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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0082: APT38

APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1] Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which APT38 stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext [2] and Banco de Chile [2]; some of their attacks have been destructive.[1][2][3][4]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

EnterpriseG0082GroupObject v3.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0082: APT38 describes [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) Active since at least 2014, [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank ...

Executive priority

G0082: APT38 is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0082: APT38 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0082: APT38 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

APT38

APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1] Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which APT38 stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext [2] and Banco de Chile [2]; some of their attacks have been destructive.[1][2][3][4]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

56 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1486Data Encrypted for Impact

APT38 has used Hermes ransomware to encrypt files with AES256.[2]

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

APT38 has injected malicious payloads into the `explorer.exe` process.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

APT38 has identified primary users, currently logged in users, sets of users that commonly use a system, or inactive users.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

APT38 uses a tool called CLEANTOAD that has the capability to modify Registry keys.[2]

EnterpriseT1049System Network Connections Discovery

APT38 installed a port monitoring tool, MAPMAKER, to print the active TCP connections on the local system.[2]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

APT38 has used a utility called CLOSESHAVE that can securely delete a file from the system. They have also removed malware, tools, or other non-native files used during the intrusion to reduce their footprint or as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

APT38 used a Trojan called KEYLIME to capture keystrokes from the victim’s machine.[2]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

APT38 has identified security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors installed on a compromised system.[1]Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

APT38 has installed a new Windows service to establish persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1548.002Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique

APT38 has used the legitimate application `ieinstal.exe` to bypass UAC.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1189Drive-by Compromise

APT38 has conducted watering holes schemes to gain initial access to victims.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

APT38 have enumerated files and directories, or searched in specific locations within a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

APT38 has used a command-line tunneler, NACHOCHEESE, to give them shell access to a victim’s machine.[2] Additionally, APT38 has used batch scripts.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

APT38 has used the RC4 algorithm to decrypt configuration data. Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

APT38 has used VBScript to execute commands and other operational tasks.[1]Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1529System Shutdown/Reboot

APT38 has used a custom MBR wiper named BOOTWRECK, which will initiate a system reboot after wiping the victim's MBR.[2]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

APT38 has used links to execute a malicious Visual Basic script.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

APT38 used a backdoor, QUICKRIDE, to communicate to the C2 server over HTTP and HTTPS.[2]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

APT38 used a backdoor, NESTEGG, that has the capability to download and upload files to and from a victim’s machine.[2] Additionally, APT38 has downloaded other payloads onto a victim’s machine.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

APT38 has unhooked DLLs to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) or anti-virus (AV) tools.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

APT38 has used several code packing methods such as Themida, Enigma, VMProtect, and Obsidium, to pack their implants.[2]

EnterpriseT1217Browser Information Discovery

APT38 has collected browser bookmark information to learn more about compromised hosts, obtain personal information about users, and acquire details about internal network resources.[1]

EnterpriseT1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsSub-technique

APT38 clears Window Event logs and Sysmon logs from the system.[2]

EnterpriseT1218.005MshtaSub-technique

APT38 has used a renamed version of `mshta.exe` to execute malicious HTML files.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1070.006TimestompSub-technique

APT38 has modified data timestamps to mimic files that are in the same folder on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1686Disable or Modify System Firewall

APT38 have created firewall exemptions on specific ports, including ports 443, 6443, 8443, and 9443.[1]

EnterpriseT1485Data Destruction

APT38 has used a custom secure delete function to make deleted files unrecoverable.[2]

EnterpriseT1110Brute Force

APT38 has used brute force techniques to attempt account access when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are unavailable.[1]

EnterpriseT1135Network Share Discovery

APT38 has enumerated network shares on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1553.005Mark-of-the-Web BypassSub-technique

APT38 has used ISO and VHD files to deploy malware and to bypass Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) security measures.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

APT38 has attempted to get detailed information about a compromised host, including the operating system, version, patches, hotfixes, and service packs.[1]

EnterpriseT1565.002Transmitted Data ManipulationSub-technique

APT38 has used DYEPACK to manipulate SWIFT messages en route to a printer.[2]

EnterpriseT1686.002Network Device FirewallSub-technique

APT38 have created firewall exemptions on specific ports, including ports 443, 6443, 8443, and 9443. [1]

EnterpriseT1561.002Disk Structure WipeSub-technique

APT38 has used a custom MBR wiper named BOOTWRECK to render systems inoperable.[2]

EnterpriseT1036.003Rename Legitimate UtilitiesSub-technique

APT38 has renamed system utilities, such as `rundll32.exe` and `mshta.exe`, to avoid detection.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1690Prevent Command History Logging

