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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery

Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.

Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to gather information about configurations and settings, such as IP addresses of configured interfaces and static/dynamic routes (e.g. show ip route, show ip interface).[1][2] On ESXi, adversaries may leverage esxcli to gather network configuration information. For example, the command `esxcli network nic list` will retrieve the MAC address, while `esxcli network ip interface ipv4 get` will retrieve the local IPv4 address.[3]

Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.

EnterpriseT1016TechniqueObject v1.7Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

System Network Configuration Discovery is a common post-access behavior where an adversary learns how a compromised host, ESXi system, or network device is connected. For leaders, the risk is not the command itself; it is that basic network details can help an intruder decide where to move next, what access may be available, and how to shape follow-on activity.

Executive priority

Prioritize this technique as a coverage validation item for SOC and incident response readiness, especially across Windows, Linux, macOS, ESXi, and network device management planes. Because the behavior can look like normal administration, executives should ask whether teams can distinguish routine troubleshooting from discovery occurring after suspicious access, and whether logs from network devices and virtualization infrastructure are included in security monitoring and audit evidence.

Technical view

ATT&CK lists this as a Discovery technique across ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, and Windows. Official examples include use of Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, route, network device CLI commands such as show ip route and show ip interface, and ESXi esxcli commands for NIC and IPv4 interface information. No official MITRE detection text is provided, but relationship context states DET0195 detects this object. SOC teams should validate behavioral analytics around command execution, shell/CLI activity, and discovery sequences, particularly when these commands occur from unusual accounts, remote sessions, service contexts, or shortly after initial access indicators.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry for network configuration utilities
  • Shell history and interactive session logs on Linux, macOS, Windows, and ESXi where available
  • Network device CLI, AAA, configuration, and command accounting logs
  • ESXi management, shell, and host activity logs related to esxcli usage
  • EDR or host audit events showing parent process, user, privilege level, and remote session context

Detection direction

  • Baseline legitimate administrative and troubleshooting use so detections do not rely only on command names.
  • Tune for context: unusual user, unusual host, uncommon parent process, remote execution, automation-like bursts, or discovery following suspicious authentication.
  • Include network devices and ESXi in detection validation; these are common blind spots compared with endpoint operating systems.
  • Use relationship context from T1016.001 Internet Connection Discovery and T1016.002 Wi-Fi Discovery to look for broader discovery clusters rather than isolated events.
  • Treat campaign and group relationships as evidence that the behavior is widely observed in ATT&CK reporting, not as proof of current activity in the local environment.

Mitigation priorities

  • Restrict administrative shell and CLI access to systems, ESXi hosts, and network devices based on operational need.
  • Ensure command logging, authentication logging, and centralized retention are enabled for endpoints, network devices, and virtualization infrastructure.
  • Harden and monitor management interfaces so discovery from compromised accounts or exposed management paths is more visible.
  • Use segmentation and least privilege so network configuration knowledge does not automatically translate into broad movement opportunity.
  • Update incident response playbooks to treat network-configuration discovery as a possible early indicator for scoping follow-on discovery and lateral movement.
Additional notes and limits

This technique is high-value for triage because it often appears early in hands-on activity and can explain how an intruder is mapping the environment. It is also noisy: administrators routinely run similar commands. The practical detection challenge is therefore behavioral correlation, not simple command matching.

MITRE provides no official detection text for this object. The supplied data supports platforms, Discovery tactic, example utilities, ESXi and network device examples, subtechnique relationships, and DET0195 as related detection strategy, but local logging architecture and administrative baselines are required to judge coverage and alert quality.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

System Network Configuration Discovery

Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.

Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to gather information about configurations and settings, such as IP addresses of configured interfaces and static/dynamic routes (e.g. show ip route, show ip interface).[1][2] On ESXi, adversaries may leverage esxcli to gather network configuration information. For example, the command `esxcli network nic list` will retrieve the MAC address, while `esxcli network ip interface ipv4 get` will retrieve the local IPv4 address.[3]

Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1001: HEXANE

HEXANE is a cyber espionage threat group that has targeted oil & gas, telecommunications, aviation, and internet service provider organizations since at least 2017. Targeted companies have been located in the Middle East and Africa, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, and Tunisia. HEXANE's TTPs appear similar to APT33 and OilRig but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as a separate entity.[1][2][3][4]

GroupEnterprise

G0129: Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been conducting operations since at least 2012. Mustang Panda has been known to use tailored phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious payloads. Mustang Panda has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmental organizations, including think tanks, religious institutions, and research entities, across the United States, Europe, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

GroupEnterprise

G1040: Play

Play is a ransomware group that has been active since at least 2022 deploying Playcrypt ransomware against the business, government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, and media sectors in North America, South America, and Europe. Play actors employ a double-extortion model, encrypting systems after exfiltrating data, and are presumed by security researchers to operate as a closed group.[1][2]

GroupEnterprise

G1043: BlackByte

BlackByte is a ransomware threat actor operating since at least 2021. BlackByte is associated with several versions of ransomware also labeled BlackByte Ransomware. BlackByte ransomware operations initially used a common encryption key allowing for the development of a universal decryptor, but subsequent versions such as BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware use more robust encryption mechanisms. BlackByte is notable for operations targeting critical infrastructure entities among other targets across North America.[1][2][3][4][5]

GroupEnterprise

G0035: Dragonfly

Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16.[1][2] Active since at least 2010, Dragonfly has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9]

GroupEnterprise

G0018: admin@338

admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors. [1]

GroupEnterprise

G1009: Moses Staff

Moses Staff is a suspected Iranian threat group that has primarily targeted Israeli companies since at least September 2021. Moses Staff openly stated their motivation in attacking Israeli companies is to cause damage by leaking stolen sensitive data and encrypting the victim's networks without a ransom demand.[1]

Security researchers assess Moses Staff is politically motivated, and has targeted government, finance, travel, energy, manufacturing, and utility companies outside of Israel as well, including those in Italy, India, Germany, Chile, Turkey, the UAE, and the US.[2]

GroupEnterprise

G0073: APT19

APT19 is a Chinese-based threat group that has targeted a variety of industries, including defense, finance, energy, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, high tech, education, manufacturing, and legal services. In 2017, a phishing campaign was used to target seven law and investment firms. [1] Some analysts track APT19 and Deep Panda as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same. [2] [3] [4]

GroupEnterprise

G1016: FIN13

FIN13 is a financially motivated cyber threat group that has targeted the financial, retail, and hospitality industries in Mexico and Latin America, as early as 2016. FIN13 achieves its objectives by stealing intellectual property, financial data, mergers and acquisition information, or PII.[1][2]

GroupEnterprise

G1017: Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021, primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam. Volt Typhoon's targeting and pattern of behavior have been assessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or disruptive attacks. Volt Typhoon has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.[1][2][3][4]. The group has leveraged compromised SOHO routers to proxy command and control traffic and obscure its infrastructure, activity associated with the KV botnet.[5].

Reporting indicates a separate initial access cluster, SYLVANITE, has been observed exploiting internet-facing edge devices and transferring access to Volt Typhoon, also tracked as VOLTZITE, for follow-on operations. [6]

GroupEnterprise

G0032: Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]

North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]

MalwareEnterprise

S0667: Chrommme

Chrommme is a backdoor tool written using the Microsoft Foundation Class (MFC) framework that was first reported in June 2021; security researchers noted infrastructure overlaps with Gelsemium malware.[1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0603: Stuxnet

Stuxnet was the first publicly reported malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. Stuxnet is a large and complex malware that utilized multiple behaviors, including numerous zero-day vulnerabilities, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.[1][2][3][4] Stuxnet was discovered in 2010, with some components being used as early as November 2008.[1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0365: Olympic Destroyer

