S0554: Egregor

Egregor is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) tool that was first observed in September 2020. Researchers have noted code similarities between Egregor and Sekhmet ransomware, as well as Maze ransomware.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseS0554MalwareObject v1.0ModifiedApr 25, 2025, 14:44 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S0554: Egregor describes [Egregor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0554) is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) tool that was first observed in September 2020. Researchers have noted code similarities between [Egregor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0554) and Sekhmet ransomware, as well as [Maze](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0449) ransomware.(Citation: NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020)(Citation: Cyble Egregor Oct 2020)(Citation: Security Boulevard Egregor Oct 2020)

Executive priority

S0554: Egregor is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0554: Egregor by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S0554: Egregor appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Egregor

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques25 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1497.003	Time Based ChecksSub-technique	Egregor can perform a long sleep (greater than or equal to 3 minutes) to evade detection.CitationJoeSecurity Egregor 2020
Enterprise	T1218.011	Rundll32Sub-technique	Egregor has used rundll32 during execution.CitationCybereason Egregor Nov 2020
Enterprise	T1197	BITS Jobs	Egregor has used BITSadmin to download and execute malicious DLLs.CitationIntrinsec Egregor Nov 2020
Enterprise	T1124	System Time Discovery	Egregor contains functionality to query the local/system time.CitationJoeSecurity Egregor 2020
Enterprise	T1027.002	Software PackingSub-technique	Egregor's payloads are custom-packed, archived and encrypted to prevent analysis.[1][2]
Enterprise	T1039	Data from Network Shared Drive	Egregor can collect any files found in the enumerated drivers before sending it to its C2 channel.[1]
Enterprise	T1106	Native API	Egregor has used the Windows API to make detection more difficult.[2]
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Egregor has been decrypted before execution.[1]CitationCybereason Egregor Nov 2020
Enterprise	T1036.004	Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique	Egregor has masqueraded the svchost.exe process to exfiltrate data.CitationIntrinsec Egregor Nov 2020
Enterprise	T1049	System Network Connections Discovery	Egregor can enumerate all connected drives.[1]
Enterprise	T1033	System Owner/User Discovery	Egregor has used tools to gather information about users.CitationIntrinsec Egregor Nov 2020
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	Egregor has the ability to download files from its C2 server.CitationCybereason Egregor Nov 2020CitationIntrinsec Egregor Nov 2020
Enterprise	T1685	Disable or Modify Tools	Egregor has disabled Windows Defender to evade protections.CitationIntrinsec Egregor Nov 2020
Enterprise	T1497	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Egregor has used multiple anti-analysis and anti-sandbox techniques to prevent automated analysis by sandboxes.[2][1]
Enterprise	T1574.001	DLLSub-technique	Egregor has used DLL side-loading to execute its payload.[2]
Enterprise	T1486	Data Encrypted for Impact	Egregor can encrypt all non-system files using a hybrid AES-RSA algorithm prior to displaying a ransom note.[1]CitationCybereason Egregor Nov 2020
Enterprise	T1069.002	Domain GroupsSub-technique	Egregor can conduct Active Directory reconnaissance using tools such as Sharphound or AdFind.CitationIntrinsec Egregor Nov 2020
Enterprise	T1218.010	Regsvr32Sub-technique	Egregor has used regsvr32.exe to execute malicious DLLs.CitationJoeSecurity Egregor 2020
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	Egregor has communicated with its C2 servers via HTTPS protocol.CitationIntrinsec Egregor Nov 2020
Enterprise	T1219	Remote Access Tools	Egregor has checked for the LogMein event log in an attempt to encrypt files in remote machines.[2]
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command ShellSub-technique	Egregor has used batch files for execution and can launch Internet Explorer from cmd.exe.CitationJoeSecurity Egregor 2020CitationCybereason Egregor Nov 2020
Enterprise	T1484.001	Group Policy ModificationSub-technique	Egregor can modify the GPO to evade detection.CitationCybereason Egregor Nov 2020 CitationIntrinsec Egregor Nov 2020
Enterprise	T1055	Process Injection	Egregor can inject its payload into iexplore.exe process.[2]
Enterprise	T1059.001	PowerShellSub-technique	Egregor has used an encoded PowerShell command by a service created by Cobalt Strike for lateral movement.CitationIntrinsec Egregor Nov 2020
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	Egregor can perform a language check of the infected system and can query the CPU information (cupid).CitationJoeSecurity Egregor 2020[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.0
Created: Dec 29, 2020, 21:32 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 25, 2025, 14:44 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 17d0e143e52e9a45...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 25, 2025, 14:44 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`17d0e143e52e…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 25, 2025, 14:44 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`17d0e143e52e…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020
NHS Digital. (2020, November 26). Egregor Ransomware The RaaS successor to Maze. Retrieved December 29, 2020.
Open source URL
[2]
Cyble Egregor Oct 2020
Cybleinc. (2020, October 31). Egregor Ransomware – A Deep Dive Into Its Activities and Techniques. Retrieved December 29, 2020.
Open source URL
[3]
Security Boulevard Egregor Oct 2020
Meskauskas, T.. (2020, October 29). Egregor: Sekhmet’s Cousin. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
Open source URL
[4]
Egregor
(Citation: NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020)(Citation: Cyble Egregor Oct 2020)
[5]
mitre-attackS0554
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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