S0368: NotPetya
NotPetya is malware that was used by Sandworm Team in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. While NotPetya appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, NotPetya may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. NotPetya contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.[1][2][3][4]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0368: NotPetya describes [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malware that was used by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. While [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) may be more appropriately thought ...
Executive priority
S0368: NotPetya is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0368: NotPetya by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0368: NotPetya appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
NotPetya
NotPetya is malware that was used by Sandworm Team in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. While NotPetya appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, NotPetya may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. NotPetya contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.[1][2][3][4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1569.002 | Service ExecutionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin SharesSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1685.005 | Clear Windows Event LogsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | |
| Enterprise | T1210 | Exploitation of Remote Services | |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1003.001 | LSASS MemorySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1529 | System Shutdown/Reboot | |
| Enterprise | T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | |
| Enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | |
| Enterprise | T1218.011 | Rundll32Sub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1078.003 | Local AccountsSub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0034: Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]
In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 138515a61280… | ||
| 19.2 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 138515a61280… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 138515a61280… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Talos Nyetya June 2017
Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant "Nyetya" Compromises Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019.
Open source URL - [2]US-CERT NotPetya 2017
US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.
Open source URL - [3]ESET Telebots June 2017
Cherepanov, A.. (2017, June 30). TeleBots are back: Supply chain attacks against Ukraine. Retrieved June 11, 2020.
Open source URL - [4]US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020
Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.
Open source URL - [5]Diskcoder.C
(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)
- [6]ExPetr
(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)
- [7]GoldenEye
(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)
- [8]Nyetya
(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)
- [9]Petrwrap
(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)
- [10]mitre-attackS0368Open source URL
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