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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0611: Clop

Clop is a ransomware family that was first observed in February 2019 and has been used against retail, transportation and logistics, education, manufacturing, engineering, automotive, energy, financial, aerospace, telecommunications, professional and legal services, healthcare, and high tech industries. Clop is a variant of the CryptoMix ransomware.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseS0611MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0611: Clop describes [Clop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0611) is a ransomware family that was first observed in February 2019 and has been used against retail, transportation and logistics, education, manufacturing, engineering, automotive, energy, financial, aerospace, telecommunications, professional and legal services, healthcare, and high tech industries. [Clop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0611) is a variant of the CryptoMix ransomware.(Citation: Mcafee Clop Aug 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Clop Dec 2020)(Citation: Unit...

Executive priority

S0611: Clop is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0611: Clop by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0611: Clop appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Clop

Clop is a ransomware family that was first observed in February 2019 and has been used against retail, transportation and logistics, education, manufacturing, engineering, automotive, energy, financial, aerospace, telecommunications, professional and legal services, healthcare, and high tech industries. Clop is a variant of the CryptoMix ransomware.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

17 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

Clop can search for processes with antivirus and antimalware product names.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1489Service Stop

Clop can kill several processes and services related to backups and security solutions.[3][1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Clop has used a simple XOR operation to decrypt strings.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Clop has used built-in API functions such as WNetOpenEnumW(), WNetEnumResourceW(), WNetCloseEnum(), GetProcAddress(), and VirtualAlloc().[1][2]

EnterpriseT1497.003Time Based ChecksSub-technique

Clop has used the sleep command to avoid sandbox detection.[3]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

Clop has been packed to help avoid detection.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1614.001System Language DiscoverySub-technique

Clop has checked the keyboard language using the GetKeyboardLayout() function to avoid installation on Russian-language or other Commonwealth of Independent States-language machines; it will also check the GetTextCharset function.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Clop has searched folders and subfolders for files to encrypt.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Clop can enumerate all processes on the victim's machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Clop can use cmd.exe to help execute commands on the system.[2]

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

Clop can use code signing to evade detection.[3]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Clop can make modifications to Registry keys.[2]

EnterpriseT1135Network Share Discovery

Clop can enumerate network shares.[1]

EnterpriseT1490Inhibit System Recovery

Clop can delete the shadow volumes with vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet and can use bcdedit to disable recovery options.[1]

EnterpriseT1486Data Encrypted for Impact

Clop can encrypt files using AES, RSA, and RC4 and will add the ".clop" extension to encrypted files.[1][3][2]

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

Clop can uninstall or disable security products.[2]

EnterpriseT1218.007MsiexecSub-technique

Clop can use msiexec.exe to disable security tools on the system.[2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0092: TA505

TA505 is a cyber criminal group that has been active since at least 2014. TA505 is known for frequently changing malware, driving global trends in criminal malware distribution, and ransomware campaigns involving Clop.[1][2][3][4][5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0092: TA505Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1518.001: Security Software DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1489: Service StopEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.003: Time Based ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.002: Software PackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1614.001: System Language DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1553.002: Code SigningEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1135: Network Share DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1490: Inhibit System RecoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1486: Data Encrypted for ImpactEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1685: Disable or Modify ToolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.007: MsiexecEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
5d5bb2e6bbae3767...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle5d5bb2e6bbae…
19.11.0Older bundle5d5bb2e6bbae…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Mcafee Clop Aug 2019

    Mundo, A. (2019, August 1). Clop Ransomware. Retrieved May 10, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Cybereason Clop Dec 2020

    Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, December 23). Cybereason vs. Clop Ransomware. Retrieved May 11, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Unit42 Clop April 2021

    Santos, D. (2021, April 13). Threat Assessment: Clop Ransomware. Retrieved July 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Clop

    (Citation: Mcafee Clop Aug 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Clop Dec 2020)

  5. [5]
    mitre-attackS0611
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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