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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.

When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This could also enable an adversary to move from a virtualized environment, such as within a virtual machine or container, onto the underlying host. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.

Adversaries may bring a signed vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine so that they can exploit the vulnerability to execute code in kernel mode. This process is sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).[1][2] Adversaries may include the vulnerable driver with files delivered during Initial Access or download it to a compromised system via Ingress Tool Transfer or Lateral Tool Transfer.

EnterpriseT1068TechniqueObject v1.6Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Privilege escalation through exploitation matters because it can turn an initial low-privilege foothold into SYSTEM, root, kernel-level, or host-level access from a container or virtualized environment. For leaders, the key issue is not only whether vulnerabilities exist, but whether patching, exploit prevention, execution control, isolation, and SOC visibility are strong enough to stop or quickly confirm escalation after compromise.

Executive priority

Prioritize this technique where business-critical Windows, Linux, macOS, and container workloads depend on strong separation of privilege. It is a decision point for vulnerability management, endpoint hardening, container isolation, incident response severity, and audit evidence: can the organization prove that high-risk OS, application, driver, firmware, and container escape paths are patched or mitigated, and can responders see attempts to load vulnerable drivers or execute exploit code?

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no official detection text for T1068, but relationship context includes DET0514 as a detection strategy and mitigations for threat intelligence, execution prevention, application isolation/sandboxing, exploit protection, and software updates. SOC and IR teams should validate visibility across endpoint and container platforms for privilege boundary changes, exploit-like process behavior, kernel/driver activity, new or suspicious signed drivers consistent with BYOVD risk, and post-exploitation movement from user-level context to elevated service, root, SYSTEM, kernel, or host context. Treat alerts in context with vulnerability exposure, recent patch state, asset criticality, and whether the affected component normally runs with high privileges.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process creation and parent/child process lineage around privilege changes
  • OS security logs for elevation, service creation, privileged token/use, and administrative context changes
  • Kernel, driver load, and code-signing related events, especially for newly introduced signed drivers
  • Vulnerability and patch inventory for operating systems, applications, drivers, firmware, and container hosts
  • Container and virtualization telemetry showing host access attempts or escape indicators

Detection direction

  • Confirm whether DET0514 or equivalent local analytics exist; ATT&CK does not provide the detection logic in the supplied object.
  • Correlate privilege escalation signals with known vulnerable software, missing patches, driver inventory, and exploit-protection events rather than relying on single events.
  • Tune for BYOVD patterns: unexpected driver introduction, driver load from unusual paths, and signed-but-vulnerable driver usage, while accounting for legitimate administrative and hardware-management activity.
  • Validate container and virtualized workload coverage; host escape risk is specifically relevant to this technique and is often missed when endpoint and cloud/container telemetry are managed separately.
  • During IR, treat sudden elevation from a low-privilege process to root/SYSTEM/kernel or host-level access as a high-priority pivot point for containment scoping.

Mitigation priorities

  • First, maintain timely software updates for operating systems, applications, drivers, and firmware, prioritizing internet-facing, privileged, and business-critical assets.
  • Use exploit protection capabilities to reduce the chance that vulnerable components can be successfully abused.
  • Apply execution prevention and application control so unauthorized exploit code, tools, and unapproved drivers are harder to run.
  • Use application isolation, sandboxing, and container hardening to limit the blast radius if exploitation occurs.
  • Maintain a threat intelligence program that maps relevant vulnerabilities, campaigns, and group tradecraft to the organization’s actual platforms and exposure.
Additional notes and limits

Relationship context shows this technique is used by multiple ATT&CK groups and campaigns and is mitigated by M1019, M1038, M1048, M1050, and M1051. The supplied description specifically highlights vulnerable high-privilege components, OS/kernel exploitation, container or VM escape, and Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver behavior. Glexia would use this object to drive cross-functional validation between vulnerability management, endpoint engineering, container/cloud operations, SOC detection engineering, and incident response.

The official ATT&CK object does not include a detection section, and the related DET0514 details are not supplied beyond its name. This take therefore identifies evidence classes and validation priorities rather than a guaranteed detection method. Local asset inventory, patch state, EDR coverage, container architecture, and approved driver/software baselines are required to determine real exposure and coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.

When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This could also enable an adversary to move from a virtualized environment, such as within a virtual machine or container, onto the underlying host. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.