Olympic Destroyer is malware that was used by Sandworm Team against the 2018 Winter Olympics, held in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The main purpose of the malware was to render infected computer systems inoperable. The malware leverages various native Windows utilities and API calls to carry out its destructive tasks. Olympic Destroyer has worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network in order to maximize its destructive impact.[1][2]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0250: Koadic

Koadic is a Windows post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool that is publicly available on GitHub. Koadic has several options for staging payloads and creating implants, and performs most of its operations using Windows Script Host.[1][2][3]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S1145: Pikabot

Pikabot is a backdoor used for initial access and follow-on tool deployment active since early 2023. Pikabot is notable for extensive use of multiple encoding, encryption, and defense evasion mechanisms to evade defenses and avoid analysis. Pikabot has some overlaps with QakBot, but insufficient evidence exists to definitively link these two malware families. Pikabot is frequently used to deploy follow on tools such as Cobalt Strike or ransomware variants.[1][2][3]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0098: T9000

T9000 is a backdoor that is a newer variant of the T5000 malware family, also known as Plat1. Its primary function is to gather information about the victim. It has been used in multiple targeted attacks against U.S.-based organizations. [1] [2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0532: Lucifer

Lucifer is a crypto miner and DDoS hybrid malware that leverages well-known exploits to spread laterally on Windows platforms.[1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S1022: IceApple

IceApple is a modular Internet Information Services (IIS) post-exploitation framework, that has been used since at least 2021 against the technology, academic, and government sectors.[1]

Windows
CampaignEnterprise

C0012: Operation CuckooBees

Operation CuckooBees was a cyber espionage campaign targeting technology and manufacturing companies in East Asia, Western Europe, and North America since at least 2019. Security researchers noted the goal of Operation CuckooBees, which was still ongoing as of May 2022, was likely the theft of proprietary information, research and development documents, source code, and blueprints for various technologies. Researchers assessed Operation CuckooBees was conducted by actors affiliated with Winnti Group, APT41, and BARIUM.[1]

CampaignEnterprise

C0017: C0017

C0017 was an APT41 campaign conducted between May 2021 and February 2022 that successfully compromised at least six U.S. state government networks through the exploitation of vulnerable Internet facing web applications. During C0017, APT41 was quick to adapt and use publicly-disclosed as well as zero-day vulnerabilities for initial access, and in at least two cases re-compromised victims following remediation efforts. The goals of C0017 are unknown, however APT41 was observed exfiltrating Personal Identifiable Information (PII).[1]

CampaignEnterprise

C0035: KV Botnet Activity

KV Botnet Activity consisted of exploitation of primarily “end-of-life” small office-home office (SOHO) equipment from manufacturers such as Cisco, NETGEAR, and DrayTek. KV Botnet Activity was used by Volt Typhoon to obfuscate connectivity to victims in multiple critical infrastructure segments, including energy and telecommunication companies and entities based on the US territory of Guam. While the KV Botnet is the most prominent element of this campaign, it overlaps with another botnet cluster referred to as the JDY cluster.[1] This botnet was disrupted by US law enforcement entities in early 2024 after periods of activity from October 2022 through January 2024.[2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.7
Created
Modified
Raw hash
7ff303f4b7bcda49...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.7Current bundle7ff303f4b7bc…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

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    Open source URL
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    Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.

    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Adamitis, D. et al. (2019, June 4). It's alive: Threat actors cobble together open-source pieces into monstrous Frankenstein campaign. Retrieved May 11, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Nettitude. (2018, July 23). Python Server for PoshC2. Retrieved April 23, 2019.

    Open source URL
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    Parys, B. (2017, February 11). The KeyBoys are back in town. Retrieved June 13, 2019.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
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    CISA. (2023, December 18). #StopRansomware: Play Ransomware AA23-352A. Retrieved September 24, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    FBI BlackByte 2022

    US Federal Bureau of Investigation & US Secret Service. (2022, February 11). Indicators of Compromise Associated with BlackByte Ransomware. Retrieved December 16, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Volexity PowerDuke November 2016

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    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Cyberreason Anchor December 2019

    Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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