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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0082: APT38

APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1] Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, Bancomext [2] and Banco de Chile [2], along with software supply chain compromises and destructive malware attacks.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

EnterpriseG0082GroupObject v4.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0082: APT38 describes [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) Active since at least 2014, [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank ...

Executive priority

G0082: APT38 is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0082: APT38 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0082: APT38 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

APT38

APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1] Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, Bancomext [2] and Banco de Chile [2], along with software supply chain compromises and destructive malware attacks.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

77 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1486Data Encrypted for Impact

APT38 has used Hermes ransomware to encrypt files with AES256.[2]

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

APT38 has injected malicious payloads into the `explorer.exe` process.Citation1 - appv APT38 has also injected malicious binaries directly into memory on compromised hosts.[5]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

APT38 has identified primary users, currently logged in users, sets of users that commonly use a system, or inactive users.[1] APT38 has run malware to enumerate the current user on compromised hosts.[6][7]

EnterpriseT1657Financial Theft

APT38 has conducted cryptocurrency theft.CitationMicrosoft CYBERWARCON NOV 2024

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

APT38 uses a tool called CLEANTOAD that has the capability to modify Registry keys.[2]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

APT38 has named malicious payloads as benign-looking executables to blend in the environment including Run keys, npm packages, and JavaScript utilities often using names mirroring Apple, Windows, or other native system files.[5][7][6]

EnterpriseT1677Poisoned Pipeline Execution

APT38 has poisoned npm packages with fake runtime dependencies to trigger execution of malicious payloads on developer endpoints or continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) systems during npm installation or update.[5][7]

EnterpriseT1049System Network Connections Discovery

APT38 installed a port monitoring tool, MAPMAKER, to print the active TCP connections on the local system.[2]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

APT38 has used a utility called CLOSESHAVE that can securely delete a file from the system. APT38 has also removed malware, tools, scripts, or other non-native files used during the intrusion to reduce their footprint or as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.[2][1][6][5]

EnterpriseT1036.006Space after FilenameSub-technique

APT38 has put several spaces before a file extension to avoid detection and suspicion.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1608.001Upload MalwareSub-technique

APT38 has uploaded malware to cloud storage services for download by targeted victims.[7]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

APT38 used a Trojan called KEYLIME to capture keystrokes from the victim’s machine.[2]

EnterpriseT1056.002GUI Input CaptureSub-technique

APT38 has leveraged a fictitious native macOS password dialog prompt to entice victims to enter credentials.[7]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

APT38 has identified security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors installed on a compromised system.[1]Citation1 - appv APT38 has also executed malware implants to enumerate all installed applications on Windows hosts including installed security products.[7]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

APT38 has installed a new Windows service to establish persistence.[1] APT38 has gained persistence on compromised systems independent of user logon by creating a background service using `sc create scdev binPath= "c:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k scdev".[7]

EnterpriseT1564.011Ignore Process InterruptsSub-technique

APT38 has used remote access tools that run AppleScript using ` nohup osascript` to ignore hangup signals.[5]

EnterpriseT1213.006DatabasesSub-technique

APT38 has copied Apple Notes database from its application container and staged for upload.[6]

EnterpriseT1548.002Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique

APT38 has used the legitimate application `ieinstal.exe` to bypass UAC.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1678Delay Execution

APT38 has delayed C2 beaconing to longer intervals on network failures.[7]

EnterpriseT1189Drive-by Compromise

APT38 has conducted watering holes schemes to gain initial access to victims.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1683.002Audio-Visual ContentSub-technique

APT38 has created fictitious profiles on social media utilizing fake photos and personas to entice users to engage in the schemes.CitationMicrosoft CYBERWARCON NOV 2024

EnterpriseT1053.006Systemd TimersSub-technique

APT38 has used a multiplatform implant that can write to `~/.config/systemd/nvmconf/` to gain persistence on Linux hosts.[7]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

APT38 has enumerated files and directories, or searched in specific locations within a compromised host.[1][5][6]

EnterpriseT1213.005Messaging ApplicationsSub-technique

APT38 has gathered Telegram Desktop messaging data from the applications data directories stored on the victim device to include cryptographic key material, and session mapping files that can recreate a compromised user’s Telegram session on another system.[6]

EnterpriseT1070.003Clear Command HistorySub-technique

APT38 has executed scripts to delete the PowerShell command history file.[7]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

APT38 has used a command-line tunneler, NACHOCHEESE, to give them shell access to a victim’s machine.[2] Additionally, APT38 has used batch scripts.Citation1 - appv[7] APT38 has also executed scripts to launch `cmd.exe` to POST stolen data to actor-controlled domains.[5]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

APT38 has used the RC4 algorithm to decrypt configuration data. Citation1 - appv APT38 has decocoded Base64 encoded PowerShell scripts prior to execution.[7]

EnterpriseT1059.002AppleScriptSub-technique

APT38 has sent Mac users.scpt files to trigger malicious downloads.CitationMicrosoft CYBERWARCON NOV 2024 APT38 has targeted macOS uses with native script stagers leading to malicious paylaods.[5] APT38 has also used an AppleScript-based credential harvesting component.[6]

