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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0007: APT28

APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.

EnterpriseG0007GroupObject v5.3Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0007: APT28 describes [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) This group has been active since at least 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT28)(...

Executive priority

G0007: APT28 is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0007: APT28 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0007: APT28 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

APT28

APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

61 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1003.003NTDSSub-technique

APT28 has used the ntdsutil.exe utility to export the Active Directory database for credential access.[2]

EnterpriseT1589.001CredentialsSub-technique

APT28 has harvested user's login credentials.CitationMicrosoft Targeting Elections September 2020

EnterpriseT1591Gather Victim Org Information

APT28 has used large language models (LLMs) to gather information about satellite capabilities.CitationMSFT-AICitationOpenAI-CTI

EnterpriseT1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique

APT28 has saved files with hidden file attributes.[16][16]

EnterpriseT1583.003Virtual Private ServerSub-technique

APT28 hosted phishing domains on free services for brief periods of time during campaigns.[17]

EnterpriseT1596Search Open Technical Databases

APT28 has used large language models (LLMs) to assist in script development and deployment.CitationMSFT-AICitationOpenAI-CTI

EnterpriseT1583.001DomainsSub-technique

APT28 registered domains imitating NATO, OSCE security websites, Caucasus information resources, and other organizations.[6][14]CitationGoogle TAG Ukraine Threat Landscape March 2022

EnterpriseT1070.006TimestompSub-technique

APT28 has performed timestomping on victim files.[5]

EnterpriseT1090.002External ProxySub-technique

APT28 used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims. The group has also used a tool that acts as a proxy to allow C2 even if the victim is behind a router. APT28 has also used a machine to relay and obscure communications between CHOPSTICK and their server.[6]CitationBitdefender APT28 Dec 2015[3]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

APT28 sent spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Office and RAR attachments.CitationUnit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018[10][11][3][18][19][20][21]CitationCato LAMEHUG JUL 2025

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

APT28 downloads and executes PowerShell scripts and performs PowerShell commands.[11][20][2]

EnterpriseT1048.002Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolSub-technique

APT28 has exfiltrated archives of collected data previously staged on a target's OWA server via HTTPS.[2]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence.[20]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

APT28 encrypted a .dll payload using RTL and a custom encryption algorithm. APT28 has also obfuscated payloads with base64, XOR, and RC4.CitationBitdefender APT28 Dec 2015CitationUnit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018[11][16][19]

EnterpriseT1203Exploitation for Client Execution

APT28 has exploited Microsoft Office vulnerability CVE-2017-0262 for execution.[18]

EnterpriseT1586.002Email AccountsSub-technique

APT28 has used compromised email accounts to send credential phishing emails.CitationGoogle TAG Ukraine Threat Landscape March 2022

EnterpriseT1114.002Remote Email CollectionSub-technique

APT28 has collected emails from victim Microsoft Exchange servers.[3][2]

EnterpriseT1505.003Web ShellSub-technique

APT28 has used a modified and obfuscated version of the reGeorg web shell to maintain persistence on a target's Outlook Web Access (OWA) server.[2]

EnterpriseT1584.008Network DevicesSub-technique

APT28 compromised Ubiquiti network devices to act as collection devices for credentials compromised via phishing webpages.[17]

EnterpriseT1550.002Pass the HashSub-technique

APT28 has used pass the hash for lateral movement.CitationMicrosoft SIR Vol 19

EnterpriseT1037.001Logon Script (Windows)Sub-technique

An APT28 loader Trojan adds the Registry key HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript to establish persistence.CitationUnit 42 Playbook Dec 2017

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

APT28 has obtained and used open-source tools like Koadic, Mimikatz, and Responder.[11][18]CitationFireEye APT28 Hospitality Aug 2017

EnterpriseT1564.003Hidden WindowSub-technique

APT28 has used the WindowStyle parameter to conceal PowerShell windows.[11] CitationMcAfee APT28 DDE1 Nov 2017

EnterpriseT1090.003Multi-hop ProxySub-technique

APT28 has routed traffic over Tor and VPN servers to obfuscate their activities.[20]

EnterpriseT1567Exfiltration Over Web Service

APT28 can exfiltrate data over Google Drive.[20]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

APT28 has used tools to perform keylogging.CitationMicrosoft SIR Vol 19[3][20]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection. The group also searched a compromised DCCC computer for specific terms.CitationÜberwachung APT28 Forfiles June 2015[3]

EnterpriseT1190Exploit Public-Facing Application

APT28 has used a variety of public exploits, including CVE 2020-0688 and CVE 2020-17144, to gain execution on vulnerable Microsoft Exchange; they have also conducted SQL injection attacks against external websites.[14][2]

EnterpriseT1669Wi-Fi Networks

APT28 has exploited open Wi-Fi access points for initial access to target devices using the network.[15]CitationDOJ GRU Charges 2018

EnterpriseT1039Data from Network Shared Drive

APT28 has collected files from network shared drives.[2]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