Adversaries may bring a signed vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine so that they can exploit the vulnerability to execute code in kernel mode. This process is sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).[1][2] Adversaries may include the vulnerable driver with files delivered during Initial Access or download it to a compromised system via Ingress Tool Transfer or Lateral Tool Transfer.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0027: Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.[1] The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.[2][3][4]

GroupEnterprise

G0125: HAFNIUM

HAFNIUM is a likely state-sponsored cyber espionage group operating out of China that has been active since at least January 2021. HAFNIUM primarily targets entities in the US across a number of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks, and NGOs. HAFNIUM has targeted remote management tools and cloud software for intial access and has demonstrated an ability to quickly operationalize exploits for identified vulnerabilities in edge devices.[1][2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G1048: UNC3886

UNC3886 is a China-nexus cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2022, targeting defense, technology, and telecommunication organizations located in the United States and the Asia-Pacific-Japan (APJ) regions. UNC3886 has displayed a deep understanding of edge devices and virtualization technologies through the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities and the use of novel malware families and utilities.[1][2]

GroupEnterprise

G0016: APT29

APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]

GroupEnterprise

G0010: Turla

Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.[1][2][3][4][5]

GroupEnterprise

G0068: PLATINUM

PLATINUM is an activity group that has targeted victims since at least 2009. The group has focused on targets associated with governments and related organizations in South and Southeast Asia. [1]

GroupEnterprise

G0061: FIN8

FIN8 is a financially motivated threat group that has been active since at least January 2016, and known for targeting organizations in the hospitality, retail, entertainment, insurance, technology, chemical, and financial sectors. In June 2021, security researchers detected FIN8 switching from targeting point-of-sale (POS) devices to distributing a number of ransomware variants.[1][2][3][4]

GroupEnterprise

G0080: Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted financial institutions since at least 2016. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. Cobalt Group has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The group has been known to target organizations in order to use their access to then compromise additional victims.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7] Reporting indicates there may be links between Cobalt Group and both the malware Carbanak and the group Carbanak.[8]

GroupEnterprise

G1017: Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021, primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam. Volt Typhoon's targeting and pattern of behavior have been assessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or disruptive attacks. Volt Typhoon has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.[1][2][3][4]. The group has leveraged compromised SOHO routers to proxy command and control traffic and obscure its infrastructure, activity associated with the KV botnet.[5].

Reporting indicates a separate initial access cluster, SYLVANITE, has been observed exploiting internet-facing edge devices and transferring access to Volt Typhoon, also tracked as VOLTZITE, for follow-on operations. [6]

GroupEnterprise

G0037: FIN6

FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.[1][2]

GroupEnterprise

G0107: Whitefly

Whitefly is a cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2017. The group has targeted organizations based mostly in Singapore across a wide variety of sectors, and is primarily interested in stealing large amounts of sensitive information. The group has been linked to an attack against Singapore’s largest public health organization, SingHealth.[1]

MalwareEnterprise

S1247: Embargo

Embargo is a ransomware variant written in Rust that has been active since at least May 2024.[1][2] Embargo ransomware operations are associated with “double extortion” ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid.[1][2] Embargo ransomware has been known to be delivered through a loader known as MDeployer which also leverages a malware component known as MS4Killer that facilitates termination of processes operating on the victim hosts.[2] Embargo is also reportedly a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS).[2]

ESXiLinuxWindows
MalwareEnterprise

S0125: Remsec

Remsec is a modular backdoor that has been used by Strider and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua. [1]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0378: PoshC2

PoshC2 is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. The server-side components of the tool are primarily written in Python, while the implants are written in PowerShell. Although PoshC2 is primarily focused on Windows implantation, it does contain a basic Python dropper for Linux/macOS.[1]

WindowsLinuxmacOS
MalwareEnterprise

S1151: ZeroCleare

ZeroCleare is a wiper malware that has been used in conjunction with the RawDisk driver since at least 2019 by suspected Iran-nexus threat actors including activity targeting the energy and industrial sectors in the Middle East and political targets in Albania.[1][2][3][4]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0154: Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]

In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows
ToolEnterprise

S0363: Empire

Empire is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure PowerShell for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. Empire was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.[1][2][3]

LinuxmacOSWindows
MalwareEnterprise

S0484: Carberp

Carberp is a credential and information stealing malware that has been active since at least 2009. Carberp's source code was leaked online in 2013, and subsequently used as the foundation for the Carbanak backdoor.[1][2][3]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0260: InvisiMole

InvisiMole is a modular spyware program that has been used by the InvisiMole Group since at least 2013. InvisiMole has two backdoor modules called RC2FM and RC2CL that are used to perform post-exploitation activities. It has been discovered on compromised victims in the Ukraine and Russia. Gamaredon Group infrastructure has been used to download and execute InvisiMole against a small number of victims.[1][2]