EnterpriseT1685.003Modify or Spoof Tool UISub-technique

APT38 has displayed a fake “system update complete” dialog to the user following successful deployment of malicious payloads.[6]

EnterpriseT1585.002Email AccountsSub-technique

APT38 has set up anonymous emails to use in publishing poisoned software packages such as sergey2016@tutamail[.]com.[7]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

APT38 has used VBScript to execute commands and other operational tasks.[1]Citation1 - appv APT38 has sent Windows victims Visual Basic script stagers leading to malicious downloads.CitationMicrosoft CYBERWARCON NOV 2024[5] APT38 has also used VBScript to execute scripts for data exfiltration.[5]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

APT38 has staged files in a central location prior to exfiltration.[6][7]

EnterpriseT1585.001Social Media AccountsSub-technique

APT38 has used professional platforms such as LinkedIn to contact potential victims.CitationMicrosoft CYBERWARCON NOV 2024[5][6][7]

EnterpriseT1027.015CompressionSub-technique

APT38 has compressed its malicious payloads in ZIP files for delivery to victims.[6]

EnterpriseT1529System Shutdown/Reboot

APT38 has used a custom MBR wiper named BOOTWRECK, which will initiate a system reboot after wiping the victim's MBR.[2]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

APT38 has used links to execute a malicious Visual Basic script.Citation1 - appv APT38 has directed users to navigate to a website under adversary control through the sharing of links in messages.CitationMicrosoft CYBERWARCON NOV 2024[7][5]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

APT38 used a backdoor, QUICKRIDE, to communicate to the C2 server over HTTP and HTTPS.[2] APT38 has also configured malicious payloads to communicate with C2 using HTTP POST requests that blend in with common traffic.[5][6]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

APT38 used a backdoor, NESTEGG, that has the capability to download and upload files to and from a victim’s machine.[2] Additionally, APT38 has downloaded other payloads onto a victim’s machine.Citation1 - appv APT38 has also injected npm packages with malicious dependencies that download second-stage payloads to victim machines.[5][7]

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

APT38 has unhooked DLLs to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) or anti-virus (AV) tools.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1583.006Web ServicesSub-technique

APT38 has used OneDrive and GoogleDrive to host malicious files.[5][7]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

APT38 has run node.js malware to query the Registry to discover installed software.[7]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

APT38 has used several code packing methods such as Themida, Enigma, VMProtect, and Obsidium, to pack their implants.[2]

EnterpriseT1217Browser Information Discovery

APT38 has collected browser bookmark information to learn more about compromised hosts, obtain personal information about users, and acquire details about internal network resources.[1] APT38 has also used malware capable of enumerating 166 unique cryptocurrency wallets, browser extensions, and browser history.[7]

EnterpriseT1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsSub-technique

APT38 clears Window Event logs and Sysmon logs from the system.[2]

EnterpriseT1684.001ImpersonationSub-technique

APT38 has impersonated recruiters and venture capitalists to lure victims into connecting to malicious skills assessments or online business meetings.CitationMicrosoft CYBERWARCON NOV 2024

EnterpriseT1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceSub-technique

APT38 has used social media sites such as LinkedIn to send malicious links to potential vicitims.[5][7]

EnterpriseT1059.006PythonSub-technique

APT38 has used Python versions of its remote access tools on Linux targets.[5]

EnterpriseT1543.001Launch AgentSub-technique

APT38 has executed a multiplatform implant that placed launch agents in ~/Library/NodePackages/ to establish persistence on macOS.[7]

EnterpriseT1218.005MshtaSub-technique

APT38 has used a renamed version of `mshta.exe` to execute malicious HTML files.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1070.006TimestompSub-technique

APT38 has modified data timestamps to mimic files that are in the same folder on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1686Disable or Modify System Firewall

APT38 have created firewall exemptions on specific ports, including ports 443, 6443, 8443, and 9443.[1]

EnterpriseT1480Execution Guardrails

APT38 has leveraged file discovery actions to determine if a predetermined file is present prior to execution to prevent redundant execution on a compromised device.[6]

EnterpriseT1583.003Virtual Private ServerSub-technique

APT38 has used virtual private server (VPS) providers to host C2 infrastructure including Hostwinds.[7]

EnterpriseT1485Data Destruction

APT38 has used a custom secure delete function to make deleted files unrecoverable.[2]

EnterpriseT1110Brute Force

APT38 has used brute force techniques to attempt account access when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are unavailable.[1]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

APT38 has run malware to discover the system time on compromised hosts.[6]

EnterpriseT1059.004Unix ShellSub-technique

APT38 has run malicious payloads using Linux and Unix shells. APT38 has also executed Unix commands sequentially using `&&` and in the background with `&`.[5] [6]

EnterpriseT1135Network Share Discovery

APT38 has enumerated network shares on a compromised host.[1][6]

EnterpriseT1553.005Mark-of-the-Web BypassSub-technique

APT38 has used ISO and VHD files to deploy malware and to bypass Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) security measures.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1567Exfiltration Over Web Service

