether SOC, identity, endpoint, email/web, and incident response teams can prove coverage for the behaviors ATT&CK associates with this malware: obfuscation, WMI execution, scheduled tasks, process injection, discovery, keylogging, local data collection, and exfiltration over C2.

Technical view

ATT&CK lists QakBot for Windows and provides no official detection text, so defenders should validate behavior-based coverage from the related techniques rather than rely on the malware name alone. Focus testing and hunts on Windows execution and persistence via WMI and Scheduled Task, stealth via obfuscated files, packing, binary padding, masqueraded file types, command obfuscation, fileless storage, and process injection/process hollowing. Discovery coverage should include application windows, user context, network configuration, internet connectivity, remote systems, and network connections. Collection and credential-risk coverage should include local data access and keylogging indicators, with network analytics for exfiltration over an existing C2 channel.

Likely telemetry

Windows endpoint process creation, parent/child process, command-line, and script execution telemetry
WMI activity and remote/local WMI execution records
Windows Scheduled Task creation, modification, and execution events
Endpoint file metadata, file writes, suspicious extensions or file-type mismatches, packed or padded binaries, and obfuscation indicators
Memory and EDR telemetry relevant to process injection or process hollowing

Detection direction

Do not depend on static QakBot indicators alone; ATT&CK relationships show multiple obfuscation and evasion behaviors that can change file appearance and weaken hash-based controls.
Validate Windows behavior detections for WMI execution, scheduled task abuse, suspicious process injection or hollowing, and command obfuscation.
Correlate discovery behaviors that may be individually noisy: user discovery, network configuration discovery, internet connectivity checks, remote system discovery, application window discovery, and network connection enumeration.
Tune detections around legitimate administration activity, especially WMI, scheduled tasks, and network discovery commands, by using baselines for expected administrative accounts, hosts, and maintenance windows.
Confirm visibility into collection and credential-risk behaviors such as local data access and keylogging-related signals; absence of this telemetry should be documented as a response limitation.

Mitigation priorities

Harden and monitor Windows execution paths most relevant to the supplied relationships: WMI, Scheduled Task, script/command execution, and suspicious child-process chains.
Reduce delivery and evasion risk with layered email/web controls, attachment and HTML handling policies, and endpoint controls that inspect behavior rather than only file hashes.
Limit blast radius through least privilege, administrative account separation, and controls that reduce the value of captured credentials or keystrokes.
Improve endpoint resilience with EDR coverage capable of observing process injection, process hollowing, fileless storage, and suspicious persistence activity.
Segment critical systems and monitor internal discovery so a compromised Windows host cannot easily map or reach high-value systems.

Analyst notes and limits

This take is based on ATT&CK S0650 QakBot version 1.3 and the supplied relationships. The most decision-relevant point is QakBot’s evolution from banking trojan to ransomware delivery agent and its mapped behaviors across discovery, stealth, execution, persistence, collection, credential access, and exfiltration. Because ATT&CK provides no official detection section for this object, coverage should be proven with local telemetry and behavior validation.

The supplied object lists Windows as the QakBot platform but does not specify tactics on the malware object itself and provides no official detection guidance. Related techniques include platforms beyond Windows, but those broader platforms should not be assumed for QakBot without additional evidence. This summary does not establish current activity, customer exposure, or guaranteed detection coverage.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

