G0065: Leviathan
Leviathan is a Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attributed to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan State Security Department and an affiliated front company.[1] Active since at least 2009, Leviathan has targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime, and transportation across the US, Canada, Australia, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.[1][2][3][4]
Security context for executives and security teams
G0065: Leviathan describes [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attributed to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan State Security Department and an affiliated front company.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021) Active since at least 2009, [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) has targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime, and transpor...
Executive priority
G0065: Leviathan is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0065: Leviathan by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0065: Leviathan appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Leviathan
Leviathan is a Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attributed to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan State Security Department and an affiliated front company.[1] Active since at least 2009, Leviathan has targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime, and transportation across the US, Canada, Australia, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.[1][2][3][4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0005: Windows Credential Editor
Windows Credential Editor is a password dumping tool. [1]
S0190: BITSAdmin
S0232: HOMEFRY
S0021: Derusbi
S0110: at
S0069: BLACKCOFFEE
BLACKCOFFEE is malware that has been used by several Chinese groups since at least 2013. [1] [2]
S0363: Empire
Empire is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure PowerShell for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. Empire was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.[1][2][3]
S0032: gh0st RAT
S0039: Net
The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. [1]
Net has a great deal of functionality, [2] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through SMB/Windows Admin Shares using net use commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as net1 user.
S0194: PowerSploit
PowerSploit is an open source, offensive security framework comprised of PowerShell modules and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related to penetration testing such as code execution, persistence, bypassing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration. [1] [2] [3]
S0233: MURKYTOP
S0228: NanHaiShu
C0049: Leviathan Australian Intrusions
Leviathan Australian Intrusions consisted of at least two long-term intrusions against victims in Australia by Leviathan, relying on similar tradecraft such as external service exploitation followed by extensive credential capture and re-use to enable privilege escalation and lateral movement. Leviathan Australian Intrusions were focused on exfiltrating sensitive data including valid credentials for the victim organizations.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 4.1 | Current bundle | d693cb17ff1d… | ||
| 19.1 | 4.1 | Older bundle | 18ed60da4f10… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021
CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department. Retrieved August 12, 2021.
Open source URL - [2]Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017
Axel F, Pierre T. (2017, October 16). Leviathan: Espionage actor spearphishes maritime and defense targets. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
Open source URL - [3]FireEye Periscope March 2018
FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
Open source URL - [4]CISA Leviathan 2024
CISA et al. (2024, July 8). People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of State Security APT40 Tradecraft in Action. Retrieved February 3, 2025.
Open source URL - [5]FireEye APT40 March 2019
Plan, F., et al. (2019, March 4). APT40: Examining a China-Nexus Espionage Actor. Retrieved March 18, 2019.
Open source URL - [6]Accenture MUDCARP March 2019
Accenture iDefense Unit. (2019, March 5). Mudcarp's Focus on Submarine Technologies. Retrieved August 24, 2021.
Open source URL - [7]APT40
FireEye reporting on TEMP.Periscope (which was combined into APT40) indicated TEMP.Periscope was reported upon as Leviathan.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)
- [8]BRONZE MOHAWK
(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE MOHAWK n.d.)
- [9]Crowdstrike KRYPTONITE PANDA August 2018
Adam Kozy. (2018, August 30). Two Birds, One Stone Panda. Retrieved August 24, 2021.
Open source URL - [10]Gadolinium
(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: MSTIC GADOLINIUM September 2020)
- [11]Gingham Typhoon
(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)
- [12]Kryptonite Panda
(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Crowdstrike KRYPTONITE PANDA August 2018)
- [13]Leviathan
(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)
- [14]MSTIC GADOLINIUM September 2020
Ben Koehl, Joe Hannon. (2020, September 24). Microsoft Security - Detecting Empires in the Cloud. Retrieved August 24, 2021.
Open source URL - [15]MUDCARP
(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019)
- [16]Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023
Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.
Open source URL - [17]SecureWorks BRONZE MOHAWK n.d.
SecureWorks. (n.d.). Threat Profile - BRONZE MOHAWK. Retrieved August 24, 2021.
Open source URL - [18]TEMP.Jumper
[Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)
- [19]TEMP.Periscope
[Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)
- [20]mitre-attackG0065Open source URL
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