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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0121: Sidewinder

Sidewinder is a suspected Indian threat actor group that has been active since at least 2012. They have been observed targeting government, military, and business entities throughout Asia, primarily focusing on Pakistan, China, Nepal, and Afghanistan.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseG0121GroupObject v1.2 Modified
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Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence Medium

Sidewinder is an ATT&CK group entry for a suspected Indian threat actor reported as active since at least 2012 and observed targeting government, military, and business entities in parts of Asia. Its value for defenders is not a single indicator list, but the behavior pattern in the relationships: user-driven execution, scripting, client exploitation, discovery, staging, web-based command and control, tool transfer, and automated collection/exfiltration. For leaders, this makes Sidewinder relevant to resilience planning where phishing, endpoint scripting, and sensitive document exposure could affect government, defense, or regionally connected business operations.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as a validation scenario for targeted intrusion readiness rather than as proof of current exposure. Executives should ask whether the organization can detect and investigate a chain that begins with malicious links or files, uses Windows scripting or trusted utilities, performs broad discovery, stages data locally, and moves data out over common web protocols. This supports control prioritization for endpoint visibility, email/web risk reduction, vulnerability management for client applications, data protection, and incident response evidence collection.

Technical view

ATT&CK does not provide a detection section for Sidewinder, so SOC and IR teams should validate coverage from the related techniques. Key areas include execution through PowerShell, Visual Basic, JavaScript, Mshta, malicious links/files, and exploitation for client execution; discovery of users, processes, network configuration, files, system information, time, installed software, and security tools; local staging and automated collection; ingress tool transfer; web-protocol command and control; and automated exfiltration. Koadic is the associated software relationship and is described as a Windows post-exploitation framework using Windows Script Host, so Windows script execution telemetry is especially important where Windows assets are in scope.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process creation and command-line logging for PowerShell, script hosts, mshta.exe, JavaScript/JScript, and Visual Basic execution
  • Parent-child process relationships showing document, browser, email, script host, or trusted utility execution chains
  • File creation, modification, and directory traversal events related to local data staging and file discovery
  • Discovery command evidence for user, process, network configuration, system information, software, security software, and system time enumeration
  • Network proxy, DNS, firewall, and web gateway logs for outbound HTTP/S or other web-protocol command-and-control patterns

Detection direction

  • Build detections around sequences, not isolated commands: user interaction or client exploitation followed by scripting, discovery, staging, and outbound web traffic is more meaningful than any single administrative utility.
  • Tune for legitimate administration noise because discovery commands, PowerShell, JavaScript, and web protocols are common in enterprise environments.
  • Validate whether obfuscated commands and encoded or encrypted files are visible to existing endpoint, EDR, proxy, and logging controls.
  • Review mshta.exe and Windows Script Host activity where Windows endpoints are present, especially when launched from user-writable paths, browsers, email clients, or document applications.
  • Correlate security software discovery with later evasion, staging, or transfer behaviors; on its own it may overlap with IT inventory activity.

Mitigation priorities

  • Reduce initial execution risk through email and web controls, user-focused safeguards for malicious links/files, and hardening of client applications vulnerable to exploitation.
  • Limit and monitor script execution, including PowerShell, Windows Script Host, JavaScript/JScript, Visual Basic, and mshta.exe where operationally feasible.
  • Maintain patch and vulnerability management for client applications because exploitation for client execution is part of the related behavior set.
  • Improve endpoint visibility for command-line execution, file staging, discovery activity, and suspicious parent-child process chains.
  • Constrain outbound network paths and monitor web-protocol traffic for unusual destinations, automation, or data transfer patterns.
Analyst notes and limits

The strongest defensive value comes from using Sidewinder as a threat-informed test case across phishing/user execution, scripting, discovery, collection, C2, and exfiltration. The official group description includes regional targeting and aliases, while the relationship set provides the practical detection and control validation surface. Koadic’s Windows Script Host behavior is notable, but the group object itself lists no platforms, so platform-specific assumptions should be validated locally.

ATT&CK provides no official detection guidance for this group, and the group object does not specify platforms or tactics. The relationships identify associated software and techniques, but they do not prove current activity against any organization or guarantee that all listed behaviors occur in every intrusion. Local telemetry, asset inventory, geography, business ties, and incident evidence are required for prioritization.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Sidewinder

Sidewinder is a suspected Indian threat actor group that has been active since at least 2012. They have been observed targeting government, military, and business entities throughout Asia, primarily focusing on Pakistan, China, Nepal, and Afghanistan.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

30 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

Sidewinder has exploited vulnerabilities to gain execution including CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2020-0674.[1][3]
Enterprise T1518.001 Security Software Discovery Sub-technique

Sidewinder has used the Windows service winmgmts:\\.\root\SecurityCenter2 to check installed antivirus products.CitationRewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020
Enterprise T1218.005 Mshta Sub-technique

Sidewinder has used mshta.exe to execute malicious payloads.CitationRewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020CitationRewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020
Enterprise T1598.003 Spearphishing Link Sub-technique

Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious links to credential harvesting websites.[1]
Enterprise T1124 System Time Discovery

Sidewinder has used tools to obtain the current system time.[1]
Enterprise T1566.002 Spearphishing Link Sub-technique

Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious links often crafted for specific targets.[1][3]
Enterprise T1074.001 Local Data Staging Sub-technique

