S9032: MuddyViper
MuddyViper is custom backdoor written in C and C++ used by MuddyWater for command and control (C2) communications and persistence. MuddyViper is loaded by Fooder and sends frequent messages to the C2 server.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S9032: MuddyViper describes [MuddyViper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9032) is custom backdoor written in C and C++ used by [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) for command and control (C2) communications and persistence. [MuddyViper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9032) is loaded by [Fooder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9033) and sends frequent messages to the C2 server.(Citation: ESET_MuddyWater_Dec2025)
Executive priority
S9032: MuddyViper is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S9032: MuddyViper by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S9032: MuddyViper appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
MuddyViper
MuddyViper is custom backdoor written in C and C++ used by MuddyWater for command and control (C2) communications and persistence. MuddyViper is loaded by Fooder and sends frequent messages to the C2 server.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1678 | Delay Execution | MuddyViper has the ability to sleep for a certain amount of time, with the default being one minute.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | MuddyViper has the ability to check for a specified list of security tools in the compromised environment.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | MuddyViper has the ability to download files from the C2 server. Additionally, MuddyViper has the ability to download a file in chunks with sleep time between each chunk.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique | MuddyViper has the ability to encrypt C2 communication using AES-CBC using the CNG API, the key `0608101047106453101617106423101013101012101083109710108585106969`, and the initialization vector `0`.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1560 | Archive Collected Data | MuddyViper has archived collected web browser data into a file named CacheDump.zip.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | MuddyViper has the ability to establish persistence by creating a scheduled task named ManageOnDriveUpdater to launch itself during system startup.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | MuddyViper has the ability to collect running processes.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | MuddyViper has used HTTP GET requests over port 443 and with the WINHTTP_FLAG_SECURE set to SSL/TLS via the WinHTTP API.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | MuddyViper has the ability to relaunch itself using the `CreateProcessW` API.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | MuddyViper has the ability to clear the Registry values in the Windows Startup folder that were previously set for persistence.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1056.002 | GUI Input CaptureSub-technique | MuddyViper has displayed a fake Windows Security dialog to gather credentials.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1620 | Reflective Code Loading | MuddyViper has reflectively loaded the decrypted HackBrowserData tool in a new thread.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | MuddyViper has decrypted the embedded HackBrowserData tool prior to execution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | MuddyViper has uploaded files to the C2 server. Additionally, MuddyViper has the ability to upload the specified file in chunks with sleep time between each chunk.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | MuddyViper has used PowerShell.exe to launch a reverse shell.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | MuddyViper has launched a reverse shell using a provided command line.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | MuddyViper has used cmd.exe to launch a reverse shell.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | MuddyViper has the ability to establish persistence by configuring its installation directory as a Windows Startup folder by setting the following Registry values to `%APPDATALOCAL%\Microsoft\Windows\PPBCompatCache\ManagerCache`: `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders\Startup` and `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders\Startup`.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0069: MuddyWater
MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East (specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia), Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. MuddyWater has reused domains dating back to October 2025, and has a preference for NameCheap and Hosterdaddy Private Limited (AS136557). In late 2025 and early 2026, MuddyWater used commercial satellite internet (i.e., Starlink) for command and control (C2) communication. [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 256ec59833f4… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 256ec59833f4… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 256ec59833f4… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]ESET_MuddyWater_Dec2025
ESET Research. (2025, December 2). MuddyWater: Snakes by the riverbank. Retrieved February 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS9032Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.