Windows
CampaignEnterprise

C0049: Leviathan Australian Intrusions

Leviathan Australian Intrusions consisted of at least two long-term intrusions against victims in Australia by Leviathan, relying on similar tradecraft such as external service exploitation followed by extensive credential capture and re-use to enable privilege escalation and lateral movement. Leviathan Australian Intrusions were focused on exfiltrating sensitive data including valid credentials for the victim organizations.[1]

CampaignEnterprise

C0045: ShadowRay

ShadowRay was a campaign that began in late 2023 targeting the education, cryptocurrency, biopharma, and other sectors through a vulnerability (CVE-2023-48022) in the Ray AI framework named ShadowRay. According to security researchers ShadowRay was the first known instance of AI workloads being activley exploited in the wild through vulnerabilities in AI infrastructure. CVE-2023-48022, which allows access to compute resources and sensitive data for exposed instances, remains unpatched and has been disputed by the vendor as they maintain that Ray is not intended for use outside of a strictly controlled network environment.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0027: Threat Group-3390Enterpriseuses · MalwareS1247: EmbargoEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0125: RemsecEnterprisemitigates · MitigationM1051: Update SoftwareEnterpriseuses · ToolS0378: PoshC2Enterprisemitigates · MitigationM1050: Exploit ProtectionEnterpriseuses · GroupG0125: HAFNIUMEnterpriseuses · GroupG1048: UNC3886Enterpriseuses · GroupG0016: APT29Enterpriseuses · MalwareS1151: ZeroCleareEnterpriseuses · GroupG0010: TurlaEnterpriseuses · GroupG0068: PLATINUMEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0154: Cobalt StrikeEnterpriseuses · ToolS0363: EmpireEnterpriseuses · GroupG0061: FIN8Enterpriseuses · GroupG0080: Cobalt GroupEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0664: PandoraEnterprisemitigates · MitigationM1048: Application Isolation and SandboxingEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0484: CarberpEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0050: CosmicDukeEnterpriseuses · MalwareS1181: BlackByte 2.0 RansomwareEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0260: InvisiMoleEnterpriseuses · GroupG1019: MoustachedBouncerEnterpriseuses · GroupG1017: Volt TyphoonEnterprise
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

MitigationEnterprise

M1051: Update Software

Software updates ensure systems are protected against known vulnerabilities by applying patches and upgrades provided by vendors. Regular updates reduce the attack surface and prevent adversaries from exploiting known security gaps. This includes patching operating systems, applications, drivers, and firmware. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Regular Operating System Updates

- Implementation: Apply the latest Windows security updates monthly using WSUS (Windows Server Update Services) or a similar patch management solution. Configure systems to check for updates automatically and schedule reboots during maintenance windows. - Use Case: Prevents exploitation of OS vulnerabilities such as privilege escalation or remote code execution.

Application Patching

- Implementation: Monitor Apache's update release notes for security patches addressing vulnerabilities. Schedule updates for off-peak hours to avoid downtime while maintaining security compliance. - Use Case: Prevents exploitation of web application vulnerabilities, such as those leading to unauthorized access or data breaches.

Firmware Updates

- Implementation: Regularly check the vendor’s website for firmware updates addressing vulnerabilities. Plan for update deployment during scheduled maintenance to minimize business disruption. - Use Case: Protects against vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit to gain access to network devices or inject malicious traffic.

Emergency Patch Deployment

- Implementation: Use the emergency patch deployment feature of the organization's patch management tool to apply updates to all affected Exchange servers within 24 hours. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of exploitation by rapidly addressing critical vulnerabilities.

Centralized Patch Management

- Implementation: Implement a centralized patch management system, such as SCCM or ManageEngine, to automate and track patch deployment across all environments. Generate regular compliance reports to ensure all systems are updated. - Use Case: Streamlines patching processes and ensures no critical systems are missed.

*Tools for Implementation*

Patch Management Tools:

- WSUS: Manage and deploy Microsoft updates across the organization. - ManageEngine Patch Manager Plus: Automate patch deployment for OS and third-party apps. - Ansible: Automate updates across multiple platforms, including Linux and Windows.

Vulnerability Scanning Tools:

- OpenVAS: Open-source vulnerability scanning to identify missing patches.

MitigationEnterprise

M1050: Exploit Protection

Deploy capabilities that detect, block, and mitigate conditions indicative of software exploits. These capabilities aim to prevent exploitation by addressing vulnerabilities, monitoring anomalous behaviors, and applying exploit-mitigation techniques to harden systems and software.

