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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0134: Transparent Tribe

Transparent Tribe is a suspected Pakistan-based threat group that has been active since at least 2013, primarily targeting diplomatic, defense, and research organizations in India and Afghanistan.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseG0134GroupObject v1.2Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0134: Transparent Tribe describes [Transparent Tribe](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) is a suspected Pakistan-based threat group that has been active since at least 2013, primarily targeting diplomatic, defense, and research organizations in India and Afghanistan.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)

Executive priority

G0134: Transparent Tribe is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0134: Transparent Tribe by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0134: Transparent Tribe appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Transparent Tribe

Transparent Tribe is a suspected Pakistan-based threat group that has been active since at least 2013, primarily targeting diplomatic, defense, and research organizations in India and Afghanistan.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1189Drive-by Compromise

Transparent Tribe has used websites with malicious hyperlinks and iframes to infect targeted victims with Crimson, njRAT, and other malicious tools.[1][4][3]

EnterpriseT1608.004Drive-by TargetSub-technique

Transparent Tribe has set up websites with malicious hyperlinks and iframes to infect targeted victims with Crimson, njRAT, and other malicious tools.[1][4][3]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Transparent Tribe has used weaponized documents in e-mail to compromise targeted systems.[1][2]CitationTalos Oblique RAT March 2021[3][4]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Transparent Tribe has dropped encoded executables on compromised hosts.[1]

EnterpriseT1568Dynamic Resolution

Transparent Tribe has used dynamic DNS services to set up C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1584.001DomainsSub-technique

Transparent Tribe has compromised domains for use in targeted malicious campaigns.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

Transparent Tribe has crafted VBS-based malicious documents.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

Transparent Tribe has embedded links to malicious downloads in e-mails.CitationTalos Oblique RAT March 2021[3]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Transparent Tribe can mimic legitimate Windows directories by using the same icons and names.[2]

EnterpriseT1583.001DomainsSub-technique

Transparent Tribe has registered domains to mimic file sharing, government, defense, and research websites for use in targeted campaigns.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique

Transparent Tribe can hide legitimate directories and replace them with malicious copies of the same name.[2]

EnterpriseT1203Exploitation for Client Execution

Transparent Tribe has crafted malicious files to exploit CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2010-3333 for execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Transparent Tribe has sent spearphishing e-mails with attachments to deliver malicious payloads.[1][2]CitationTalos Oblique RAT March 2021[3][4]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

Transparent Tribe has directed users to open URLs hosting malicious content.CitationTalos Oblique RAT March 2021[3]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S0385: njRAT

njRAT is a remote access tool (RAT) that was first observed in 2012. It has been used by threat actors in the Middle East.[1]

Windows
CampaignEnterprise

C0011: C0011

C0011 was a suspected cyber espionage campaign conducted by Transparent Tribe that targeted students at universities and colleges in India. Security researchers noted this campaign against students was a significant shift from Transparent Tribe's historic targeting Indian government, military, and think tank personnel, and assessed it was still ongoing as of July 2022.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

attributed to · CampaignC0011: C0011Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1189: Drive-by CompromiseEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0334: DarkCometEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1608.004: Drive-by TargetEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0644: ObliqueRATEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1568: Dynamic ResolutionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1584.001: DomainsEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0385: njRATEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.002: Spearphishing LinkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1583.001: DomainsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1564.001: Hidden Files and DirectoriesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1203: Exploitation for Client ExecutionEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0115: CrimsonEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.001: Malicious LinkEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0643: PeppyEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
2b543550640dd3c7...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.2Current bundle2b543550640d…
19.11.2Older bundle910a17358cd8…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016

    Huss, D. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020

    Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved September 2, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021

    Malhotra, A. et al. (2021, May 13). Transparent Tribe APT expands its Windows malware arsenal. Retrieved September 2, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Unit 42 ProjectM March 2016

    Falcone, R. and Conant S. (2016, March 25). ProjectM: Link Found Between Pakistani Actor and Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved September 2, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    APT36

    (Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)

  6. [6]
    COPPER FIELDSTONE

    (Citation: Secureworks COPPER FIELDSTONE Profile)

  7. [7]
    Crowdstrike Mythic Leopard Profile

    Crowdstrike. (n.d.). Mythic Leopard. Retrieved October 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Mythic Leopard

    (Citation: Crowdstrike Mythic Leopard Profile)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)

  9. [9]
    ProjectM

    (Citation: Unit 42 ProjectM March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)

  10. [10]
    Secureworks COPPER FIELDSTONE Profile

    Secureworks. (n.d.). COPPER FIELDSTONE. Retrieved October 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    mitre-attackG0134
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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