G0073: APT19
MITRE ATT&CK G0073: APT19 Group details, with detection guidance, relationships and mapped CVEs.
Security context for executives and security teams
G0073: APT19 describes [APT19](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0073) is a Chinese-based threat group that has targeted a variety of industries, including defense, finance, energy, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, high tech, education, manufacturing, and legal services. In 2017, a phishing campaign was used to target seven law and investment firms. (Citation: FireEye APT19) Some analysts track [APT19](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0073) and [Deep Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009) as the same group, but it is unclear fro...
Executive priority
G0073: APT19 is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0073: APT19 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0073: APT19 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
APT19
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | This object uses Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder. |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | This object uses PowerShell. |
| Enterprise | T1564.003 | Hidden WindowSub-technique | This object uses Hidden Window. |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | This object uses System Network Configuration Discovery. |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | This object uses System Owner/User Discovery. |
| Enterprise | T1218.011 | Rundll32Sub-technique | This object uses Rundll32. |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | This object uses Modify Registry. |
| Enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | This object uses Drive-by Compromise. |
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | This object uses Windows Service. |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | This object uses Web Protocols. |
| Enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | This object uses Command and Scripting Interpreter. |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | This object uses Encrypted/Encoded File. |
| Enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique | This object uses Spearphishing Attachment. |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | This object uses Malicious File. |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | This object uses System Information Discovery. |
| Enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard EncodingSub-technique | This object uses Standard Encoding. |
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | This object uses Tool. |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | This object uses DLL. |
| Enterprise | T1218.010 | Regsvr32Sub-technique | This object uses Regsvr32. |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | This object uses Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information. |
| Enterprise | T1027.010 | Command ObfuscationSub-technique | This object uses Command Obfuscation. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0154: Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]
In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]
S0363: Empire
Empire is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure PowerShell for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. Empire was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.[1][2][3]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.6 | Current bundle | ac43694c26c2… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.6 | Older bundle | 9043f41e86b5… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]FireEye APT19
Ahl, I. (2017, June 06). Privileges and Credentials: Phished at the Request of Counsel. Retrieved May 17, 2018.
Open source URL - [2]ICIT China's Espionage Jul 2016
Scott, J. and Spaniel, D. (2016, July 28). ICIT Brief - China’s Espionage Dynasty: Economic Death by a Thousand Cuts. Retrieved June 7, 2018.
Open source URL - [3]FireEye APT Groups
FireEye. (n.d.). Advanced Persistent Threat Groups. Retrieved August 3, 2018.
Open source URL - [4]Unit 42 C0d0so0 Jan 2016
Grunzweig, J., Lee, B. (2016, January 22). New Attacks Linked to C0d0so0 Group. Retrieved August 2, 2018.
Open source URL - [5]APT19
(Citation: FireEye APT19)
- [6]C0d0so0
(Citation: Unit 42 C0d0so0 Jan 2016)
- [7]Codoso
(Citation: Unit 42 C0d0so0 Jan 2016)
- [8]Codoso Team
(Citation: FireEye APT Groups)
- [9]Dark Reading Codoso Feb 2015
Chickowski, E. (2015, February 10). Chinese Hacking Group Codoso Team Uses Forbes.com As Watering Hole. Retrieved September 13, 2018.
Open source URL - [10]Sunshop Group
(Citation: Dark Reading Codoso Feb 2015)
- [11]mitre-attackG0073Open source URL
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