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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0570: BitPaymer

BitPaymer is a ransomware variant first observed in August 2017 targeting hospitals in the U.K. BitPaymer uses a unique encryption key, ransom note, and contact information for each operation. BitPaymer has several indicators suggesting overlap with the Dridex malware and is often delivered via Dridex.[1]

EnterpriseS0570MalwareObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0570: BitPaymer describes [BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570) is a ransomware variant first observed in August 2017 targeting hospitals in the U.K. [BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570) uses a unique encryption key, ransom note, and contact information for each operation. [BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570) has several indicators suggesting overlap with the [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) malware and is often delivered via [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384).(C...

Executive priority

S0570: BitPaymer is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0570: BitPaymer by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0570: BitPaymer appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

BitPaymer

BitPaymer is a ransomware variant first observed in August 2017 targeting hospitals in the U.K. BitPaymer uses a unique encryption key, ransom note, and contact information for each operation. BitPaymer has several indicators suggesting overlap with the Dridex malware and is often delivered via Dridex.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

18 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

BitPaymer can use net view to discover remote systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1480Execution Guardrails

BitPaymer compares file names and paths to a list of excluded names and directory names during encryption.[1]

EnterpriseT1222.001Windows PermissionsSub-technique

BitPaymer can use icacls /reset and takeown /F to reset a targeted executable's permissions and then take ownership.[1]

EnterpriseT1486Data Encrypted for Impact

BitPaymer can import a hard-coded RSA 1024-bit public key, generate a 128-bit RC4 key for each file, and encrypt the file in place, appending .locked to the filename.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

BitPaymer has used RC4-encrypted strings and string hashes to avoid identifiable strings within the binary.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.006TimestompSub-technique

BitPaymer can modify the timestamp of an executable so that it can be identified and restored by the decryption tool.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

BitPaymer has set the run key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1135Network Share Discovery

BitPaymer can search for network shares on the domain or workgroup using net view .[1]

EnterpriseT1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftSub-technique

BitPaymer can use the tokens of users to create processes on infected systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

BitPaymer can use the RegEnumKeyW to iterate through Registry keys.[1]

EnterpriseT1490Inhibit System Recovery

BitPaymer attempts to remove the backup shadow files from the host using vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet.[1]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

BitPaymer has attempted to install itself as a service to maintain persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1548.002Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique

BitPaymer can suppress UAC prompts by setting the HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command registry key on Windows 10 or HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command on Windows 7 and launching the eventvwr.msc process, which launches BitPaymer with elevated privileges.[1]

EnterpriseT1564.004NTFS File AttributesSub-technique

BitPaymer has copied itself to the :bin alternate data stream of a newly created file.[1]

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

BitPaymer can enumerate existing Windows services on the host that are configured to run as LocalSystem.[1]

EnterpriseT1087.001Local AccountSub-technique

BitPaymer can enumerate the sessions for each user logged onto the infected host.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

BitPaymer can set values in the Registry to help in execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

BitPaymer has used dynamic API resolution to avoid identifiable strings within the binary, including RegEnumKeyW.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0119: Indrik SpiderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1018: Remote System DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1480: Execution GuardrailsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1222.001: Windows PermissionsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1486: Data Encrypted for ImpactEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.006: TimestompEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1135: Network Share DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1134.001: Token Impersonation/TheftEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1012: Query RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1490: Inhibit System RecoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543.003: Windows ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1548.002: Bypass User Account ControlEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1564.004: NTFS File AttributesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1007: System Service DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1087.001: Local AccountEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
83fff0315921ccda...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle83fff0315921…
19.11.1Older bundle83fff0315921…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    BitPaymer

    (Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)

  3. [3]
    FriedEx

    (Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)

  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS0570
    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    wp_encrypt

    (Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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