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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1552.001: Credentials In Files

Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through OS Credential Dumping.CitationCG 2014 Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller.CitationSRD GPP

In cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files.CitationUnit 42 Hildegard Malware They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs.CitationUnit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.CitationSpecter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage

EnterpriseT1552.001Sub-techniqueObject v1.3Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1552.001: Credentials In Files describes Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords. It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003).(Citati...

Executive priority

T1552.001: Credentials In Files is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1552.001: Credentials In Files by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (credential-access), supported platforms (Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Identity, privilege, and authentication events
  • Cloud control-plane, SaaS audit, and container platform logs
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1552.001: Credentials In Files appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Credentials In Files

Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through OS Credential Dumping.CitationCG 2014 Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller.CitationSRD GPP

In cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files.CitationUnit 42 Hildegard Malware They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs.CitationUnit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.CitationSpecter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
30fa2e359c31c27b...
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.