QakBot

QakBot is a modular banking trojan that has been used primarily by financially-motivated actors since at least 2007. QakBot is continuously maintained and developed and has evolved from an information stealer into a delivery agent for ransomware, most notably ProLock and Egregor.[1][2][3][4]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques 71 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1218.010	Regsvr32 Sub-technique	QakBot can use Regsvr32 to execute malicious DLLs.[2]CitationCyberint Qakbot May 2021[4]CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022CitationNCC Group Black Basta June 2022CitationDeep Instinct Black Basta August 2022
Enterprise	T1564.001	Hidden Files and Directories Sub-technique	QakBot has placed its payload in hidden subdirectories.CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022
Enterprise	T1497.001	System Checks Sub-technique	QakBot can check the compromised host for the presence of multiple executables associated with analysis tools and halt execution if any are found.CitationTrend Micro Qakbot May 2020[4]
Enterprise	T1018	Remote System Discovery	QakBot can identify remote systems through the `net view` command.CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020[3]CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022
Enterprise	T1005	Data from Local System	QakBot can use a variety of commands, including esentutl.exe to steal sensitive data from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge, to acquire information that is subsequently exfiltrated.[2][3]
Enterprise	T1090.002	External Proxy Sub-technique	QakBot has a module that can proxy C2 communications.[3]
Enterprise	T1059.001	PowerShell Sub-technique	QakBot can use PowerShell to download and execute payloads.CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command Shell Sub-technique	QakBot can use cmd.exe to launch itself and to execute multiple C2 commands.CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020[4][3]CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022
Enterprise	T1518.001	Security Software Discovery Sub-technique	QakBot can identify the installed antivirus product on a targeted system.CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020[4][4][3]
Enterprise	T1106	Native API	QakBot can use `GetProcAddress` to help delete malicious strings from memory.[4]
Enterprise	T1027.001	Binary Padding Sub-technique	QakBot can use large file sizes to evade detection.CitationTrend Micro Qakbot May 2020CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020
Enterprise	T1543.003	Windows Service Sub-technique	QakBot can remotely create a temporary service on a target host.CitationNCC Group Black Basta June 2022
Enterprise	T1568.002	Domain Generation Algorithms Sub-technique	QakBot can use domain generation algorithms in C2 communication.CitationTrend Micro Qakbot May 2020
Enterprise	T1685	Disable or Modify Tools	QakBot has the ability to modify the Registry to add its binaries to the Windows Defender exclusion list.CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020
Enterprise	T1083	File and Directory Discovery	QakBot can identify whether it has been run previously on a host by checking for a specified folder.[4]
Enterprise	T1547.001	Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Sub-technique	QakBot can maintain persistence by creating an auto-run Registry key.CitationTrend Micro Qakbot May 2020CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020[1]CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020
Enterprise	T1027.011	Fileless Storage Sub-technique	QakBot can store its configuration information in a randomly named subkey under `HKCU\Software\Microsoft`.[2]CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020
Enterprise	T1036.008	Masquerade File Type Sub-technique	The QakBot payload has been disguised as a PNG file and hidden within LNK files using a Microsoft File Explorer icon.CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022
Enterprise	T1135	Network Share Discovery	QakBot can use `net share` to identify network shares for use in lateral movement.CitationTrend Micro Qakbot May 2020[3]
Enterprise	T1055.012	Process Hollowing Sub-technique	QakBot can use process hollowing to execute its main payload.[4]
Enterprise	T1059.007	JavaScript Sub-technique	The QakBot web inject module can inject Java Script into web banking pages visited by the victim.[3]CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022
Enterprise	T1218.007	Msiexec Sub-technique	QakBot can use MSIExec to spawn multiple cmd.exe processes.CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	QakBot can deobfuscate and re-assemble code strings for execution.CitationCyberint Qakbot May 2021[4][3]
Enterprise	T1114.001	Local Email Collection Sub-technique	QakBot can target and steal locally stored emails to support thread hijacking phishing campaigns.CitationKroll Qakbot June 2020[1][3]
Enterprise	T1204.001	Malicious Link Sub-technique	QakBot has gained execution through users opening malicious links.CitationTrend Micro Qakbot May 2020CitationKroll Qakbot June 2020[1][4][3]CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022
Enterprise	T1124	System Time Discovery	QakBot can identify the system time on a targeted host.[3]
Enterprise	T1204.002	Malicious File Sub-technique	QakBot has gained execution through users opening malicious attachments.CitationTrend Micro Qakbot May 2020CitationKroll Qakbot June 2020CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020[1]CitationCyberint Qakbot May 2021[4][3]CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020CitationDeep Instinct Black Basta August 2022CitationMicrosoft Ransomware as a Service
Enterprise	T1041	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	QakBot can send stolen information to C2 nodes including passwords, accounts, and emails.[3]
Enterprise	T1033	System Owner/User Discovery	QakBot can identify the user name on a compromised system.[3]CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022
Enterprise	T1027.006	HTML Smuggling Sub-technique	QakBot has been delivered in ZIP files via HTML smuggling.CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022CitationDeep Instinct Black Basta August 2022
Enterprise	T1016.001	Internet Connection Discovery Sub-technique	QakBot can measure the download speed on a targeted host.[3]
Enterprise	T1573.001	Symmetric Cryptography Sub-technique	QakBot can RC4 encrypt strings in C2 communication.[3]
Enterprise	T1027.010	Command Obfuscation Sub-technique	QakBot can use obfuscated and encoded scripts.CitationCyberint Qakbot May 2021CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web Protocols Sub-technique	QakBot has the ability to use HTTP and HTTPS in communication with C2 servers.CitationTrend Micro Qakbot May 2020CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020[3]
Enterprise	T1553.002	Code Signing Sub-technique	QakBot can use signed loaders to evade detection.[4]CitationDeep Instinct Black Basta August 2022
