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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0051: FIN10

FIN10 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations. [1]

EnterpriseG0051GroupObject v1.3Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0051: FIN10 describes [FIN10](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0051) is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations. (Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017)

Executive priority

G0051: FIN10 is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0051: FIN10 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0051: FIN10 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

FIN10

FIN10 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

11 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

FIN10 has used batch scripts and scheduled tasks to delete critical system files.[1]

EnterpriseT1570Lateral Tool Transfer

FIN10 has deployed Meterpreter stagers and SplinterRAT instances in the victim network after moving laterally.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

FIN10 has used Meterpreter to enumerate users on remote systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

FIN10 has executed malicious .bat files containing PowerShell commands.[1]

EnterpriseT1078.003Local AccountsSub-technique

FIN10 has moved laterally using the Local Administrator account.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

FIN10 has established persistence by using the Registry option in PowerShell Empire to add a Run key.[1]CitationGithub PowerShell Empire

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

FIN10 has established persistence by using S4U tasks as well as the Scheduled Task option in PowerShell Empire.[1]CitationGithub PowerShell Empire

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

FIN10 has relied on publicly-available software to gain footholds and establish persistence in victim environments.[1]

EnterpriseT1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolSub-technique

FIN10 has used RDP to move laterally to systems in the victim environment.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

FIN10 uses PowerShell for execution as well as PowerShell Empire to establish persistence.[1]CitationGithub PowerShell Empire

EnterpriseT1078Valid Accounts

FIN10 has used stolen credentials to connect remotely to victim networks using VPNs protected with only a single factor.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

ToolEnterprise

S0363: Empire

Empire is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure PowerShell for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. Empire was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.[1][2][3]

LinuxmacOSWindows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · ToolS0363: EmpireEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1570: Lateral Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1078.003: Local AccountsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1588.002: ToolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1021.001: Remote Desktop ProtocolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1078: Valid AccountsEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
4b2ce38aa30c70c6...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.3Current bundle4b2ce38aa30c…
19.11.3Older bundlef4f65bf9578e…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    FireEye FIN10 June 2017

    FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, June 16). FIN10: Anatomy of a Cyber Extortion Operation. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    FIN10

    (Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017)

  3. [3]
    mitre-attackG0051
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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