G0008: Carbanak
Security context for executives and security teams
G0008: Carbanak describes [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a cybercriminal group that has used [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware to target financial institutions since at least 2013. [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) may be linked to groups tracked separately as [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) that have also used [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware.(Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)(Citati...
Executive priority
G0008: Carbanak is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0008: Carbanak by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0008: Carbanak appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Carbanak
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1218.011 | Rundll32Sub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts | |
| Enterprise | T1102.002 | Bidirectional CommunicationSub-technique | Carbanak has used a VBScript named "ggldr" that uses Google Apps Script, Sheets, and Forms services for C2.CitationForcepoint Carbanak Google C2 |
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1219 | Remote Access Tools | Carbanak used legitimate programs such as AmmyyAdmin and Team Viewer for remote interactive C2 to target systems.CitationGroup-IB Anunak |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1686 | Disable or Modify System Firewall | |
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0030: Carbanak
S0002: Mimikatz
S0029: PsExec
S0108: netsh
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 25f0e35af198… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 7727a5aebc78… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Kaspersky Carbanak
Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved August 23, 2018.
Open source URL - [2]FireEye FIN7 April 2017
Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.
Open source URL - [3]Europol Cobalt Mar 2018
Europol. (2018, March 26). Mastermind Behind EUR 1 Billion Cyber Bank Robbery Arrested in Spain. Retrieved October 10, 2018.
Open source URL - [4]Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile
CTU. (n.d.). GOLD NIAGARA. Retrieved September 21, 2021.
Open source URL - [5]Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD Threat Profile
Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD KINGSWOOD. Retrieved October 18, 2021.
Open source URL - [6]Anunak
(Citation: Fox-It Anunak Feb 2015)
- [7]Carbanak
(Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: Fox-It Anunak Feb 2015)
- [8]Fox-It Anunak Feb 2015
Prins, R. (2015, February 16). Anunak (aka Carbanak) Update. Retrieved January 20, 2017.
Open source URL - [9]mitre-attackG0008Open source URL
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