APT28 has used tools to take screenshots from victims.CitationESET Sednit Part 2CitationXAgentOSX 2017[3][21]

EnterpriseT1110.001Password GuessingSub-technique

APT28 has used a brute-force/password-spray tooling that operated in two modes: in brute-force mode it typically sent over 300 authentication attempts per hour per targeted account over the course of several hours or days.[23] APT28 has also used a Kubernetes cluster to conduct distributed, large-scale password guessing attacks.[2]

EnterpriseT1583.006Web ServicesSub-technique

APT28 has used newly-created Blogspot pages for credential harvesting operations.CitationGoogle TAG Ukraine Threat Landscape March 2022

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

An APT28 loader Trojan will enumerate the victim's processes searching for explorer.exe if its current process does not have necessary permissions.CitationUnit 42 Playbook Dec 2017

EnterpriseT1189Drive-by Compromise

APT28 has compromised targets via strategic web compromise utilizing custom exploit kits.[21] APT28 used reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) against government websites to redirect users to phishing webpages.[17]

EnterpriseT1595.002Vulnerability ScanningSub-technique

APT28 has performed large-scale scans in an attempt to find vulnerable servers.CitationTrendMicro Pawn Storm 2019

EnterpriseT1546.015Component Object Model HijackingSub-technique

APT28 has used COM hijacking for persistence by replacing the legitimate MMDeviceEnumerator object with a payload.CitationESET Sednit Part 1[13]

EnterpriseT1199Trusted Relationship

Once APT28 gained access to the DCCC network, the group then proceeded to use that access to compromise the DNC network.[3]

EnterpriseT1120Peripheral Device Discovery

APT28 uses a module to receive a notification every time a USB mass storage device is inserted into a victim.CitationMicrosoft SIR Vol 19

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

An APT28 loader Trojan uses a cmd.exe and batch script to run its payload.CitationUnit 42 Playbook Dec 2017 The group has also used macros to execute payloads.[16]CitationUnit42 Cannon Nov 2018[19][20]

EnterpriseT1557.004Evil TwinSub-technique

APT28 has used a Wi-Fi Pineapple to set up Evil Twin Wi-Fi Poisoning for the purposes of capturing victim credentials or planting espionage-oriented malware.[14]

EnterpriseT1498Network Denial of Service

In 2016, APT28 conducted a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against the World Anti-Doping Agency.[14]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

APT28 has intentionally deleted computer files to cover their tracks, including with use of the program CCleaner.[3]

EnterpriseT1560Archive Collected Data

APT28 used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents on the DCCC and DNC networks.[3]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

APT28 has downloaded additional files, including by using a first-stage downloader to contact the C2 server to obtain the second-stage implant.CitationBitdefender APT28 Dec 2015CitationUnit 42 Playbook Dec 2017[19][20][2]

EnterpriseT1598Phishing for Information

APT28 has used spearphishing to compromise credentials.CitationMicrosoft Targeting Elections September 2020[21]

EnterpriseT1559.002Dynamic Data ExchangeSub-technique

APT28 has delivered JHUHUGIT and Koadic by executing PowerShell commands through DDE in Word documents.CitationMcAfee APT28 DDE1 Nov 2017CitationMcAfee APT28 DDE2 Nov 2017[11]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

APT28 has changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign, and renamed a web shell instance to appear as a legitimate OWA page.[2]

EnterpriseT1119Automated Collection

APT28 used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents on the DCCC and DNC networks.[3]

EnterpriseT1078.004Cloud AccountsSub-technique

APT28 has used compromised Office 365 service accounts with Global Administrator privileges to collect email from user inboxes.[2]

EnterpriseT1221Template Injection

APT28 used weaponized Microsoft Word documents abusing the remote template function to retrieve a malicious macro. CitationUnit42 Sofacy Dec 2018

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

APT28 has retrieved internal documents from machines inside victim environments, including by using Forfiles to stage documents before exfiltration.CitationÜberwachung APT28 Forfiles June 2015[3]CitationTrendMicro Pawn Storm 2019[2]

EnterpriseT1213.002SharepointSub-technique

APT28 has collected information from Microsoft SharePoint services within target networks.CitationRSAC 2015 Abu Dhabi Stefano Maccaglia

EnterpriseT1078Valid Accounts

APT28 has used legitimate credentials to gain initial access, maintain access, and exfiltrate data from a victim network. The group has specifically used credentials stolen through a spearphishing email to login to the DCCC network. The group has also leveraged default manufacturer's passwords to gain initial access to corporate networks via IoT devices such as a VOIP phone, printer, and video decoder.CitationTrend Micro Pawn Storm April 2017[3][25][2]

EnterpriseT1025Data from Removable Media

An APT28 backdoor may collect the entire contents of an inserted USB device.CitationMicrosoft SIR Vol 19

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Later implants used by APT28, such as CHOPSTICK, use a blend of HTTP, HTTPS, and other legitimate channels for C2, depending on module configuration.[6][2]

EnterpriseT1213Data from Information Repositories

APT28 has collected files from various information repositories.[2]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

