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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0384: Dridex

Dridex is a prolific banking Trojan that first appeared in 2014. By December 2019, the US Treasury estimated Dridex had infected computers in hundreds of banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, leading to more than $100 million in theft. Dridex was created from the source code of the Bugat banking Trojan (also known as Cridex).[1][2][3]

EnterpriseS0384MalwareObject v2.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0384: Dridex describes [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a prolific banking Trojan that first appeared in 2014. By December 2019, the US Treasury estimated [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) had infected computers in hundreds of banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, leading to more than $100 million in theft. [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) was created from the source code of the Bugat banking Trojan (also known as Cridex).(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kasp...

Executive priority

S0384: Dridex is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0384: Dridex by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0384: Dridex appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Dridex

Dridex is a prolific banking Trojan that first appeared in 2014. By December 2019, the US Treasury estimated Dridex had infected computers in hundreds of banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, leading to more than $100 million in theft. Dridex was created from the source code of the Bugat banking Trojan (also known as Cridex).[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

15 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Dridex has encrypted traffic with RC4.[2]

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

Dridex can abuse legitimate Windows executables to side-load malicious DLL files.CitationRed Canary Dridex Threat Report 2021

EnterpriseT1219Remote Access Tools

Dridex contains a module for VNC.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Dridex has used the OutputDebugStringW function to avoid malware analysis as part of its anti-debugging technique.[4]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Dridex can maintain persistence via the creation of scheduled tasks within system directories such as `windows\system32\`, `windows\syswow64,` `winnt\system32`, and `winnt\syswow64`.CitationRed Canary Dridex Threat Report 2021

EnterpriseT1185Browser Session Hijacking

Dridex can perform browser attacks via web injects to steal information such as credentials, certificates, and cookies.[1]

EnterpriseT1518Software Discovery

Dridex has collected a list of installed software on the system.[4]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Dridex has used POST requests and HTTPS for C2 communications.[2][4]

EnterpriseT1218.010Regsvr32Sub-technique

Dridex can use `regsvr32.exe` to initiate malicious code.CitationRed Canary Dridex Threat Report 2021

EnterpriseT1573.002Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique

Dridex has encrypted traffic with RSA.[2]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

Dridex's strings are obfuscated using RC4.[4]

EnterpriseT1090Proxy

Dridex contains a backconnect module for tunneling network traffic through a victim's computer. Infected computers become part of a P2P botnet that can relay C2 traffic to other infected peers.[1][4]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Dridex has collected the computer name and OS architecture information from the system.[4]

EnterpriseT1090.003Multi-hop ProxySub-technique

Dridex can use multiple layers of proxy servers to hide terminal nodes in its infrastructure.[4]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Dridex has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.[4]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0092: TA505

TA505 is a cyber criminal group that has been active since at least 2014. TA505 is known for frequently changing malware, driving global trends in criminal malware distribution, and ransomware campaigns involving Clop.[1][2][3][4][5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0119: Indrik SpiderEnterpriseuses · GroupG0092: TA505Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1574.001: DLLEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1219: Remote Access ToolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1185: Browser Session HijackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1518: Software DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.010: Regsvr32Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.002: Asymmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1090: ProxyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1090.003: Multi-hop ProxyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
0eceead1d6aaf0fe...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.1Current bundle0eceead1d6aa…
19.12.1Older bundle0eceead1d6aa…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Dell Dridex Oct 2015

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Kaspersky Dridex May 2017

    Slepogin, N. (2017, May 25). Dridex: A History of Evolution. Retrieved May 31, 2019.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019

    U.S. Department of Treasury. (2019, December 5). Treasury Sanctions Evil Corp, the Russia-Based Cybercriminal Group Behind Dridex Malware. Retrieved September 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021

    Check Point Research. (2021, January 4). Stopping Serial Killer: Catching the Next Strike. Retrieved September 7, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Bugat v5

    (Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)

  6. [6]
    Dridex

    (Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017)(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021)

  7. [7]
    mitre-attackS0384
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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