APT38 has prepended a space to all of their terminal commands to operate without leaving traces in the HISTCONTROL environment.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

APT38 has used Task Scheduler to run programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.[1] Additionally, APT38 has used living-off-the-land scripts to execute a malicious script via a scheduled task.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

APT38 has obtained and used open-source tools such as Mimikatz.CitationESET Lazarus KillDisk April 2018

EnterpriseT1505.003Web ShellSub-technique

APT38 has used web shells for persistence or to ensure redundant access.[1]

EnterpriseT1115Clipboard Data

APT38 used a Trojan called KEYLIME to collect data from the clipboard.[2]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

APT38 has used rundll32.exe to execute binaries, scripts, and Control Panel Item files and to execute code via proxy to avoid triggering security tools.[1]Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1565.003Runtime Data ManipulationSub-technique

APT38 has used DYEPACK.FOX to manipulate PDF data as it is accessed to remove traces of fraudulent SWIFT transactions from the data displayed to the end user.[2]

EnterpriseT1583.001DomainsSub-technique

APT38 has created fake domains to imitate legitimate venture capital or bank domains.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1106Native API

APT38 has used the Windows API to execute code within a victim's system.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.001Compiled HTML FileSub-technique

APT38 has used CHM files to move concealed payloads.CitationKaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood APR 2017

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

APT38 has attempted to lure victims into enabling malicious macros within email attachments.[1] Additionally, APT38 has used malicious Word documents and shortcut files.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1565.001Stored Data ManipulationSub-technique

APT38 has used DYEPACK to create, delete, and alter records in databases used for SWIFT transactions.[2]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

APT38 has collected data from a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

APT38 has used PowerShell to execute commands and other operational tasks.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.003CronSub-technique

APT38 has used cron to create pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs on a Linux system.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

APT38 has conducted spearphishing campaigns using malicious email attachments.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.007MsiexecSub-technique

APT38 has used `msiexec.exe` to execute malicious files.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1569.002Service ExecutionSub-technique

APT38 has created new services or modified existing ones to run executables, commands, or scripts.[1]

EnterpriseT1480.002Mutual ExclusionSub-technique

APT38 has created a mutex to avoid duplicate execution.Citation1 - appv

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

APT38 leveraged Sysmon to understand the processes, services in the organization.[2]

EnterpriseT1036.006Space after FilenameSub-technique

APT38 has put several spaces before a file extension to avoid detection and suspicion.Citation1 - appv

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S0593: ECCENTRICBANDWAGON

ECCENTRICBANDWAGON is a remote access Trojan (RAT) used by North Korean cyber actors that was first identified in August 2020. It is a reconnaissance tool--with keylogging and screen capture functionality--used for information gathering on compromised systems.[1]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0039: Net

The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. [1]

Net has a great deal of functionality, [2] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through SMB/Windows Admin Shares using net use commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as net1 user.

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0002: Mimikatz

Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. [1] [2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0607: KillDisk

KillDisk is a disk-wiping tool designed to overwrite files with random data to render the OS unbootable. It was first observed as a component of BlackEnergy malware during cyber attacks against Ukraine in 2015. KillDisk has since evolved into stand-alone malware used by a variety of threat actors against additional targets in Europe and Latin America; in 2016 a ransomware component was also incorporated into some KillDisk variants.[1][2][3][4]

LinuxWindows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
3.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
638b7f7ef17532ab...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.23.1Current bundle638b7f7ef175…
19.13.1Older bundle093f161abc03…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020

    DHS/CISA. (2020, August 26). FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks. Retrieved September 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    FireEye APT38 Oct 2018

    FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021

    Department of Justice. (2021, February 17). Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe. Retrieved June 9, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017

    GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    APT38

    (Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)

  6. [6]
    BeagleBoyz

    (Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)

  7. [7]
    Bluenoroff

    (Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017)

  8. [8]
    COPERNICIUM

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  9. [9]
    CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021

    CrowdStrike. (2021, June 7). CrowdStrike 2021 Global Threat Report. Retrieved September 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018

    Meyers, Adam. (2018, April 6). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for April: STARDUST CHOLLIMA. Retrieved September 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    NICKEL GLADSTONE

    (Citation: SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021)

  13. [13]
    Sapphire Sleet

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  14. [14]
    SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021

    SecureWorks. (2021, September 29). NICKEL GLADSTONE Threat Profile. Retrieved September 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Stardust Chollima

    (Citation: CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021)

  16. [16]
    mitre-attackG0082
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.