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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0012: Darkhotel

Darkhotel is a suspected South Korean threat group that has targeted victims primarily in East Asia since at least 2004. The group's name is based on cyber espionage operations conducted via hotel Internet networks against traveling executives and other select guests. Darkhotel has also conducted spearphishing campaigns and infected victims through peer-to-peer and file sharing networks.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseG0012GroupObject v3.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Darkhotel matters because ATT&CK describes it as a long-running espionage-focused group associated with targeting traveling executives through hotel Internet networks, as well as spearphishing and peer-to-peer/file-sharing infection paths. For leadership, the decision value is not the name alone; it is whether high-value users, travel workflows, shared content, and endpoint controls are resilient when attacks begin outside the normal corporate perimeter.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as a test of executive protection, user-targeted intrusion readiness, and evidence quality. Ask whether the organization can protect and investigate traveling executives, detect malicious attachments or drive-by compromise, validate code-signing trust decisions, and respond when credentials or sensitive files may have been collected. Because MITRE provides no official detection text for this group, confidence should come from local telemetry, control validation, and incident response exercises rather than assumed coverage.

Technical view

SOC and IR teams should map coverage to the related ATT&CK techniques: initial access through drive-by compromise, malicious files, spearphishing attachments, removable media, and tainted shared content; execution through client exploitation and Windows command shell; discovery of system, network, process, file, time, and security software details; stealth through encoded files, masqueraded resource names, sandbox evasion, deobfuscation, and code signing; persistence through Windows Run keys/startup folders; collection through keylogging; and command-and-control/tool transfer using encrypted traffic and ingress tool transfer. Validate detections as behavior chains, not single indicators, because the supplied ATT&CK object has no official detection guidance.

Likely telemetry

  • Email security and attachment detonation results for targeted spearphishing attachments
  • Endpoint process creation, command-line, parent-child process, and script or shell execution logs
  • File creation, modification, rename, and directory enumeration telemetry, including shared locations
  • Windows Registry Run key and Startup Folder change events where Windows is in scope
  • Browser, web proxy, DNS, and network session logs relevant to drive-by compromise and external tool transfer

Detection direction

  • Build detections around sequences: initial file/web exposure followed by discovery commands, encoded or renamed payloads, persistence changes, and external file transfer.
  • Tune for high-value user context, especially executives and travelers, while avoiding assumptions that every travel network event is malicious.
  • Review whether sandbox and malware-analysis workflows account for samples that change behavior based on system checks or user activity checks.
  • Validate coverage for signed-but-suspicious binaries; code signing should inform trust decisions, not automatically suppress investigation.
  • Monitor shared drives, SaaS shared content, and internal repositories for unexpected executable or script content where Taint Shared Content is relevant.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with protection for high-risk users: hardened endpoints, phishing-resistant processes, safe travel guidance, and rapid reporting paths for suspicious hotel-network or attachment events.
  • Maintain disciplined vulnerability and patch management for client applications because related behavior includes exploitation for client execution and drive-by compromise.
  • Restrict and monitor execution from user-writable paths, shared content, removable media, and startup locations where business operations allow.
  • Apply least privilege and application control principles to reduce the value of keylogging, command shell abuse, persistence, and tool transfer.
  • Review code-signing policy so signed binaries are still subject to behavioral inspection and certificate anomalies can be investigated.
Additional notes and limits

The supplied ATT&CK object identifies aliases Darkhotel, DUBNIUM, and Zigzag Hail, and describes targeting primarily in East Asia since at least 2004, including hotel Internet operations against traveling executives, spearphishing, and peer-to-peer/file-sharing infection. The relationship set is rich enough to guide defensive validation across initial access, execution, discovery, persistence, collection, command and control, and stealth behaviors, but it should be localized to the organization’s actual platforms and telemetry.