Enterprise	T1027	Obfuscated Files or Information	QakBot has hidden code within Excel spreadsheets by turning the font color to white and splitting it across multiple cells.CitationCyberint Qakbot May 2021
Enterprise	T1210	Exploitation of Remote Services	QakBot can move laterally using worm-like functionality through exploitation of SMB.CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020
Enterprise	T1057	Process Discovery	QakBot has the ability to check running processes.[4]
Enterprise	T1069.001	Local Groups Sub-technique	QakBot can use `net localgroup` to enable discovery of local groups.[3]CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022
Enterprise	T1574.001	DLL Sub-technique	QakBot has the ability to use DLL side-loading for execution.CitationDeep Instinct Black Basta August 2022
Enterprise	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	QakBot can use `net config workstation`, `arp -a`, `nslookup`, and `ipconfig /all` to gather network configuration information.CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020[3]CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022CitationMicrosoft Ransomware as a Service
Enterprise	T1539	Steal Web Session Cookie	QakBot has the ability to capture web session cookies.CitationKroll Qakbot June 2020[3]
Enterprise	T1055	Process Injection	QakBot can inject itself into processes including explore.exe, Iexplore.exe, Mobsync.exe., and wermgr.exe.CitationTrend Micro Qakbot May 2020CitationKroll Qakbot June 2020[1][3]CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022
Enterprise	T1482	Domain Trust Discovery	QakBot can run `nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts` for domain trust discovery.[3]
Enterprise	T1074.001	Local Data Staging Sub-technique	QakBot has stored stolen emails and other data into new folders prior to exfiltration.CitationKroll Qakbot June 2020
Enterprise	T1110	Brute Force	QakBot can conduct brute force attacks to capture credentials.CitationKroll Qakbot June 2020CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020[3]
Enterprise	T1553.005	Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Sub-technique	QakBot has been packaged in ISO files in order to bypass Mark of the Web (MOTW) security measures.CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022
Enterprise	T1185	Browser Session Hijacking	QakBot can use advanced web injects to steal web banking credentials.CitationCyberint Qakbot May 2021[3]
Enterprise	T1497.003	Time Based Checks Sub-technique	The QakBot dropper can delay dropping the payload to evade detection.CitationCyberint Qakbot May 2021[3]
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	QakBot has the ability to download additional components and malware.CitationTrend Micro Qakbot May 2020CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020[1]CitationCyberint Qakbot May 2021[3]CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020
Enterprise	T1120	Peripheral Device Discovery	QakBot can identify peripheral devices on targeted systems.CitationTrend Micro Qakbot May 2020
Enterprise	T1095	Non-Application Layer Protocol	QakBot has the ability use TCP to send or receive C2 packets.[3]
Enterprise	T1566.002	Spearphishing Link Sub-technique	QakBot has spread through emails with malicious links.CitationTrend Micro Qakbot May 2020CitationKroll Qakbot June 2020[1][4][3]CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022
Enterprise	T1027.005	Indicator Removal from Tools Sub-technique	QakBot can make small changes to itself in order to change its checksum and hash value.CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020CitationCyberint Qakbot May 2021
Enterprise	T1112	Modify Registry	QakBot can modify the Registry to store its configuration information in a randomly named subkey under `HKCU\Software\Microsoft`.[2]CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020
Enterprise	T1566.001	Spearphishing Attachment Sub-technique	QakBot has spread through emails with malicious attachments.CitationTrend Micro Qakbot May 2020CitationKroll Qakbot June 2020[1]CitationCyberint Qakbot May 2021[4][3]CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020CitationDeep Instinct Black Basta August 2022CitationMicrosoft Ransomware as a Service
Enterprise	T1056.001	Keylogging Sub-technique	QakBot can capture keystrokes on a compromised host.CitationKroll Qakbot June 2020[1][3]
Enterprise	T1091	Replication Through Removable Media	QakBot has the ability to use removable drives to spread through compromised networks.CitationTrend Micro Qakbot May 2020
Enterprise	T1132.001	Standard Encoding Sub-technique	QakBot can Base64 encode system information sent to C2.CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020[3]
Enterprise	T1059.005	Visual Basic Sub-technique	QakBot can use VBS to download and execute malicious files.CitationTrend Micro Qakbot May 2020 CitationKroll Qakbot June 2020CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020[1]CitationCyberint Qakbot May 2021CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	QakBot can collect system information including the OS version and domain on a compromised host.CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020[4]CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020CitationMicrosoft Ransomware as a Service
Enterprise	T1047	Windows Management Instrumentation	QakBot can execute WMI queries to gather information.[3]
Enterprise	T1010	Application Window Discovery	QakBot has the ability to enumerate windows on a compromised host.[4]
Enterprise	T1518	Software Discovery	QakBot can enumerate a list of installed programs.CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020
Enterprise	T1049	System Network Connections Discovery	QakBot can use `netstat` to enumerate current network connections.[3]CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022
Enterprise	T1053.005	Scheduled Task Sub-technique	QakBot has the ability to create scheduled tasks for persistence.CitationTrend Micro Qakbot May 2020CitationKroll Qakbot June 2020CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020[1][2]CitationCyberint Qakbot May 2021[3]CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020
Enterprise	T1218.011	Rundll32 Sub-technique	QakBot has used Rundll32.exe to drop malicious DLLs including Brute Ratel C4 and to enable C2 communication.CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020[2]CitationCyberint Qakbot May 2021[4]CitationTrend Micro Black Basta October 2022
Enterprise	T1572	Protocol Tunneling	The QakBot proxy module can encapsulate SOCKS5 protocol within its own proxy protocol.[3]
Enterprise	T1555.003	Credentials from Web Browsers Sub-technique	QakBot has collected usernames and passwords from Firefox and Chrome.[3]
Enterprise	T1027.002	Software Packing Sub-technique	QakBot can encrypt and pack malicious payloads.CitationCyberint Qakbot May 2021
Enterprise	T1070.004	File Deletion Sub-technique	QakBot can delete folders and files including overwriting its executable with legitimate programs.CitationKroll Qakbot June 2020CitationCrowdstrike Qakbot October 2020[4]CitationGroup IB Ransomware September 2020

