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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G1040: Play

Play is a ransomware group that has been active since at least 2022 deploying Playcrypt ransomware against the business, government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, and media sectors in North America, South America, and Europe. Play actors employ a double-extortion model, encrypting systems after exfiltrating data, and are presumed by security researchers to operate as a closed group.[1][2]

EnterpriseG1040GroupObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G1040: Play describes [Play](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1040) is a ransomware group that has been active since at least 2022 deploying [Playcrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1162) ransomware against the business, government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, and media sectors in North America, South America, and Europe. [Play](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1040) actors employ a double-extortion model, encrypting systems after exfiltrating data, and are presumed by security researchers to operate as a closed group.(Ci...

Executive priority

G1040: Play is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G1040: Play by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G1040: Play appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Play

Play is a ransomware group that has been active since at least 2022 deploying Playcrypt ransomware against the business, government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, and media sectors in North America, South America, and Europe. Play actors employ a double-extortion model, encrypting systems after exfiltrating data, and are presumed by security researchers to operate as a closed group.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

26 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1030Data Transfer Size Limits

Play has split victims' files into chunks for exfiltration.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Play has used the information-stealing tool Grixba to enumerate network information.[1]

EnterpriseT1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Play has used WinSCP to exfiltrate data to actor-controlled accounts.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Play has used tools including Wevtutil to remove malicious files from compromised hosts.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Play has used a batch script to remove indicators of its presence on compromised hosts.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

Play has used Base64-encoded PowerShell scripts to disable Microsoft Defender.[2]

EnterpriseT1560.001Archive via UtilitySub-technique

Play has used WinRAR to compress files prior to exfiltration.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

Play has used tools such as AdFind, Nltest, and BloodHound to enumerate shares and hostnames on compromised networks.[2]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Play has used the information stealer Grixba to check for a list of security processes.[2]

EnterpriseT1027.010Command ObfuscationSub-technique

Play has used Base64-encoded PowerShell scripts for post exploit activities on compromised hosts.[2]

EnterpriseT1587.001MalwareSub-technique

Play developed and employ Playcrypt ransomware.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1078.003Local AccountsSub-technique

Play has used valid local accounts to gain initial access.[2]

EnterpriseT1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesSub-technique

Play has used Cobalt Strike to move laterally via SMB.[2]

EnterpriseT1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsSub-technique

Play has used tools to remove log files on targeted systems.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1078Valid Accounts

Play has used valid VPN accounts to achieve initial access.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Play has used Cobalt Strike to download files to compromised machines.[2]

EnterpriseT1078.002Domain AccountsSub-technique

Play has used valid domain accounts for access.[2]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Play has leveraged tools to enumerate system information.[2]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Play has used the Grixba information stealer to list security files and processes.[2]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

Play has used the information-stealing tool Grixba to scan for anti-virus software.[1]

EnterpriseT1133External Remote Services

Play has used Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and Virtual Private Networks (VPN) for initial access.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

Play has used multiple tools for discovery and defense evasion purposes on compromised hosts.[1]

EnterpriseT1190Exploit Public-Facing Application

Play has exploited known vulnerabilities for initial access including CVE-2018-13379 and CVE-2020-12812 in FortiOS and CVE-2022-41082 and CVE-2022-41040 ("ProxyNotShell") in Microsoft Exchange.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1003.001LSASS MemorySub-technique

Play has used Mimikatz and the Windows Task Manager to dump LSASS process memory.[2]

EnterpriseT1657Financial Theft

Play demands ransom payments from victims to unencrypt filesystems and to not publish sensitive data exfiltrated from victim networks.[1]

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

Play has used tools including GMER, IOBit, and PowerTool to disable antivirus software.[1][2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

ToolEnterprise

S0359: Nltest

Nltest is a Windows command-line utility used to list domain controllers and enumerate domain trusts.[1]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0029: PsExec

PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers.[1][2]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0363: Empire

Empire is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure PowerShell for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. Empire was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.[1][2][3]

LinuxmacOSWindows
ToolEnterprise

S0645: Wevtutil

Wevtutil is a Windows command-line utility that enables administrators to retrieve information about event logs and publishers.[1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0154: Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]

In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows
MalwareEnterprise

S1162: Playcrypt

Playcrypt is a ransomware that has been used by Play since at least 2022 in attacks against against the business, government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, and media sectors in North America, South America, and Europe. Playcrypt derives its name from adding the .play extension to encrypted files and has overlap with tactics and tools associated with Hive and Nokoyawa ransomware and infrastructure associated with Quantum ransomware.[1][2][3]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0002: Mimikatz

Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. [1] [2]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
2f3b9f7e6b996c2a...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.0Current bundle2f3b9f7e6b99…
19.21.0Older bundle2f3b9f7e6b99…
19.11.0Older bundle0bd42175ffe5…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    CISA Play Ransomware Advisory December 2023

    CISA. (2023, December 18). #StopRansomware: Play Ransomware AA23-352A. Retrieved September 24, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Trend Micro Ransomware Spotlight Play July 2023

    Trend Micro Research. (2023, July 21). Ransomware Spotlight: Play. Retrieved September 24, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attackG1040
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.