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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0455: Metamorfo

Metamorfo is a Latin-American banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that has been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses on targeting banks and cryptocurrency services in Brazil and Mexico.[1][2]

EnterpriseS0455MalwareObject v2.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0455: Metamorfo describes [Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a Latin-American banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that has been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses on targeting banks and cryptocurrency services in Brazil and Mexico.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

Executive priority

S0455: Metamorfo is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0455: Metamorfo by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0455: Metamorfo appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Metamorfo

Metamorfo is a Latin-American banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that has been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses on targeting banks and cryptocurrency services in Brazil and Mexico.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

46 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1059.007JavaScriptSub-technique

Metamorfo includes payloads written in JavaScript.[1]

EnterpriseT1518Software Discovery

Metamorfo has searched the compromised system for banking applications.CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018[2]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

Metamorfo has a command to launch a keylogger and capture keystrokes on the victim’s machine.CitationFortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020[2]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

Metamorfo collects a list of installed antivirus software from the victim’s system.CitationFortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020[2]

EnterpriseT1573.002Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique

Metamorfo's C2 communication has been encrypted using OpenSSL.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Metamorfo has used HTTP for C2.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1218.007MsiexecSub-technique

Metamorfo has used MsiExec.exe to automatically execute files.CitationFortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020[2]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Metamorfo requires the user to double-click the executable to run the malicious HTA file or to download a malicious installer.CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018[2]

EnterpriseT1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique

Metamorfo has injected a malicious DLL into the Windows Media Player process (wmplayer.exe).[1]

EnterpriseT1102.001Dead Drop ResolverSub-technique

Metamorfo has used YouTube to store and hide C&C server domains.[2]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Metamorfo has encrypted payloads and strings.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Metamorfo has used native WINAPI calls.[1]CitationFortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

Metamorfo has side-loaded its malicious DLL file.[1]CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018[2]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Metamorfo has been delivered to victims via emails with malicious HTML attachments.CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018[2]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

Metamorfo uses JavaScript to get the system time.[1]

EnterpriseT1095Non-Application Layer Protocol

Metamorfo has used raw TCP for C2.CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Metamorfo has configured persistence to the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, Spotify =% APPDATA%\Spotify\Spotify.exe and used .LNK files in the startup folder to achieve persistence.[1]CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018CitationFortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020[2]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Metamorfo can send the data it collects to the C2 server.[2]

EnterpriseT1070Indicator Removal

Metamorfo has a command to delete a Registry key it uses, \Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\notes.CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018

EnterpriseT1056.002GUI Input CaptureSub-technique

Metamorfo has displayed fake forms on top of banking sites to intercept credentials from victims.CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018

EnterpriseT1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Metamorfo has embedded a "vmdetect.exe" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Metamorfo has deleted itself from the system after execution.[1]CitationFortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Metamorfo has written process names to the Registry, disabled IE browser features, deleted Registry keys, and changed the ExtendedUIHoverTime key.[1]CitationFortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018[2]

EnterpriseT1102.003One-Way CommunicationSub-technique

Metamorfo has downloaded a zip file for execution on the system.[1]CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018CitationFortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020

EnterpriseT1119Automated Collection

Metamorfo has automatically collected mouse clicks, continuous screenshots on the machine, and set timers to collect the contents of the clipboard and website browsing.CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018

EnterpriseT1571Non-Standard Port

Metamorfo has communicated with hosts over raw TCP on port 9999.CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018

EnterpriseT1218.005MshtaSub-technique

Metamorfo has used mshta.exe to execute a HTA payload.CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018

EnterpriseT1115Clipboard Data

Metamorfo has a function to hijack data from the clipboard by monitoring the contents of the clipboard and replacing the cryptocurrency wallet with the attacker's.CitationFortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020[2]

EnterpriseT1129Shared Modules

Metamorfo had used AutoIt to load and execute the DLL payload.CitationFortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Metamorfo has collected the hostname and operating system version from the compromised host.CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018CitationFortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020[2]

EnterpriseT1565.002Transmitted Data ManipulationSub-technique

Metamorfo has a function that can watch the contents of the system clipboard for valid bitcoin addresses, which it then overwrites with the attacker's address.CitationFortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020[2]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

Metamorfo can collect screenshots of the victim’s machine.CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018[2]

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

Metamorfo has digitally signed executables using AVAST Software certificates.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Metamorfo has used cmd.exe /c to execute files.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

Metamorfo has used VMProtect to pack and protect files.CitationFortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

Metamorfo has a function to kill processes associated with defenses and can prevent certain processes from launching.[1]CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018

EnterpriseT1010Application Window Discovery

Metamorfo can enumerate all windows on the victim’s machine.CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018CitationFortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Metamorfo has collected the username from the victim's machine.[2]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Metamorfo has disguised an MSI file as the Adobe Acrobat Reader Installer and has masqueraded payloads as OneDrive, WhatsApp, or Spotify, for example.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Metamorfo has used MSI files to download additional files to execute.[1]CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018CitationFortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020[2]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Metamorfo has performed process name checks and has monitored applications.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Metamorfo has encrypted C2 commands with AES-256.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

Metamorfo has used VBS code on victims’ systems.CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018

EnterpriseT1564.003Hidden WindowSub-technique

Metamorfo has hidden its GUI using the ShowWindow() WINAPI call.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Upon execution, Metamorfo has unzipped itself after being downloaded to the system and has performed string decryption.[1]CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018[2]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Metamorfo has searched the Program Files directories for specific folders and has searched for strings related to its mutexes.[1]CitationFortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020CitationFireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
2.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
544ae66f95dc1ef9...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.02.1Current bundle544ae66f95dc…
19.22.1Older bundle544ae66f95dc…
19.12.1Older bundle544ae66f95dc…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020

    Erlich, C. (2020, April 3). The Avast Abuser: Metamorfo Banking Malware Hides By Abusing Avast Executable. Retrieved May 26, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019

    ESET Research. (2019, October 3). Casbaneiro: peculiarities of this banking Trojan that affects Brazil and Mexico. Retrieved September 23, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Casbaneiro

    (Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

  4. [4]
    Metamorfo

    (Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

  5. [5]
    mitre-attackS0455
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.