LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0091: Silence

Silence is a financially motivated threat actor targeting financial institutions in different countries. The group was first seen in June 2016. Their main targets reside in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Poland and Kazakhstan. They compromised various banking systems, including the Russian Central Bank's Automated Workstation Client, ATMs, and card processing.[1][2]

EnterpriseG0091GroupObject v2.2Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0091: Silence describes [Silence](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0091) is a financially motivated threat actor targeting financial institutions in different countries. The group was first seen in June 2016. Their main targets reside in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Poland and Kazakhstan. They compromised various banking systems, including the Russian Central Bank's Automated Workstation Client, ATMs, and card processing.(Citation: Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019)(Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017)

Executive priority

G0091: Silence is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0091: Silence by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0091: Silence appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Silence

Silence is a financially motivated threat actor targeting financial institutions in different countries. The group was first seen in June 2016. Their main targets reside in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Poland and Kazakhstan. They compromised various banking systems, including the Russian Central Bank's Automated Workstation Client, ATMs, and card processing.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

28 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1571Non-Standard Port

Silence has used port 444 when sending data about the system from the client to the server.CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Silence has used scheduled tasks to stage its operation.[1]

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

Silence has injected a DLL library containing a Trojan into the fwmain32.exe process.CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Silence has used HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and the Startup folder to establish persistence.CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

Silence has used VBS scripts.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Silence can create, delete, or modify a specified Registry key or value.CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolSub-technique

Silence has used RDP for lateral movement.CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1125Video Capture

Silence has been observed making videos of victims to observe bank employees day to day activities.[2]CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1059.007JavaScriptSub-technique

Silence has used JS scripts.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.001Compiled HTML FileSub-technique

Silence has weaponized CHM files in their phishing campaigns.[1][2]CitationGroup IB Silence Aug 2019CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1072Software Deployment Tools

Silence has used RAdmin, a remote software tool used to remotely control workstations and ATMs.CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

Silence can capture victim screen activity.[2]CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1027.010Command ObfuscationSub-technique

Silence has used environment variable string substitution for obfuscation.[1]

EnterpriseT1569.002Service ExecutionSub-technique

Silence has used Winexe to install a service on the remote system.[2]CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1090.002External ProxySub-technique

Silence has used ProxyBot, which allows the attacker to redirect traffic from the current node to the backconnect server via Sock4\Socks5.CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

Silence has used a valid certificate to sign their primary loader Silence.Downloader (aka TrueBot).CitationGroup IB Silence Aug 2019

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Silence has downloaded additional modules and malware to victim’s machines.CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1078Valid Accounts

Silence has used compromised credentials to log on to other systems and escalate privileges.CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

Silence has used Nmap to scan the corporate network, build a network topology, and identify vulnerable hosts.CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1003.001LSASS MemorySub-technique

Silence has used the Farse6.1 utility (based on Mimikatz) to extract credentials from lsass.exe.CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

Silence has used PowerShell to download and execute payloads.[1]CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

Silence has obtained and modified versions of publicly-available tools like Empire and PsExec.CitationGroup IB Silence Aug 2019 [2]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Silence has deleted artifacts, including scheduled tasks, communicates files from the C2 and other logs.[1]CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Silence has sent emails with malicious DOCX, CHM, LNK and ZIP attachments. [1][2]CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Silence has named its backdoor "WINWORD.exe".CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Silence attempts to get users to launch malicious attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.[1][2]CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Silence has used Windows command-line to run commands.[1][2]CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Silence has leveraged the Windows API, including using CreateProcess() or ShellExecute(), to perform a variety of tasks.[2]CitationGroup IB Silence Sept 2018

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

ToolEnterprise

S0363: Empire

Empire is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure PowerShell for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. Empire was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.[1][2][3]

LinuxmacOSWindows
ToolEnterprise

S0191: Winexe

Winexe is a lightweight, open source tool similar to PsExec designed to allow system administrators to execute commands on remote servers. [1] Winexe is unique in that it is a GNU/Linux based client. [2]

ToolEnterprise

S0195: SDelete

SDelete is an application that securely deletes data in a way that makes it unrecoverable. It is part of the Microsoft Sysinternals suite of tools. [1]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
8cf0bdd5f78feb29...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.2Current bundle8cf0bdd5f78f…
19.12.2Older bundle48bf04c1915c…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019

    Skulkin, O.. (2019, January 20). Silence: Dissecting Malicious CHM Files and Performing Forensic Analysis. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    SecureList Silence Nov 2017

    GReAT. (2017, November 1). Silence – a new Trojan attacking financial organizations. Retrieved May 24, 2019.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020

    Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Silence

    (Citation: Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019)(Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017)

  5. [5]
    Whisper Spider

    (Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)

  6. [6]
    mitre-attackG0091
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.