S0612: WastedLocker
WastedLocker is a ransomware family attributed to Indrik Spider that has been used since at least May 2020. WastedLocker has been used against a broad variety of sectors, including manufacturing, information technology, and media.[1][2][3]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0612: WastedLocker describes [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612) is a ransomware family attributed to [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) that has been used since at least May 2020. [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612) has been used against a broad variety of sectors, including manufacturing, information technology, and media.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)(Citation: NCC Group WastedLocker June 2020)(Citation: Sentinel Labs WastedLocker July 2020)
Executive priority
S0612: WastedLocker is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0612: WastedLocker by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0612: WastedLocker appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
WastedLocker
WastedLocker is a ransomware family attributed to Indrik Spider that has been used since at least May 2020. WastedLocker has been used against a broad variety of sectors, including manufacturing, information technology, and media.[1][2][3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | WastedLocker created and established a service that runs until the encryption process is complete.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1564.001 | Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique | WastedLocker has copied a random file from the Windows System32 folder to the |
| Enterprise | T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery | WastedLocker can delete shadow volumes.[1][2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | WastedLocker can modify registry values within the |
| Enterprise | T1497.001 | System ChecksSub-technique | WastedLocker checked if UCOMIEnumConnections and IActiveScriptParseProcedure32 Registry keys were detected as part of its anti-analysis technique.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | WastedLocker can encrypt data and leave a ransom note.[1][2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | WastedLocker has used cmd to execute commands on the system.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1548.002 | Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique | WastedLocker can perform a UAC bypass if it is not executed with administrator rights or if the infected host runs Windows Vista or later.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry | WastedLocker checks for specific registry keys related to the |
| Enterprise | T1027.016 | Junk Code InsertionSub-technique | WastedLocker contains junk code to increase its entropy and hide the actual code.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1120 | Peripheral Device Discovery | WastedLocker can enumerate removable drives prior to the encryption process.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | WastedLocker's custom crypter, CryptOne, leveraged the VirtualAlloc() API function to help execute the payload.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | WastedLocker has performed DLL hijacking before execution.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | WastedLocker can enumerate files and directories just prior to encryption.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1564.004 | NTFS File AttributesSub-technique | WastedLocker has the ability to save and execute files as an alternate data stream (ADS).[3] |
| Enterprise | T1135 | Network Share Discovery | WastedLocker can identify network adjacent and accessible drives.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | WastedLocker's custom cryptor, CryptOne, used an XOR based algorithm to decrypt the payload.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1569.002 | Service ExecutionSub-technique | WastedLocker can execute itself as a service.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | The WastedLocker payload includes encrypted strings stored within the .bss section of the binary file.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1222.001 | Windows PermissionsSub-technique | WastedLocker has a command to take ownership of a file and reset the ACL permissions using the |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0119: Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider is a Russia-based cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2014. Indrik Spider initially started with the Dridex banking Trojan, and then by 2017 they began running ransomware operations using BitPaymer, WastedLocker, and Hades ransomware. Following U.S. sanctions and an indictment in 2019, Indrik Spider changed their tactics and diversified their toolset.[1][2][3]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 19d06fc7d8c6… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 19d06fc7d8c6… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 19d06fc7d8c6… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Symantec WastedLocker June 2020
Symantec Threat Intelligence. (2020, June 25). WastedLocker: Symantec Identifies Wave of Attacks Against U.S. Organizations. Retrieved May 20, 2021.
Open source URL - [2]NCC Group WastedLocker June 2020
Antenucci, S., Pantazopoulos, N., Sandee, M. (2020, June 23). WastedLocker: A New Ransomware Variant Developed By The Evil Corp Group. Retrieved September 14, 2021.
Open source URL - [3]Sentinel Labs WastedLocker July 2020
Walter, J.. (2020, July 23). WastedLocker Ransomware: Abusing ADS and NTFS File Attributes. Retrieved September 14, 2021.
Open source URL - [4]WastedLocker
(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)(Citation: NCC Group WastedLocker June 2020)
- [5]mitre-attackS0612Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.