The group object lists no platforms, tactics, labels, or official detection text. Related techniques include platform information, but that does not prove every platform is used in every Darkhotel-related intrusion. This take does not claim current activity, customer exposure, attribution certainty beyond MITRE’s wording, or guaranteed detection coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Darkhotel

Darkhotel is a suspected South Korean threat group that has targeted victims primarily in East Asia since at least 2004. The group's name is based on cyber espionage operations conducted via hotel Internet networks against traveling executives and other select guests. Darkhotel has also conducted spearphishing campaigns and infected victims through peer-to-peer and file sharing networks.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

24 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

Darkhotel has searched for anti-malware strings and anti-virus processes running on the system.[2][4]

EnterpriseT1497.002User Activity Based ChecksSub-technique

Darkhotel has used malware that repeatedly checks the mouse cursor position to determine if a real user is on the system.[5]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Darkhotel has obfuscated code using RC4, XOR, and RSA.[2][6]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Darkhotel has used AES-256 and 3DES for C2 communications.[6]

EnterpriseT1080Taint Shared Content

Darkhotel used a virus that propagates by infecting executables stored on shared drives.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Darkhotel has collected the hostname, OS version, service pack version, and the processor architecture from the victim’s machine.[2][6]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

Darkhotel has used a keylogger.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Darkhotel has sent spearphishing emails with malicious RAR and .LNK attachments.[2][6]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Darkhotel malware can collect a list of running processes on a system.[2]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Darkhotel has decrypted strings and imports using RC4 during execution.[2][6]

EnterpriseT1189Drive-by Compromise

Darkhotel used embedded iframes on hotel login portals to redirect selected victims to download malware.[1]

EnterpriseT1091Replication Through Removable Media

Darkhotel's selective infector modifies executables stored on removable media as a method of spreading across computers.[1]

EnterpriseT1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Darkhotel malware has employed just-in-time decryption of strings to evade sandbox detection.[5]

EnterpriseT1497.001System ChecksSub-technique

Darkhotel malware has used a series of checks to determine if it's being analyzed; checks include the length of executable names, if a filename ends with .Md5.exe, and if the program is executed from the root of the C:\ drive, as well as checks for sandbox-related libraries.[5][4]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

Darkhotel malware can obtain system time from a compromised host.[5]

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

Darkhotel has used code-signing certificates on its malware that are either forged due to weak keys or stolen. Darkhotel has also stolen certificates and signed backdoors and downloaders with them.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Darkhotel has collected the IP address and network adapter information from the victim’s machine.[2][6]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Darkhotel has used malware that searched for files with specific patterns.[6]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Darkhotel has dropped an mspaint.lnk shortcut to disk which launches a shell script that downloads and executes a file.[2]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Darkhotel has used malware that is disguised as a Secure Shell (SSH) tool.[4]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Darkhotel has used first-stage payloads that download additional malware from C2 servers.[4]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Darkhotel has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.[1]

EnterpriseT1203Exploitation for Client Execution

Darkhotel has exploited Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2015-8651 for execution.[4]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Darkhotel has sent spearphishing emails in an attempt to lure users into clicking on a malicious attachments.[2][6]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
3.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
520ca8dca1825aae...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.13.0Current bundle520ca8dca182…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Kaspersky Darkhotel

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Microsoft Digital Defense FY20 Sept 2020

    Microsoft . (2020, September 29). Microsoft Digital Defense Report FY20. Retrieved April 21, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM June 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, June 9). Reverse-engineering DUBNIUM. Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Lastline DarkHotel Just In Time Decryption Nov 2015

    Arunpreet Singh, Clemens Kolbitsch. (2015, November 5). Defeating Darkhotel Just-In-Time Decryption. Retrieved April 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, July 14). Reverse engineering DUBNIUM – Stage 2 payload analysis . Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    DUBNIUM

    (Citation: Microsoft Digital Defense FY20 Sept 2020)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM June 2016)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM Flash June 2016)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016)

  8. [8]
    DUBNIUM

    (Citation: Microsoft Digital Defense FY20 Sept 2020)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM June 2016)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM Flash June 2016)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016)

  9. [9]
    DUBNIUM

    (Citation: Microsoft Digital Defense FY20 Sept 2020)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM June 2016)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM Flash June 2016)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016)

  10. [10]
    Darkhotel

    (Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel)

  11. [11]
    Darkhotel

    (Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel)

  12. [12]
    Darkhotel

    (Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel)

