G0052: CopyKittens
CopyKittens is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2013. It has targeted countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S., Jordan, and Germany. The group is responsible for the campaign known as Operation Wilted Tulip.[1][2][3]
Security context for executives and security teams
G0052: CopyKittens describes [CopyKittens](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0052) is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2013. It has targeted countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S., Jordan, and Germany. The group is responsible for the campaign known as Operation Wilted Tulip.(Citation: ClearSky CopyKittens March 2017)(Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017)(Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)
Executive priority
G0052: CopyKittens is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0052: CopyKittens by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0052: CopyKittens appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
CopyKittens
CopyKittens is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2013. It has targeted countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S., Jordan, and Germany. The group is responsible for the campaign known as Operation Wilted Tulip.[1][2][3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1560.003 | Archive via Custom MethodSub-technique | CopyKittens encrypts data with a substitute cipher prior to exfiltration.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1560.001 | Archive via UtilitySub-technique | CopyKittens uses ZPP, a .NET console program, to compress files with ZIP.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | CopyKittens has used PowerShell Empire.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1090 | Proxy | CopyKittens has used the AirVPN service for operational activity.CitationMicrosoft POLONIUM June 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1218.011 | Rundll32Sub-technique | CopyKittens uses rundll32 to load various tools on victims, including a lateral movement tool named Vminst, Cobalt Strike, and shellcode.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1564.003 | Hidden WindowSub-technique | CopyKittens has used |
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | CopyKittens has used Metasploit, Empire, and AirVPN for post-exploitation activities.CitationClearSky and Trend Micro Operation Wilted Tulip July 2017CitationMicrosoft POLONIUM June 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1553.002 | Code SigningSub-technique | CopyKittens digitally signed an executable with a stolen certificate from legitimate company AI Squared.[2] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0154: Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]
In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]
S0363: Empire
Empire is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure PowerShell for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. Empire was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.[1][2][3]
S0164: TDTESS
TDTESS is a 64-bit .NET binary backdoor used by CopyKittens. [1]
S0167: Matryoshka
Matryoshka is a malware framework used by CopyKittens that consists of a dropper, loader, and RAT. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from July 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other minor differences. [1] [2]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.6 | Current bundle | 982aba0c56f0… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.6 | Older bundle | 05bdc5a28170… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]ClearSky CopyKittens March 2017
ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, March 30). Jerusalem Post and other Israeli websites compromised by Iranian threat agent CopyKitten. Retrieved August 21, 2017.
- [2]ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017
ClearSky Cyber Security and Trend Micro. (2017, July). Operation Wilted Tulip: Exposing a cyber espionage apparatus. Retrieved August 21, 2017.
- [3]CopyKittens Nov 2015
Minerva Labs LTD and ClearSky Cyber Security. (2015, November 23). CopyKittens Attack Group. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [4]CopyKittens
(Citation: ClearSky CopyKittens March 2017) (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)
- [5]mitre-attackG0052Open source URL
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