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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0339: Micropsia

Micropsia is a remote access tool written in Delphi.[1][2]

EnterpriseS0339MalwareObject v1.2Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Micropsia is a Windows remote access tool. Its ATT&CK relationships make it material because the behavior spans persistence, command execution, discovery, credential collection through keylogging, screen/audio capture, automated collection, archiving, tool transfer, and web-protocol command and control. For leaders, the practical question is not whether one malware name is blocked; it is whether Windows endpoint, identity, network, and incident response controls can expose a remote-access intrusion as it moves from foothold to surveillance and data collection.

Executive priority

Prioritize Micropsia as a readiness test for remote-access malware on Windows systems. The linked behaviors touch business continuity and sensitive-information risk: adversaries can discover users and systems, inspect security tooling, persist through shortcut modification, collect keystrokes and screen/audio content, stage data with archives, and communicate over common web protocols. Executives should ask whether SOC coverage can correlate these behaviors into an incident narrative, whether IR playbooks include credential reset and host containment decisions, and whether audit evidence proves collection of the endpoint and network logs needed to investigate this class of activity.

Technical view

Validate Windows-focused detections and response procedures around the related ATT&CK techniques: encoded or encrypted files, WMI execution, Windows command shell activity, user/system/file/security-software discovery, keylogging, screen and audio capture, automated collection, ingress tool transfer, archive creation, hidden files/directories, shortcut-based persistence, and web-protocol command and control. Because ATT&CK provides no official detection text for Micropsia, defenders should not rely on a malware-name alert alone. Build behavior-based coverage that correlates suspicious process execution, persistence changes, discovery commands, collection artifacts, archive staging, and outbound HTTP/S-like traffic from unusual processes or hosts.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry, especially cmd.exe and WMI-related execution
  • WMI activity logs and management instrumentation events
  • File creation, modification, hidden attribute changes, and encoded/encrypted artifact evidence
  • Startup folder and shortcut creation or modification events
  • Endpoint security alerts for keylogging, screen capture, audio capture, or suspicious access to input/peripheral capabilities where available

Detection direction

  • Correlate multiple behaviors rather than treating each as a standalone alert: discovery followed by command shell or WMI execution, persistence changes, collection, archiving, and outbound web-protocol traffic is more meaningful than any single event.
  • Tune WMI and command shell detections to distinguish routine administration from unusual parent processes, user context, host role, timing, and destinations.
  • Review visibility for shortcut modification in startup-related locations; this can be a blind spot if endpoint telemetry focuses only on registry persistence.
  • Confirm whether endpoint tooling records file attribute changes and hidden files/directories, not only executable launches.
  • Treat keylogging, screen capture, and audio capture as high-sensitivity collection behaviors; validate both technical detection and privacy/legal handling in IR processes.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with containment and monitoring priorities for Windows endpoints that can execute remote-access tooling: EDR coverage, process logging, WMI visibility, and network egress observability.
  • Harden persistence paths by monitoring and controlling startup folders and shortcut modifications where operationally feasible.
  • Reduce credential exposure by strengthening identity controls and preparing rapid credential reset workflows when keylogging is suspected.
  • Limit unnecessary WMI and command shell abuse through administrative control review, least privilege, and scrutiny of remote administration patterns.
  • Improve egress governance and proxy/network logging so web-protocol command and control can be investigated by host, user, process, and destination.
Additional notes and limits

The supplied ATT&CK object identifies Micropsia as a Delphi-written remote access tool for Windows and provides relationships to multiple techniques that describe how the malware has been observed or documented to behave. The strongest defensive value is to use those relationships as a coverage checklist across execution, persistence, discovery, collection, stealth, command and control, and tool transfer. Local baselining is essential because many related behaviors, such as WMI, command shell usage, archiving, and web traffic, also occur during legitimate administration.

MITRE does not provide official detection guidance for this object, and the malware object itself lists no tactics. Several related techniques have broader platform lists, but the Micropsia object platform supplied here is Windows; coverage statements should therefore be validated against Windows telemetry for this take. External references are limited to the cited Talos and Radware reporting plus the MITRE entry; no claim of current activity, customer exposure, or guaranteed detection is supported by the supplied fields.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Micropsia

Micropsia is a remote access tool written in Delphi.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

16 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Micropsia gathers the hostname and OS version from the victim’s machine.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1119Automated Collection

Micropsia executes an RAR tool to recursively archive files based on a predefined list of file extensions (*.xls, *.xlsx, *.csv, *.odt, *.doc, *.docx, *.ppt, *.pptx, *.pdf, *.mdb, *.accdb, *.accde, *.txt).[2]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

Micropsia searches for anti-virus software and firewall products installed on the victim’s machine using WMI.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

Micropsia has keylogging capabilities.[2]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Micropsia can perform a recursive directory listing for all volume drives available on the victim's machine and can also fetch specific files by their paths.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Micropsia creates a command-line shell using cmd.exe.[2]

EnterpriseT1547.009Shortcut ModificationSub-technique

Micropsia creates a shortcut to maintain persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Micropsia collects the username from the victim’s machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Micropsia can download and execute an executable from the C2 server.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1560.001Archive via UtilitySub-technique

Micropsia creates a RAR archive based on collected files on the victim's machine.[2]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Micropsia uses HTTP and HTTPS for C2 network communications.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Micropsia obfuscates the configuration with a custom Base64 and XOR.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

Micropsia takes screenshots every 90 seconds by calling the Gdi32.BitBlt API.[2]

EnterpriseT1123Audio Capture

Micropsia can perform microphone recording.[2]

EnterpriseT1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique

Micropsia creates a new hidden directory to store all components' outputs in a dedicated sub-folder for each.[2]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

Micropsia searches for anti-virus software and firewall products installed on the victim’s machine using WMI.[1][2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1028: APT-C-23

APT-C-23 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014.[1] APT-C-23 has primarily focused its operations on the Middle East, including Israeli military assets. APT-C-23 has developed mobile spyware targeting Android and iOS devices since 2017.[2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
1e96501c9d87c34c...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.2Current bundle1e96501c9d87…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Micropsia

    (Citation: Talos Micropsia June 2017)(Citation: Radware Micropsia July 2018)

  4. [4]
    Micropsia

    (Citation: Talos Micropsia June 2017)(Citation: Radware Micropsia July 2018)

  5. [5]
    Micropsia

    (Citation: Talos Micropsia June 2017)(Citation: Radware Micropsia July 2018)

  6. [6]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    mitre-attackS0339
    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    mitre-attackS0339
    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    mitre-attackS0339
    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  51. [51]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  52. [52]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  53. [53]
    Radware Micropsia July 2018

    Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  54. [54]
    Talos Micropsia June 2017

    Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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