G0082: APT38
APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1] Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, Bancomext [2] and Banco de Chile [2], along with software supply chain compromises and destructive malware attacks.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
Security context for executives and security teams
G0082: APT38 describes [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) Active since at least 2014, [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank ...
Executive priority
G0082: APT38 is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0082: APT38 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0082: APT38 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
APT38
APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1] Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, Bancomext [2] and Banco de Chile [2], along with software supply chain compromises and destructive malware attacks.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | |
| Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1657 | Financial Theft | APT38 has conducted cryptocurrency theft.CitationMicrosoft CYBERWARCON NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1677 | Poisoned Pipeline Execution | |
| Enterprise | T1049 | System Network Connections Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1036.006 | Space after FilenameSub-technique | APT38 has put several spaces before a file extension to avoid detection and suspicion.Citation1 - appv |
| Enterprise | T1608.001 | Upload MalwareSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1056.001 | KeyloggingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1056.002 | GUI Input CaptureSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1564.011 | Ignore Process InterruptsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1213.006 | DatabasesSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1548.002 | Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique | APT38 has used the legitimate application `ieinstal.exe` to bypass UAC.Citation1 - appv |
| Enterprise | T1678 | Delay Execution | |
| Enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | |
| Enterprise | T1683.002 | Audio-Visual ContentSub-technique | APT38 has created fictitious profiles on social media utilizing fake photos and personas to entice users to engage in the schemes.CitationMicrosoft CYBERWARCON NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1053.006 | Systemd TimersSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1213.005 | Messaging ApplicationsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1070.003 | Clear Command HistorySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | |
| Enterprise | T1059.002 | AppleScriptSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1685.003 | Modify or Spoof Tool UISub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1585.002 | Email AccountsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.005 | Visual BasicSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data StagingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1585.001 | Social Media AccountsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027.015 | CompressionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1529 | System Shutdown/Reboot | |
| Enterprise | T1204.001 | Malicious LinkSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | APT38 used a backdoor, NESTEGG, that has the capability to download and upload files to and from a victim’s machine.[2] Additionally, APT38 has downloaded other payloads onto a victim’s machine.Citation1 - appv APT38 has also injected npm packages with malicious dependencies that download second-stage payloads to victim machines.[5][7] |
| Enterprise | T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools | APT38 has unhooked DLLs to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) or anti-virus (AV) tools.Citation1 - appv |
| Enterprise | T1583.006 | Web ServicesSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry | |
| Enterprise | T1027.002 | Software PackingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1217 | Browser Information Discovery | APT38 has collected browser bookmark information to learn more about compromised hosts, obtain personal information about users, and acquire details about internal network resources.[1] APT38 has also used malware capable of enumerating 166 unique cryptocurrency wallets, browser extensions, and browser history.[7] |
| Enterprise | T1685.005 | Clear Windows Event LogsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1684.001 | ImpersonationSub-technique | APT38 has impersonated recruiters and venture capitalists to lure victims into connecting to malicious skills assessments or online business meetings.CitationMicrosoft CYBERWARCON NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1566.003 | Spearphishing via ServiceSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.006 | PythonSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1543.001 | Launch AgentSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1218.005 | MshtaSub-technique | APT38 has used a renamed version of `mshta.exe` to execute malicious HTML files.Citation1 - appv |
| Enterprise | T1070.006 | TimestompSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1686 | Disable or Modify System Firewall | |
| Enterprise | T1480 | Execution Guardrails | |
| Enterprise | T1583.003 | Virtual Private ServerSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1485 | Data Destruction | |
| Enterprise | T1110 | Brute Force | |
| Enterprise | T1124 | System Time Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1059.004 | Unix ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1135 | Network Share Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1553.005 | Mark-of-the-Web BypassSub-technique | APT38 has used ISO and VHD files to deploy malware and to bypass Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) security measures.Citation1 - appv |
| Enterprise | T1567 | Exfiltration Over Web Service | |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1195.001 | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard EncodingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1565.002 | Transmitted Data ManipulationSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | |
| Enterprise | T1686.002 | Network Device FirewallSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1561.002 | Disk Structure WipeSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1036.003 | Rename Legitimate UtilitiesSub-technique | APT38 has renamed system utilities, such as `rundll32.exe` and `mshta.exe`, to avoid detection.Citation1 - appv |
| Enterprise | T1690 | Prevent Command History Logging | APT38 has prepended a space to all of their terminal commands to operate without leaving traces in the HISTCONTROL environment.[1] APT38 has prevented logging and muted error logs through the use of `/dev/null 2>&1 &`. [5][6] APT38 has also executed scripts to delete the PowerShell command history file and to prevent future history recording using `-Force Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing`.[7] |
| Enterprise | T1036.008 | Masquerade File TypeSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1552.004 | Private KeysSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1505.003 | Web ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1552.003 | Shell HistorySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1115 | Clipboard Data | |
| Enterprise | T1555.003 | Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0593: ECCENTRICBANDWAGON
ECCENTRICBANDWAGON is a remote access Trojan (RAT) used by North Korean cyber actors that was first identified in August 2020. It is a reconnaissance tool--with keylogging and screen capture functionality--used for information gathering on compromised systems.[1]
S0039: Net
The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. [1]
Net has a great deal of functionality, [2] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through SMB/Windows Admin Shares using net use commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as net1 user.
S0376: HOPLIGHT
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 4.0 | Current bundle | 0655a4e1b3ec… | ||
| 19.2 | 3.1 | Older bundle | 638b7f7ef175… | ||
| 19.1 | 3.1 | Older bundle | 093f161abc03… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020
DHS/CISA. (2020, August 26). FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks. Retrieved September 29, 2021.
Open source URL - [2]FireEye APT38 Oct 2018
FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021
Department of Justice. (2021, February 17). Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe. Retrieved June 9, 2021.
Open source URL - [4]Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017
GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
Open source URL - [5]Microsoft Axios Compromise APR 2026
Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, April 1). Mitigating the Axios npm supply chain compromise. Retrieved September 30, 2026.
Open source URL - [6]Microsoft Sapphire Sleet APR 2026
Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, April 16). Dissecting Sapphire Sleet’s macOS intrusion from lure to compromise. Retrieved September 30, 2026.
Open source URL - [7]MIcrosoft Mastra npm Compromise JUN 2026
Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, June 17). From package to postinstall payload: Inside the Mastra npm supply chain compromise by Sapphire Sleet. Retrieved September 30, 2026.
Open source URL - [8]APT38
(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)
- [9]BeagleBoyz
(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)
- [10]Bluenoroff
(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017)
- [11]COPERNICIUM
(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)
- [12]CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021
CrowdStrike. (2021, June 7). CrowdStrike 2021 Global Threat Report. Retrieved September 29, 2021.
Open source URL - [13]CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018
Meyers, Adam. (2018, April 6). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for April: STARDUST CHOLLIMA. Retrieved September 29, 2021.
Open source URL - [14]Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023
Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.
Open source URL - [15]NICKEL GLADSTONE
(Citation: SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021)
- [16]Sapphire Sleet
(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)
- [17]SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021
SecureWorks. (2021, September 29). NICKEL GLADSTONE Threat Profile. Retrieved September 29, 2021.
Open source URL - [18]Stardust Chollima
(Citation: CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021)
- [19]mitre-attackG0082Open source URL
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