APT38 has exfiltrated stolen credentials to actor-controlled infrastructure leveraging Telegram Bot API.[7]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

APT38 has attempted to get detailed information about a compromised host, including the operating system, version, patches, hotfixes, and service packs.[1] APT38 has executed malware to collect current user, host name, system time, and operating system install date from targeted systems.[5][6][7]

EnterpriseT1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsSub-technique

APT38 has injected malicious dependencies into software packages such as Axios and Mastra npm packages.[5][7]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

APT38 has utilized Base64 encoded HTTP POST communications to C2.[7]

EnterpriseT1565.002Transmitted Data ManipulationSub-technique

APT38 has used DYEPACK to manipulate SWIFT messages en route to a printer.[2]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

APT38 has exfiltrated victim device and user details contained in a POST request to register the compromised system with C2 infrastructure.[6][7]

EnterpriseT1686.002Network Device FirewallSub-technique

APT38 have created firewall exemptions on specific ports, including ports 443, 6443, 8443, and 9443. [1]

EnterpriseT1561.002Disk Structure WipeSub-technique

APT38 has used a custom MBR wiper named BOOTWRECK to render systems inoperable.[2]

EnterpriseT1036.003Rename Legitimate UtilitiesSub-technique

APT38 has renamed system utilities, such as `rundll32.exe` and `mshta.exe`, to avoid detection.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1690Prevent Command History Logging

APT38 has prepended a space to all of their terminal commands to operate without leaving traces in the HISTCONTROL environment.[1] APT38 has prevented logging and muted error logs through the use of `/dev/null 2>&1 &`. [5][6] APT38 has also executed scripts to delete the PowerShell command history file and to prevent future history recording using `-Force Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing`.[7]

EnterpriseT1036.008Masquerade File TypeSub-technique

APT38 has configured malware to rename malicious payloads with naming conventions that reduce a chance of detection to include renaming “package.md” to “package.json”.[5]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

APT38 has used Task Scheduler to run programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.[1] Additionally, APT38 has used living-off-the-land scripts to execute a malicious script via a scheduled task.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1552.004Private KeysSub-technique

APT38 has gathered cryptographic key data related to cryptocurrency wallets, SSH keys, and messaging applications to include Telegram.[6]

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

APT38 has obtained and used open-source tools such as Mimikatz.CitationESET Lazarus KillDisk April 2018

EnterpriseT1505.003Web ShellSub-technique

APT38 has used web shells for persistence or to ensure redundant access.[1]

EnterpriseT1552.003Shell HistorySub-technique

APT38 has gathered data and credentials stored in Shell History.[7]

EnterpriseT1115Clipboard Data

APT38 used a Trojan called KEYLIME to collect data from the clipboard.[2]

EnterpriseT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique

APT38 has gathered Web browser data to include saved credentials, cookies, bookmarks, autofill data, and extension-specific storage. APT38 has also sought cryptocurrency wallet extensions.[6][7]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S0593: ECCENTRICBANDWAGON

ECCENTRICBANDWAGON is a remote access Trojan (RAT) used by North Korean cyber actors that was first identified in August 2020. It is a reconnaissance tool--with keylogging and screen capture functionality--used for information gathering on compromised systems.[1]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0039: Net

The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. [1]

Net has a great deal of functionality, [2] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through SMB/Windows Admin Shares using net use commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as net1 user.

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
4.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
0655a4e1b3ec6e21...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.04.0Current bundle0655a4e1b3ec…
19.23.1Older bundle638b7f7ef175…
19.13.1Older bundle093f161abc03…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020

    DHS/CISA. (2020, August 26). FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks. Retrieved September 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    FireEye APT38 Oct 2018

    FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021

    Department of Justice. (2021, February 17). Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe. Retrieved June 9, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017

    GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Microsoft Axios Compromise APR 2026

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, April 1). Mitigating the Axios npm supply chain compromise. Retrieved September 30, 2026.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Microsoft Sapphire Sleet APR 2026

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, April 16). Dissecting Sapphire Sleet’s macOS intrusion from lure to compromise. Retrieved September 30, 2026.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    MIcrosoft Mastra npm Compromise JUN 2026

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, June 17). From package to postinstall payload: Inside the Mastra npm supply chain compromise by Sapphire Sleet. Retrieved September 30, 2026.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    APT38

    (Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)

  9. [9]
    BeagleBoyz

    (Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)

  10. [10]
    Bluenoroff

    (Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017)

  11. [11]
    COPERNICIUM

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  12. [12]
    CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021

    CrowdStrike. (2021, June 7). CrowdStrike 2021 Global Threat Report. Retrieved September 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018

    Meyers, Adam. (2018, April 6). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for April: STARDUST CHOLLIMA. Retrieved September 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    NICKEL GLADSTONE

    (Citation: SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021)

  16. [16]
    Sapphire Sleet

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  17. [17]
    SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021

    SecureWorks. (2021, September 29). NICKEL GLADSTONE Threat Profile. Retrieved September 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Stardust Chollima

    (Citation: CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021)

  19. [19]
    mitre-attackG0082
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.