Operating System Exploit Protections:

- Use Case: Enable built-in exploit protection features provided by modern operating systems, such as Microsoft's Exploit Protection, which includes techniques like Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), and Control Flow Guard (CFG). - Implementation: Enforce DEP for all programs and enable ASLR to randomize memory addresses used by system and application processes. Windows: Configure Exploit Protection through the Windows Security app or deploy settings via Group Policy. `ExploitProtectionExportSettings.exe -path "exploit_settings.xml"` Linux: Use Kernel-level hardening features like SELinux, AppArmor, or GRSEC to enforce memory protections and prevent exploits.

Third-Party Endpoint Security:

- Use Case: Use endpoint protection tools with built-in exploit protection, such as enhanced memory protection, behavior monitoring, and real-time exploit detection. - Implementation: Deploy tools to detect and block exploitation attempts targeting unpatched software.

Virtual Patching: - Use Case: Use tools to implement virtual patches that mitigate vulnerabilities in applications or operating systems until official patches are applied. - Implementation: Use Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) to block exploitation attempts on known vulnerabilities in outdated applications.

Hardening Application Configurations:

- Use Case: Disable risky application features that can be exploited, such as macros in Microsoft Office or JScript in Internet Explorer. - Implementation: Configure Microsoft Office Group Policies to disable execution of macros in downloaded files.

MitigationEnterprise

M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing

Application Isolation and Sandboxing refers to the technique of restricting the execution of code to a controlled and isolated environment (e.g., a virtual environment, container, or sandbox). This method prevents potentially malicious code from affecting the rest of the system or network by limiting access to sensitive resources and critical operations. The goal is to contain threats and minimize their impact. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Browser Sandboxing:

- Use Case: Implement browser sandboxing to isolate untrusted web content and prevent malicious web pages or scripts from accessing sensitive system resources or initiating unauthorized downloads. - Implementation: Use browsers with built-in sandboxing features (e.g., Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge) or deploy enhanced browser security frameworks that limit the execution scope of active content. Consider controls that monitor or restrict script-based file generation and downloads commonly abused in evasion techniques like HTML smuggling.

Application Virtualization:

- Use Case: Deploy critical or high-risk applications in a virtualized environment to ensure any compromise does not affect the host system. - Implementation: Use application virtualization platforms to run applications in isolated environments.

Email Attachment Sandboxing:

- Use Case: Route email attachments to a sandbox environment to detect and block malware before delivering emails to end-users. - Implementation: Integrate security solutions with sandbox capabilities to analyze email attachments.

Endpoint Sandboxing:

- Use Case: Run all downloaded files and applications in a restricted environment to monitor their behavior for malicious activity. - Implementation: Use endpoint protection tools for sandboxing at the endpoint level.

MitigationEnterprise

M1019: Threat Intelligence Program

A Threat Intelligence Program enables organizations to proactively identify, analyze, and act on cyber threats by leveraging internal and external data sources. The program supports decision-making processes, prioritizes defenses, and improves incident response by delivering actionable intelligence tailored to the organization's risk profile and operational environment. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Establish a Threat Intelligence Team:

- Form a dedicated team or assign responsibility to existing security personnel to collect, analyze, and act on threat intelligence.

Define Intelligence Requirements:

- Identify the organization’s critical assets and focus intelligence gathering efforts on threats targeting these assets.

Leverage Internal and External Data Sources:

- Collect intelligence from internal sources such as logs, incidents, and alerts. Subscribe to external threat intelligence feeds, participate in ISACs, and monitor open-source intelligence (OSINT).

Implement Tools for Automation:

- Use threat intelligence platforms (TIPs) to automate the collection, enrichment, and dissemination of threat data. - Integrate threat intelligence with SIEMs to correlate IOCs with internal events.

Analyze and Act on Intelligence:

- Use frameworks like MITRE ATT&CK to map intelligence to adversary TTPs. - Prioritize defensive measures, such as patching vulnerabilities or deploying IOCs, based on analyzed threats.

Share and Collaborate:

- Share intelligence with industry peers through ISACs or threat-sharing platforms to enhance collective defense.

Evaluate and Update the Program:

- Regularly assess the effectiveness of the threat intelligence program. - Update intelligence priorities and capabilities as new threats emerge.

*Tools for Implementation*

Threat Intelligence Platforms (TIPs):

- OpenCTI: An open-source platform for structuring and sharing threat intelligence. - MISP: A threat intelligence sharing platform for sharing structured threat data.

Threat Intelligence Feeds:

- Open Threat Exchange (OTX): Provides free access to a large repository of threat intelligence. - CIRCL OSINT Feed: A free source for IOCs and threat information.

