T1071.001: Web Protocols
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Protocols such as HTTP/S[1] and WebSocket[2] that carry web traffic may be very common in environments. HTTP/S packets have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.
Security context for executives and security teams
T1071.001: Web Protocols describes Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. Protocols such as HTTP/S(Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda) and WebSocket(Citation: Brazking-Websockets) that carry web traffic may be very common in environments. HTTP/S packets have many fields and header...
Executive priority
T1071.001: Web Protocols is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1071.001: Web Protocols by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (command-and-control), supported platforms (ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1071.001: Web Protocols appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Web Protocols
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Protocols such as HTTP/S[1] and WebSocket[2] that carry web traffic may be very common in environments. HTTP/S packets have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | This object subtechnique of Application Layer Protocol. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0075: Rancor
G1013: Metador
Metador is a suspected cyber espionage group that was first reported in September 2022. Metador has targeted a limited number of telecommunication companies, internet service providers, and universities in the Middle East and Africa. Security researchers named the group Metador based on the "I am meta" string in one of the group's malware samples and the expectation of Spanish-language responses from C2 servers.[1]
G1042: RedEcho
G1002: BITTER
G1036: Moonstone Sleet
Moonstone Sleet is a North Korean-linked threat actor executing both financially motivated attacks and espionage operations. The group previously overlapped significantly with another North Korean-linked entity, Lazarus Group, but has differentiated its tradecraft since 2023. Moonstone Sleet is notable for creating fake companies and personas to interact with victim entities, as well as developing unique malware such as a variant delivered via a fully functioning game.[1]
G0049: OilRig
OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
G0071: Orangeworm
Orangeworm is a group that has targeted organizations in the healthcare sector in the United States, Europe, and Asia since at least 2015, likely for the purpose of corporate espionage.[1] Reverse engineering of Kwampirs, directly associated with Orangeworm activity, indicates significant functional and development overlaps with Shamoon.[2]
G0067: APT37
APT37 is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. APT37 has also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, North Korean Human Rights, and Evil New Year 2018.[1][2][3]
North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
G1035: Winter Vivern
Winter Vivern is a group linked to Russian and Belorussian interests active since at least 2020 targeting various European government and NGO entities, along with sporadic targeting of Indian and US victims. The group leverages a combination of document-based phishing activity and server-side exploitation for initial access, leveraging adversary-controlled and -created infrastructure for follow-on command and control.[1][2][3][4][5]
G0070: Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal is threat group that has been attributed to the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security (GDGS) and has operated since at least 2012. [1]
G1034: Daggerfly
Daggerfly is a People's Republic of China-linked APT entity active since at least 2012. Daggerfly has targeted individuals, government and NGO entities, and telecommunication companies in Asia and Africa. Daggerfly is associated with exclusive use of MgBot malware and is noted for several potential supply chain infection campaigns.[1][2][3][4]
G0059: Magic Hound
Magic Hound is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resource-intensive cyber espionage operations, likely on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have targeted European, U.S., and Middle Eastern government and military personnel, academics, journalists, and organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), via complex social engineering campaigns since at least 2014.[1][2][3][4][5]
S1047: Mori
Mori is a backdoor that has been used by MuddyWater since at least January 2022.[1][2]
S0275: UPPERCUT
UPPERCUT is a 32-bit HTTP-based backdoor that has been used by menuPass since at least 2017.[1] Once thought to be exclusive to menuPass, UPPERCUT was also observed being used by menuPass-associated MirrorFace during Operation AkaiRyū.[2]
S0495: RDAT
S1108: PULSECHECK
PULSECHECK is a web shell written in Perl that was used by APT5 as early as 2020 including against Pulse Secure VPNs at US Defense Industrial Base (DIB) companies.[1]
S0207: Vasport
S0502: Drovorub
S0144: ChChes
S1246: BeaverTail
BeaverTail is a malware that has both a JavaScript and C++ variant. Active since 2022, BeaverTail is capable of stealing logins from browsers and serves as a downloader for second stage payloads. BeaverTail has previously been leveraged by North Korea-affiliated actors identified as DeceptiveDevelopment or Contagious Interview. BeaverTail has been delivered to victims through code repository sites and has been embedded within malicious attachments.[1][2][3][4]
S1023: CreepyDrive
CreepyDrive is a custom implant has been used by POLONIUM since at least early 2022 for C2 with and exfiltration to actor-controlled OneDrive accounts.[1]
POLONIUM has used a similar implant called CreepyBox that relies on actor-controlled DropBox accounts.[1]
S0091: Epic
S1026: Mongall
Mongall is a backdoor that has been used since at least 2013, including by Aoqin Dragon.[1]
S0341: Xbash
Xbash is a malware family that has targeted Linux and Microsoft Windows servers. The malware has been tied to the Iron Group, a threat actor group known for previous ransomware attacks. Xbash was developed in Python and then converted into a self-contained Linux ELF executable by using PyInstaller.[1]
C0047: RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations
RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations was executed by Mustang Panda from mid-2023 through the end of 2024 against multiple entities in East and Southeast Asia. RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations involved phishing to deliver malicious files or links to users prompting follow-on installer downloads to load PlugX on victim machines in a persistent state.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.5 | Current bundle | 51da3d4f96b0… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.5 | Older bundle | 3ec95b2fcc94… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.5 | Older bundle | 3ec95b2fcc94… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]CrowdStrike Putter Panda
Crowdstrike Global Intelligence Team. (2014, June 9). CrowdStrike Intelligence Report: Putter Panda. Retrieved January 22, 2016.
- [2]Brazking-Websockets
Shahar Tavor. (n.d.). BrazKing Android Malware Upgraded and Targeting Brazilian Banks. Retrieved March 24, 2023.
Open source URL - [3]University of Birmingham C2
Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved September 3, 2026.
Open source URL - [4]mitre-attackT1071.001Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
