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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0012: Darkhotel

Darkhotel is a suspected South Korean threat group that has targeted victims primarily in East Asia since at least 2004. The group's name is based on cyber espionage operations conducted via hotel Internet networks against traveling executives and other select guests. Darkhotel has also conducted spearphishing campaigns and infected victims through peer-to-peer and file sharing networks.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseG0012GroupObject v3.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0012: Darkhotel describes [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012) is a suspected South Korean threat group that has targeted victims primarily in East Asia since at least 2004. The group's name is based on cyber espionage operations conducted via hotel Internet networks against traveling executives and other select guests. [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012) has also conducted spearphishing campaigns and infected victims through peer-to-peer and file sharing networks.(Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel)(Citation: Secure...

Executive priority

G0012: Darkhotel is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0012: Darkhotel by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0012: Darkhotel appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Darkhotel

Darkhotel is a suspected South Korean threat group that has targeted victims primarily in East Asia since at least 2004. The group's name is based on cyber espionage operations conducted via hotel Internet networks against traveling executives and other select guests. Darkhotel has also conducted spearphishing campaigns and infected victims through peer-to-peer and file sharing networks.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

24 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

Darkhotel has searched for anti-malware strings and anti-virus processes running on the system.[2][4]

EnterpriseT1497.002User Activity Based ChecksSub-technique

Darkhotel has used malware that repeatedly checks the mouse cursor position to determine if a real user is on the system.CitationLastline DarkHotel Just In Time Decryption Nov 2015

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Darkhotel has obfuscated code using RC4, XOR, and RSA.[2][5]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Darkhotel has used AES-256 and 3DES for C2 communications.[5]

EnterpriseT1080Taint Shared Content

Darkhotel used a virus that propagates by infecting executables stored on shared drives.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Darkhotel has collected the hostname, OS version, service pack version, and the processor architecture from the victim’s machine.[2][5]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

Darkhotel has used a keylogger.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Darkhotel has sent spearphishing emails with malicious RAR and .LNK attachments.[2][5]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Darkhotel malware can collect a list of running processes on a system.[2]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Darkhotel has decrypted strings and imports using RC4 during execution.[2][5]

EnterpriseT1189Drive-by Compromise

Darkhotel used embedded iframes on hotel login portals to redirect selected victims to download malware.[1]

EnterpriseT1091Replication Through Removable Media

Darkhotel's selective infector modifies executables stored on removable media as a method of spreading across computers.[1]

EnterpriseT1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Darkhotel malware has employed just-in-time decryption of strings to evade sandbox detection.CitationLastline DarkHotel Just In Time Decryption Nov 2015

EnterpriseT1497.001System ChecksSub-technique

Darkhotel malware has used a series of checks to determine if it's being analyzed; checks include the length of executable names, if a filename ends with .Md5.exe, and if the program is executed from the root of the C:\ drive, as well as checks for sandbox-related libraries.CitationLastline DarkHotel Just In Time Decryption Nov 2015[4]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

Darkhotel malware can obtain system time from a compromised host.CitationLastline DarkHotel Just In Time Decryption Nov 2015

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

Darkhotel has used code-signing certificates on its malware that are either forged due to weak keys or stolen. Darkhotel has also stolen certificates and signed backdoors and downloaders with them.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Darkhotel has collected the IP address and network adapter information from the victim’s machine.[2][5]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Darkhotel has used malware that searched for files with specific patterns.[5]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Darkhotel has dropped an mspaint.lnk shortcut to disk which launches a shell script that downloads and executes a file.[2]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Darkhotel has used malware that is disguised as a Secure Shell (SSH) tool.[4]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Darkhotel has used first-stage payloads that download additional malware from C2 servers.[4]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Darkhotel has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.[1]

EnterpriseT1203Exploitation for Client Execution

Darkhotel has exploited Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2015-8651 for execution.[4]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Darkhotel has sent spearphishing emails in an attempt to lure users into clicking on a malicious attachments.[2][5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1518.001: Security Software DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.002: User Activity Based ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1080: Taint Shared ContentEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1056.001: KeyloggingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1189: Drive-by CompromiseEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1091: Replication Through Removable MediaEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497: Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.001: System ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1124: System Time DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1553.002: Code SigningEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1203: Exploitation for Client ExecutionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
3.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
05b8b376b35f4ec2...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.23.0Current bundle05b8b376b35f…
19.13.0Older bundle520ca8dca182…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Kaspersky Darkhotel

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Microsoft Digital Defense FY20 Sept 2020

    Microsoft . (2020, September 29). Microsoft Digital Defense Report FY20. Retrieved April 21, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM June 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, June 9). Reverse-engineering DUBNIUM. Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, July 14). Reverse engineering DUBNIUM – Stage 2 payload analysis . Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    DUBNIUM

    (Citation: Microsoft Digital Defense FY20 Sept 2020)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM June 2016)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM Flash June 2016)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016)

  7. [7]
    Darkhotel

    (Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel)

  8. [8]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM Flash June 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, June 20). Reverse-engineering DUBNIUM’s Flash-targeting exploit. Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Zigzag Hail

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  11. [11]
    mitre-attackG0012
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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