  13. [13]
    Kaspersky Darkhotel

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Kaspersky Darkhotel

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM Flash June 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, June 20). Reverse-engineering DUBNIUM’s Flash-targeting exploit. Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM Flash June 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, June 20). Reverse-engineering DUBNIUM’s Flash-targeting exploit. Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM Flash June 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, June 20). Reverse-engineering DUBNIUM’s Flash-targeting exploit. Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, July 14). Reverse engineering DUBNIUM – Stage 2 payload analysis . Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, July 14). Reverse engineering DUBNIUM – Stage 2 payload analysis . Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM June 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, June 9). Reverse-engineering DUBNIUM. Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM June 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, June 9). Reverse-engineering DUBNIUM. Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Microsoft Digital Defense FY20 Sept 2020

    Microsoft . (2020, September 29). Microsoft Digital Defense Report FY20. Retrieved April 21, 2021.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Microsoft Digital Defense FY20 Sept 2020

    Microsoft . (2020, September 29). Microsoft Digital Defense Report FY20. Retrieved April 21, 2021.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
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    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
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    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Zigzag Hail

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  30. [30]
    Zigzag Hail

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  31. [31]
    Zigzag Hail

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  32. [32]
    mitre-attackG0012
    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    mitre-attackG0012
    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    mitre-attackG0012
    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM June 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, June 9). Reverse-engineering DUBNIUM. Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM June 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, June 9). Reverse-engineering DUBNIUM. Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    Lastline DarkHotel Just In Time Decryption Nov 2015

    Arunpreet Singh, Clemens Kolbitsch. (2015, November 5). Defeating Darkhotel Just-In-Time Decryption. Retrieved April 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, July 14). Reverse engineering DUBNIUM – Stage 2 payload analysis . Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, July 14). Reverse engineering DUBNIUM – Stage 2 payload analysis . Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, July 14). Reverse engineering DUBNIUM – Stage 2 payload analysis . Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, July 14). Reverse engineering DUBNIUM – Stage 2 payload analysis . Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    Kaspersky Darkhotel

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    Kaspersky Darkhotel

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, July 14). Reverse engineering DUBNIUM – Stage 2 payload analysis . Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, July 14). Reverse engineering DUBNIUM – Stage 2 payload analysis . Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    Kaspersky Darkhotel

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.

    Open source URL
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    Kaspersky Darkhotel

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.

    Open source URL
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    Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, July 14). Reverse engineering DUBNIUM – Stage 2 payload analysis . Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  55. [55]
    Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, July 14). Reverse engineering DUBNIUM – Stage 2 payload analysis . Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
  56. [56]
    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, July 14). Reverse engineering DUBNIUM – Stage 2 payload analysis . Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, July 14). Reverse engineering DUBNIUM – Stage 2 payload analysis . Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    Kaspersky Darkhotel

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.

    Open source URL
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    Kaspersky Darkhotel

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.

    Open source URL
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    Kaspersky Darkhotel

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.

    Open source URL
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    Kaspersky Darkhotel

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.

    Open source URL
  68. [68]
    Lastline DarkHotel Just In Time Decryption Nov 2015

    Arunpreet Singh, Clemens Kolbitsch. (2015, November 5). Defeating Darkhotel Just-In-Time Decryption. Retrieved April 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Lastline DarkHotel Just In Time Decryption Nov 2015

    Arunpreet Singh, Clemens Kolbitsch. (2015, November 5). Defeating Darkhotel Just-In-Time Decryption. Retrieved April 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Lastline DarkHotel Just In Time Decryption Nov 2015

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    Open source URL
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    Lastline DarkHotel Just In Time Decryption Nov 2015

    Arunpreet Singh, Clemens Kolbitsch. (2015, November 5). Defeating Darkhotel Just-In-Time Decryption. Retrieved April 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Microsoft. (2016, June 9). Reverse-engineering DUBNIUM. Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Microsoft DUBNIUM June 2016

    Microsoft. (2016, June 9). Reverse-engineering DUBNIUM. Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Lastline DarkHotel Just In Time Decryption Nov 2015

    Arunpreet Singh, Clemens Kolbitsch. (2015, November 5). Defeating Darkhotel Just-In-Time Decryption. Retrieved April 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Lastline DarkHotel Just In Time Decryption Nov 2015

    Arunpreet Singh, Clemens Kolbitsch. (2015, November 5). Defeating Darkhotel Just-In-Time Decryption. Retrieved April 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Kaspersky Darkhotel

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    Open source URL
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    Kaspersky Darkhotel

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    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

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    Open source URL
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    Microsoft. (2016, July 14). Reverse engineering DUBNIUM – Stage 2 payload analysis . Retrieved March 31, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015

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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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