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0127: TA551

TA551 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since at least 2018. [1] The group has primarily targeted English, German, Italian, and Japanese speakers through email-based malware distribution campaigns. [2]

G1037: TA577

TA577 is an initial access broker (IAB) that has distributed QakBot and Pikabot, and was among the first observed groups distributing Latrodectus in 2023.[1]

G1046: Storm-1811

Storm-1811 is a financially-motivated entity linked to Black Basta ransomware deployment. Storm-1811 is notable for unique phishing and social engineering mechanisms for initial access, such as overloading victim email inboxes with non-malicious spam to prompt a fake "help desk" interaction leading to the deployment of adversary tools and capabilities.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release: 19.1
Object version: 1.3
Created: Sep 27, 2021, 19:35 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Nov 17, 2024, 13:02 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: dba2548fa18345cb...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.1	Jun 3, 2026, 07:54 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.3	Nov 17, 2024, 13:02 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`dba2548fa183…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Trend Micro Qakbot December 2020

Trend Micro. (2020, December 17). QAKBOT: A decade-old malware still with new tricks. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL
[2]
Red Canary Qbot

Rainey, K. (n.d.). Qbot. Retrieved September 27, 2021.
Open source URL
[3]
Kaspersky QakBot September 2021

Kuzmenko, A. et al. (2021, September 2). QakBot technical analysis. Retrieved September 27, 2021.
Open source URL
[4]
ATT QakBot April 2021

Morrow, D. (2021, April 15). The rise of QakBot. Retrieved September 27, 2021.
Open source URL
[5]
Pinkslipbot

(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)(Citation: ATT QakBot April 2021)
[6]
QBot

(Citation: Trend Micro Qakbot December 2020)(Citation: Red Canary Qbot)(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)(Citation: ATT QakBot April 2021)
[7]
QuackBot

(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)
[8]
mitre-attack S0650
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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