Automation and Enrichment Tools:

- TheHive: An open-source incident response platform with threat intelligence integration. - Yeti: A platform for managing and structuring knowledge about threats.

Analysis Frameworks:

- MITRE ATT&CK Navigator: A tool for mapping threat intelligence to adversary behaviors. - Cuckoo Sandbox: Analyzes malware to extract behavioral indicators.

Community and Collaboration Tools:

- ISAC Memberships: Join industry-specific ISACs for intelligence sharing. - Slack/Discord Channels: Participate in threat intelligence communities for real-time collaboration.

MitigationEnterprise

M1038: Execution Prevention

Prevent the execution of unauthorized or malicious code on systems by implementing application control, script blocking, and other execution prevention mechanisms. This ensures that only trusted and authorized code is executed, reducing the risk of malware and unauthorized actions. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Application Control:

- Use Case: Use tools like AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to create whitelists of authorized applications and block unauthorized ones. On Linux, use tools like SELinux or AppArmor to define mandatory access control policies for application execution. - Implementation: Allow only digitally signed or pre-approved applications to execute on servers and endpoints. (e.g., `New-AppLockerPolicy -PolicyType Enforced -FilePath "C:\Policies\AppLocker.xml"`)

Script Blocking:

- Use Case: Use script control mechanisms to block unauthorized execution of scripts, such as PowerShell or JavaScript. Web Browsers: Use browser extensions or settings to block JavaScript execution from untrusted sources. - Implementation: Configure PowerShell to enforce Constrained Language Mode for non-administrator users. (e.g., `Set-ExecutionPolicy AllSigned`)

Executable Blocking:

- Use Case: Prevent execution of binaries from suspicious locations, such as `%TEMP%` or `%APPDATA%` directories. - Implementation: Block execution of `.exe`, `.bat`, or `.ps1` files from user-writable directories.

Dynamic Analysis Prevention: - Use Case: Use behavior-based execution prevention tools to identify and block malicious activity in real time. - Implemenation: Employ EDR solutions that analyze runtime behavior and block suspicious code execution.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.6
Created
Modified
Raw hash
3de5ec70eae5fbd6...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.6Current bundle3de5ec70eae5…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ESET InvisiMole June 2020

    Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Unit42 AcidBox June 2020

    Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017

    Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, June 27). BRONZE UNION Cyberespionage Persists Despite Disclosures. Retrieved July 13, 2017.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Profero APT27 December 2020

    Global Threat Center, Intelligence Team. (2020, December). APT27 Turns to Ransomware. Retrieved November 12, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Kaspersky ProjectSauron Technical Analysis

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, August 9). The ProjectSauron APT. Technical Analysis. Retrieved August 17, 2016.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    GitHub PoshC2

    Nettitude. (2018, July 23). Python Server for PoshC2. Retrieved April 23, 2019.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    TechNet Moving Beyond EMET

    Nunez, N. (2017, August 9). Moving Beyond EMET II – Windows Defender Exploit Guard. Retrieved March 12, 2018.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity

    Wikipedia. (2018, January 11). Control-flow integrity. Retrieved March 12, 2018.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Microsoft Silk Typhoon MAR 2025

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence . (2025, March 5). Silk Typhoon targeting IT supply chain. Retrieved March 20, 2025.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Google Cloud Threat Intelligence VMWare ESXi Zero-Day 2023

    Alexander Marvi, Brad Slaybaugh, Ron Craft, and Rufus Brown. (2023, June 13). VMware ESXi Zero-Day Used by Chinese Espionage Actor to Perform Privileged Guest Operations on Compromised Hypervisors. Retrieved March 26, 2025.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    ESET T3 Threat Report 2021

    ESET. (2022, February). THREAT REPORT T3 2021. Retrieved February 10, 2022.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019

    Kessem, L. (2019, December 4). New Destructive Wiper ZeroCleare Targets Energy Sector in the Middle East. Retrieved September 4, 2024.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016

    Windows Defender Advanced Threat Hunting Team. (2016, April 29). PLATINUM: Targeted attacks in South and Southeast Asia. Retrieved February 15, 2018.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Cobalt Strike TTPs Dec 2017

    Cobalt Strike. (2017, December 8). Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Cobalt Strike Manual 4.3 November 2020

    Strategic Cyber LLC. (2020, November 5). Cobalt Strike: Advanced Threat Tactics for Penetration Testers. Retrieved April 13, 2021.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Github PowerShell Empire

    Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    FireEye Fin8 May 2016

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