APT28 executed CHOPSTICK by using rundll32 commands such as rundll32.exe “C:\Windows\twain_64.dll”. APT28 also executed a .dll for a first stage dropper using rundll32.exe. An APT28 loader Trojan saved a batch script that uses rundll32 to execute a DLL payload.[5]CitationBitdefender APT28 Dec 2015[11]CitationUnit 42 Playbook Dec 2017[13][2]

EnterpriseT1560.001Archive via UtilitySub-technique

APT28 has used a variety of utilities, including WinRAR, to archive collected data with password protection.[2]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

An APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload.CitationUnit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018[11]

EnterpriseT1598.003Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

APT28 has conducted credential phishing campaigns with links that redirect to credential harvesting sites.CitationGoogle TAG Ukraine Threat Landscape March 2022[3][13][14][21]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

ToolEnterprise

S0645: Wevtutil

Wevtutil is a Windows command-line utility that enables administrators to retrieve information about event logs and publishers.[1]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0160: certutil

certutil is a command-line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure Certificate Services. [1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0023: CHOPSTICK

CHOPSTICK is a malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used since at least 2012 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. It has both Windows and Linux variants. [1] [2] [3] [4] It is tracked separately from the X-Agent for Android.

WindowsLinux
ToolEnterprise

S0039: Net

The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. [1]

Net has a great deal of functionality, [2] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through SMB/Windows Admin Shares using net use commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as net1 user.

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0193: Forfiles

Forfiles is a Windows utility commonly used in batch jobs to execute commands on one or more selected files or directories (ex: list all directories in a drive, read the first line of all files created yesterday, etc.). Forfiles can be executed from either the command line, Run window, or batch files/scripts. [1]

ToolEnterprise

S0002: Mimikatz

Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. [1] [2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0045: ADVSTORESHELL

ADVSTORESHELL is a spying backdoor that has been used by APT28 from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase. [1] [2]

Windows
CampaignEnterprise

C0051: APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign

APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign was conducted by APT28 from early February 2022 to November 2024 against organizations and individuals with expertise on Ukraine. APT28 primarily leveraged living-off-the-land techniques, while leveraging the zero-day exploitation of CVE-2022-38028. Notably, APT28 leveraged Wi-Fi networks in close proximity to the intended target to gain initial access to the victim environment. By daisy-chaining multiple compromised organizations nearby the intended target, APT28 discovered dual-homed systems (with both a wired and wireless network connection) to enable Wi-Fi and use compromised credentials to connect to the victim network.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
5.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
82ecf9b2bb36c4c2...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.25.3Current bundle82ecf9b2bb36…
19.15.3Older bundle1d743dbb2ee5…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020

    NSA/FBI. (2020, August). Russian GRU 85th GTsSS Deploys Previously Undisclosed Drovorub Malware. Retrieved August 25, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021

    NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018

    Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018

    Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Crowdstrike DNC June 2016

    Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    FireEye APT28

    FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    SecureWorks TG-4127

    SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    FireEye APT28 January 2017

    FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR

    Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Sofacy DealersChoice

    Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018

    Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group’s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    Symantec APT28 Oct 2018

    Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    ESET Zebrocy May 2019

    ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018

    Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Nearest Neighbor Volexity

    Koessel, Sean. Adair, Steven. Lancaster, Tom. (2024, November 22). The Nearest Neighbor Attack: How A Russian APT Weaponized Nearby Wi-Fi Networks for Covert Access. Retrieved February 25, 2025.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Talos Seduploader Oct 2017

    Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). "Cyber Conflict" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Leonard TAG 2023

    Billy Leonard. (2023, April 19). Ukraine remains Russia’s biggest cyber focus in 2023. Retrieved March 1, 2024.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018

    Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020

    Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm’s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017

    Secureworks CTU. (2017, March 30). IRON TWILIGHT Supports Active Measures. Retrieved February 28, 2022.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Kaspersky Sofacy

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    ESET Sednit Part 3

    ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016.

  25. [25]
    Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019

    MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    APT28

    (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021)

  27. [27]
    FROZENLAKE

    (Citation: Leonard TAG 2023)

  28. [28]
    Fancy Bear

    (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021)

  29. [29]
    Forest Blizzard

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  30. [30]
    Group 74

    (Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)

  31. [31]
    GruesomeLarch

    (Citation: Nearest Neighbor Volexity)

  32. [32]
    IRON TWILIGHT

    (Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Profile)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017)

  33. [33]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    Pawn Storm

    (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020)

  35. [35]
    SNAKEMACKEREL

    (Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)

  36. [36]
    STRONTIUM

    (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021)

  37. [37]
    Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Profile

    Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON TWILIGHT. Retrieved February 28, 2022.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Sednit

    This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044).(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)

  39. [39]
    Sofacy

    This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware.(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)

  40. [40]
    Swallowtail

    (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)

  41. [41]
    TG-4127

    (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)

  42. [42]
    Threat Group-4127

    (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)

  43. [43]
    Tsar Team

    (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)

  44. [44]
    mitre-attackG0007
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.