Sidewinder has collected stolen files in a temporary folder in preparation for exfiltration.[1]
Enterprise T1057 Process Discovery

Sidewinder has used tools to identify running processes on the victim's machine.[1]
Enterprise T1059.007 JavaScript Sub-technique

Sidewinder has used JavaScript to drop and execute malware loaders.[1]CitationRewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020
Enterprise T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File Sub-technique

Sidewinder has used base64 encoding and ECDH-P256 encryption for payloads.[1]CitationRewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020[3]
Enterprise T1020 Automated Exfiltration

Sidewinder has configured tools to automatically send collected files to attacker controlled servers.[1]
Enterprise T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Sidewinder has used LNK files to download remote files to the victim's network.[1][3]
Enterprise T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Sub-technique

Sidewinder has added paths to executables in the Registry to establish persistence.CitationRewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020CitationRewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020[3]
Enterprise T1071.001 Web Protocols Sub-technique

Sidewinder has used HTTP in C2 communications.[1]CitationRewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020CitationRewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020
Enterprise T1559.002 Dynamic Data Exchange Sub-technique

Sidewinder has used the ActiveXObject utility to create OLE objects to obtain execution through Internet Explorer.CitationRewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020CitationRewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020
Enterprise T1083 File and Directory Discovery

Sidewinder has used malware to collect information on files and directories.[1]
Enterprise T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery

Sidewinder has used malware to collect information on network interfaces, including the MAC address.[1]
Enterprise T1598.002 Spearphishing Attachment Sub-technique

Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious attachments that lead victims to credential harvesting websites.[1]CitationRewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020[3]
Enterprise T1027.010 Command Obfuscation Sub-technique

Sidewinder has used base64 encoding for scripts.[1]CitationRewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020
Enterprise T1059.001 PowerShell Sub-technique

Sidewinder has used PowerShell to drop and execute malware loaders.[1]
Enterprise T1518 Software Discovery

Sidewinder has used tools to enumerate software installed on an infected host.[1]CitationRewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020
Enterprise T1059.005 Visual Basic Sub-technique

Sidewinder has used VBScript to drop and execute malware loaders.[1]
Enterprise T1082 System Information Discovery

Sidewinder has used tools to collect the computer name, OS version, installed hotfixes, as well as information regarding the memory and processor on a compromised host.[1]CitationRewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020
Enterprise T1119 Automated Collection

Sidewinder has used tools to automatically collect system and network configuration information.[1]
Enterprise T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment Sub-technique

Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious attachments often crafted for specific targets.[1]
Enterprise T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location Sub-technique

Sidewinder has named malicious files rekeywiz.exe to match the name of a legitimate Windows executable.CitationRewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020
Enterprise T1204.001 Malicious Link Sub-technique

Sidewinder has lured targets to click on malicious links to gain execution in the target environment.[1]CitationRewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020CitationRewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020[3]
Enterprise T1204.002 Malicious File Sub-technique

Sidewinder has lured targets to click on malicious files to gain execution in the target environment.[1]CitationRewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020CitationRewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020[3]
Enterprise T1033 System Owner/User Discovery

Sidewinder has used tools to identify the user of a compromised host.[1]
Enterprise T1574.001 DLL Sub-technique

Sidewinder has used DLL side-loading to drop and execute malicious payloads including the hijacking of the legitimate Windows application file rekeywiz.exe.[1]
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Tool Enterprise

S0250: Koadic

Koadic is a Windows post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool that is publicly available on GitHub. Koadic has several options for staging payloads and creating implants, and performs most of its operations using Windows Script Host.[1][2][3]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Technique T1203: Exploitation for Client Execution Enterprise uses · Technique T1518.001: Security Software Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1218.005: Mshta Enterprise uses · Technique T1598.003: Spearphishing Link Enterprise uses · Technique T1124: System Time Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1566.002: Spearphishing Link Enterprise uses · Technique T1074.001: Local Data Staging Enterprise uses · Technique T1057: Process Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1059.007: JavaScript Enterprise uses · Technique T1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded File Enterprise uses · Technique T1020: Automated Exfiltration Enterprise uses · Technique T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer Enterprise uses · Technique T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Enterprise uses · Technique T1071.001: Web Protocols Enterprise uses · Technique T1559.002: Dynamic Data Exchange Enterprise uses · Technique T1083: File and Directory Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1598.002: Spearphishing Attachment Enterprise uses · Technique T1027.010: Command Obfuscation Enterprise uses · Technique T1059.001: PowerShell Enterprise uses · Technique T1518: Software Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1059.005: Visual Basic Enterprise uses · Technique T1082: System Information Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1119: Automated Collection Enterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
c657657a434133f7...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.2 Current bundle c657657a4341…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ATT Sidewinder January 2021

    Hegel, T. (2021, January 13). A Global Perspective of the SideWinder APT. Retrieved January 27, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Securelist APT Trends April 2018

    Global Research and Analysis Team . (2018, April 12). APT Trends report Q1 2018. Retrieved January 27, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Cyble Sidewinder September 2020

    Cyble. (2020, September 26). SideWinder APT Targets with futuristic Tactics and Techniques. Retrieved January 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Rattlesnake

    (Citation: Cyble Sidewinder September 2020)

  5. [5]
    T-APT-04

    (Citation: Cyble Sidewinder September 2020)

  6. [6]
    mitre-attack G0121
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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