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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1555.001: Keychain

Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as items shared among users on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for items synced with Apple’s iCloud service.

Keychains can be viewed and edited through the Keychain Access application or using the command-line utility security. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/, /Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/.[1][2][3]

Adversaries may gather user credentials from Keychain storage/memory. For example, the command security dump-keychain –d will dump all Login Keychain credentials from ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db. Adversaries may also directly read Login Keychain credentials from the ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain file. Both methods require a password, where the default password for the Login Keychain is the current user’s password to login to the macOS host.[4][5]

EnterpriseT1555.001Sub-techniqueObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1555.001: Keychain describes Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as i...

Executive priority

T1555.001: Keychain is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1555.001: Keychain by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (credential-access), supported platforms (macOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Identity, privilege, and authentication events
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1555.001: Keychain appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Keychain

Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as items shared among users on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for items synced with Apple’s iCloud service.

Keychains can be viewed and edited through the Keychain Access application or using the command-line utility security. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/, /Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/.[1][2][3]

Adversaries may gather user credentials from Keychain storage/memory. For example, the command security dump-keychain –d will dump all Login Keychain credentials from ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db. Adversaries may also directly read Login Keychain credentials from the ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain file. Both methods require a password, where the default password for the Login Keychain is the current user’s password to login to the macOS host.[4][5]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

2 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1555Credentials from Password StoresThis object subtechnique of Credentials from Password Stores.
EnterpriseT1142KeychainKeychain revoked by this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S1153: Cuckoo Stealer

Cuckoo Stealer is a macOS malware with characteristics of spyware and an infostealer that has been in use since at least 2024. Cuckoo Stealer is a universal Mach-O binary that can run on Intel or ARM-based Macs and has been spread through trojanized versions of various potentially unwanted programs or PUP's such as converters, cleaners, and uninstallers.[1][2]

macOS
MalwareEnterprise

S0690: Green Lambert

Green Lambert is a modular backdoor that security researchers assess has been used by an advanced threat group referred to as Longhorn and The Lamberts. First reported in 2017, the Windows variant of Green Lambert may have been used as early as 2008; a macOS version was uploaded to a multiscanner service in September 2014.[1][2]

WindowsiOSmacOS
MalwareEnterprise

S1185: LightSpy

First observed in 2018, LightSpy is a modular malware family that initially targeted iOS devices in Southern Asia before expanding to Android and macOS platforms. It consists of a downloader, a main executable that manages network communications, and functionality-specific modules, typically implemented as `.dylib` files (iOS, macOS) or `.apk` files (Android). LightSpy can collect VoIP call recordings, SMS messages, and credential stores, which are then exfiltrated to a command and control (C2) server.[1]

AndroidWindowsiOS
MalwareEnterprise

S1246: BeaverTail

BeaverTail is a malware that has both a JavaScript and C++ variant. Active since 2022, BeaverTail is capable of stealing logins from browsers and serves as a downloader for second stage payloads. BeaverTail has previously been leveraged by North Korea-affiliated actors identified as DeceptiveDevelopment or Contagious Interview. BeaverTail has been delivered to victims through code repository sites and has been embedded within malicious attachments.[1][2][3][4]

LinuxmacOSWindows
MalwareEnterprise

S9010: GlassWorm

GlassWorm is a worm that propagated through supply chain attacks by compromising repository credentials from victim environments and having malicious payloads added to those compromised accounts for distribution to victims across the various development ecosystems.[1][2][3] GlassWorm has numerous variants, including Rust binaries, encrypted JavaScript and a variant leveraging invisible Unicode characters that made reverse engineering difficult.[4][1][5] GlassWorm has employed a unique command and control (C2) methodology using Solana blockchain.[6][1] GlassWorm was first reported in October 2025.[6][1][3]

macOSWindows
MalwareEnterprise

S1016: MacMa

MacMa is a macOS-based backdoor with a large set of functionalities to control and exfiltrate files from a compromised computer. MacMa has been observed in the wild since November 2021.[1] MacMa shares command and control and unique libraries with MgBot and Nightdoor, indicating a relationship with the Daggerfly threat actor.[2]

macOS
ToolEnterprise

S0363: Empire

Empire is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure PowerShell for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. Empire was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.[1][2][3]

LinuxmacOSWindows
ToolEnterprise

S0349: LaZagne

LaZagne is a post-exploitation, open-source tool used to recover stored passwords on a system. It has modules for Windows, Linux, and OSX, but is mainly focused on Windows systems. LaZagne is publicly available on GitHub.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

mitigates · MitigationM1027: Password PoliciesEnterpriseuses · GroupG1052: Contagious InterviewEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0278: iKittenEnterpriseuses · MalwareS1153: Cuckoo StealerEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0690: Green LambertEnterpriseuses · MalwareS1185: LightSpyEnterpriseuses · MalwareS1246: BeaverTailEnterpriseuses · MalwareS9010: GlassWormEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0274: CalistoEnterpriseuses · MalwareS1016: MacMaEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0279: ProtonEnterpriseuses · ToolS0363: EmpireEnterpriseuses · ToolS0349: LaZagneEnterprisesubtechnique of · TechniqueT1555: Credentials from Password StoresEnterprisedetects · Detection StrategyDET0396: Detect Access to macOS Keychain for Credential TheftEnterpriserevoked by · TechniqueT1142: KeychainEnterprise
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

MitigationEnterprise

M1027: Password Policies

Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access. Strong password policies include enforcing password complexity, requiring regular password changes, and preventing password reuse. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Windows Systems:

- Use Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to configure: - Minimum password length (e.g., 12+ characters). - Password complexity requirements. - Password history (e.g., disallow last 24 passwords). - Account lockout duration and thresholds.

Linux Systems:

- Configure Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM): - Use `pam_pwquality` to enforce complexity and length requirements. - Implement `pam_tally2` or `pam_faillock` for account lockouts. - Use `pwunconv` to disable password reuse.

Password Managers:

- Enforce usage of enterprise password managers (e.g., Bitwarden, 1Password, LastPass) to generate and store strong passwords.

Password Blacklisting:

- Use tools like Have I Been Pwned password checks or NIST-based blacklist solutions to prevent users from setting compromised passwords.

Regular Auditing:

- Periodically audit password policies and account configurations to ensure compliance using tools like LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution) and vulnerability scanners.

*Tools for Implementation*

Windows:

- Group Policy Management Console (GPMC): Enforce password policies. - Microsoft Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS): Enforce random, unique admin passwords.

Linux/macOS:

- PAM Modules (pam_pwquality, pam_tally2, pam_faillock): Enforce password rules. - Lynis: Audit password policies and system configurations.

Cross-Platform:

- Password Managers (Bitwarden, 1Password, KeePass): Manage and enforce strong passwords. - Have I Been Pwned API: Prevent the use of breached passwords. - NIST SP 800-63B compliant tools: Enforce password guidelines and blacklisting.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
1cd7b43705a8e623...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle1cd7b43705a8…
19.11.1Older bundle1cd7b43705a8…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Keychain Services Apple

    Apple. (n.d.). Keychain Services. Retrieved April 11, 2022.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Keychain Decryption Passware

    Yana Gourenko. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Apple Keychain Decryption. Retrieved April 13, 2022.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    OSX Keychain Schaumann

    Jan Schaumann. (2015, November 5). Using the OS X Keychain to store and retrieve passwords. Retrieved March 31, 2022.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    External to DA, the OS X Way

    Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved September 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Empire Keychain Decrypt

    Empire. (2018, March 8). Empire keychaindump_decrypt Module. Retrieved April 14, 2022.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    mitre-attackT1555.001
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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