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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0570: BitPaymer

BitPaymer is a ransomware variant first observed in August 2017 targeting hospitals in the U.K. BitPaymer uses a unique encryption key, ransom note, and contact information for each operation. BitPaymer has several indicators suggesting overlap with the Dridex malware and is often delivered via Dridex.[1]

EnterpriseS0570MalwareObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

BitPaymer is a Windows ransomware variant associated in ATT&CK with targeted operations where each operation used unique encryption keys, ransom notes, and contact information. For leaders, the practical issue is not only file encryption: the related ATT&CK behaviors show discovery, privilege escalation, persistence, registry and service changes, recovery inhibition, and stealth techniques that can precede or support a disruptive ransomware event.

Executive priority

Treat BitPaymer as a ransomware-readiness test case for Windows environments. Priority questions include: can the organization detect discovery and privilege escalation before encryption, can incident response preserve evidence when ransomware uses unique per-operation artifacts, and can recovery proceed if local recovery mechanisms are inhibited. The Dridex delivery/overlap noted by ATT&CK also makes malware-to-ransomware escalation a relevant threat intelligence and response-planning scenario, without assuming current exposure.

Technical view

ATT&CK lists BitPaymer on Windows and relates it to techniques including System Service Discovery, Query/Modify Registry, Remote System Discovery, Local Account Discovery, Network Share Discovery, Native API use, Token Impersonation/Theft, Windows permissions changes, execution guardrails, timestomping, NTFS file attributes, Windows service and Run Key persistence, UAC bypass, Data Encrypted for Impact, and Inhibit System Recovery. SOC and IR teams should validate visibility across Windows endpoint process activity, service and registry changes, account/token-related privilege events, share and remote-system enumeration, file timestamp/attribute anomalies, recovery-control tampering, and mass file modification/encryption behavior.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry
  • Windows Registry query and modification events
  • Windows service creation or modification records
  • Startup folder and Registry Run Key monitoring
  • Local account and group enumeration evidence

Detection direction

  • Correlate discovery activity with later persistence, privilege escalation, recovery inhibition, and encryption indicators rather than relying on a single ransomware signature.
  • Tune Windows registry and service monitoring for unusual creation or modification paths, while accounting for legitimate administrative and software deployment activity.
  • Validate coverage for network share discovery and remote system enumeration, because ransomware impact often depends on locating reachable systems and shared data.
  • Review file integrity and EDR logic for timestomping, NTFS attribute use, ACL changes, and high-volume file rewrites; these signals can be noisy unless tied to process lineage and user context.
  • Because ATT&CK provides no official detection text for BitPaymer, local baselining and incident-derived indicators are necessary to convert the technique relationships into reliable detections.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize resilient, tested backups and recovery procedures, including scenarios where local recovery features are disabled or removed.
  • Harden Windows administrative paths: restrict local administrator rights, monitor privilege elevation, and reduce opportunities for token impersonation and UAC bypass.
  • Limit ransomware blast radius by controlling access to network shares, reviewing permissions, and segmenting critical systems where feasible.
  • Protect and monitor persistence locations such as Windows services, Registry Run Keys, and startup folders.
  • Ensure malware response playbooks account for possible Dridex-to-ransomware progression noted by ATT&CK, including rapid containment, credential review, and preservation of endpoint evidence.
Additional notes and limits

ATT&CK identifies BitPaymer as first observed in August 2017 targeting hospitals in the U.K., with overlap with Dridex and frequent delivery via Dridex, citing CrowdStrike reporting. ATT&CK also relates the malware to Indrik Spider use and multiple Windows-relevant techniques. Use these relationships to guide defensive validation, not as proof of activity in any specific environment.

The supplied ATT&CK object has no official detection guidance, no explicit tactics on the malware object itself, and limited external reference detail beyond the CrowdStrike source. Several related techniques are broad ATT&CK behaviors, so environment-specific telemetry, baselines, and incident evidence are required before making coverage or exposure claims.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

BitPaymer

BitPaymer is a ransomware variant first observed in August 2017 targeting hospitals in the U.K. BitPaymer uses a unique encryption key, ransom note, and contact information for each operation. BitPaymer has several indicators suggesting overlap with the Dridex malware and is often delivered via Dridex.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

18 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

BitPaymer can use net view to discover remote systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1480Execution Guardrails

BitPaymer compares file names and paths to a list of excluded names and directory names during encryption.[1]

EnterpriseT1222.001Windows PermissionsSub-technique

BitPaymer can use icacls /reset and takeown /F to reset a targeted executable's permissions and then take ownership.[1]

EnterpriseT1486Data Encrypted for Impact

BitPaymer can import a hard-coded RSA 1024-bit public key, generate a 128-bit RC4 key for each file, and encrypt the file in place, appending .locked to the filename.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

BitPaymer has used RC4-encrypted strings and string hashes to avoid identifiable strings within the binary.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.006TimestompSub-technique

BitPaymer can modify the timestamp of an executable so that it can be identified and restored by the decryption tool.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

BitPaymer has set the run key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1135Network Share Discovery

BitPaymer can search for network shares on the domain or workgroup using net view .[1]

EnterpriseT1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftSub-technique

BitPaymer can use the tokens of users to create processes on infected systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

BitPaymer can use the RegEnumKeyW to iterate through Registry keys.[1]

EnterpriseT1490Inhibit System Recovery

BitPaymer attempts to remove the backup shadow files from the host using vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet.[1]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

BitPaymer has attempted to install itself as a service to maintain persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1548.002Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique

BitPaymer can suppress UAC prompts by setting the HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command registry key on Windows 10 or HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command on Windows 7 and launching the eventvwr.msc process, which launches BitPaymer with elevated privileges.[1]

EnterpriseT1564.004NTFS File AttributesSub-technique

BitPaymer has copied itself to the :bin alternate data stream of a newly created file.[1]

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

BitPaymer can enumerate existing Windows services on the host that are configured to run as LocalSystem.[1]

EnterpriseT1087.001Local AccountSub-technique

BitPaymer can enumerate the sessions for each user logged onto the infected host.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

BitPaymer can set values in the Registry to help in execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

BitPaymer has used dynamic API resolution to avoid identifiable strings within the binary, including RegEnumKeyW.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1018: Remote System DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1480: Execution GuardrailsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1222.001: Windows PermissionsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1486: Data Encrypted for ImpactEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.006: TimestompEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1135: Network Share DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1134.001: Token Impersonation/TheftEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1012: Query RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1490: Inhibit System RecoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543.003: Windows ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1548.002: Bypass User Account ControlEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1564.004: NTFS File AttributesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1007: System Service DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1087.001: Local AccountEnterpriseuses · GroupG0119: Indrik SpiderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
83fff0315921ccda...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.1Current bundle83fff0315921…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021

    Podlosky, A., Feeley, B. (2021, March 17). INDRIK SPIDER Supersedes WastedLocker with Hades Ransomware to Circumvent OFAC Sanctions. Retrieved September 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    BitPaymer

    (Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)

  4. [4]
    BitPaymer

    (Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)

  5. [5]
    BitPaymer

    (Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)

  6. [6]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    FriedEx

    (Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)

  9. [9]
    FriedEx

    (Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)

  10. [10]
    FriedEx

    (Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)

  11. [11]
    mitre-attackS0570
    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    mitre-attackS0570
    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    mitre-attackS0570
    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    wp_encrypt

    (Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)

  15. [15]
    wp_encrypt

    (Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)

  16. [16]
    wp_encrypt

    (Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)

  17. [17]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
  51. [51]
    Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018

    Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.

    Open source URL
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Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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