T1550.002: Pass the Hash
Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash.
When performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems.
Adversaries may also use stolen password hashes to "overpass the hash." Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform Pass the Ticket attacks.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
Pass the Hash matters because it turns stolen Windows password hashes into usable access for lateral movement without needing the user’s cleartext password. For leaders, the key issue is not only password theft; it is whether one compromised endpoint or account can become a path to additional systems, privileged access, or operational disruption.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a Windows lateral-movement risk tied to identity hygiene and privileged access control. Executives should ask whether privileged and standard accounts are separated, whether stale or over-permissioned accounts exist, whether Windows systems are consistently updated, and whether SOC/IR teams can reconstruct suspicious authentication paths after a credential-access event. The technique is associated in ATT&CK with multiple campaigns, groups, and tools, so coverage should be treated as a resilience and incident-readiness requirement, not a niche detection use case.
Technical view
ATT&CK lists this as a Windows sub-technique under Use Alternate Authentication Material for lateral movement. The supplied ATT&CK object does not provide official detection text, but it is linked to DET0409, a detection strategy for Pass the Hash on Windows. SOC and detection teams should validate whether they can correlate credential-access precursors with subsequent local or remote authentications by the same account, especially where authentication succeeds without expected user activity. For overpass-the-hash context, teams should also consider Kerberos ticket creation patterns following use of a password hash. IR teams should be prepared to scope both the account and every host where that account authenticated after suspected hash capture.
Likely telemetry
- Windows authentication and logon records for local and remote access
- Endpoint security telemetry showing credential access activity before lateral movement
- Account usage history across hosts, especially privileged account use
- Kerberos ticket-related telemetry relevant to overpass-the-hash scenarios
- Remote session, service, or administrative access evidence on Windows systems
Detection direction
- Start by validating the related DET0409 detection strategy against local Windows authentication telemetry; ATT&CK does not include official detection logic for this object.
- Tune for sequences: suspected credential access followed by new or unusual authentication to local or remote Windows systems using the same account.
- Baseline privileged and administrative account behavior so unusual host-to-host use is reviewable rather than lost in normal administration noise.
- Watch for blind spots where endpoint logs, authentication logs, or privileged account audit trails are missing, short-retained, or not correlated by account and host.
- Handle false positives carefully: legitimate administration can resemble lateral movement, so detections should include context such as account role, source host, destination host, timing, and expected maintenance activity.
Mitigation priorities
- Strengthen User Account Management: remove stale accounts, enforce least privilege, and make account lifecycle controls auditable.
- Prioritize Privileged Account Management: limit privileged account scope, separate administrative use from normal user activity, and monitor privileged authentication.
- Maintain Windows software updates to reduce related attack surface and support current security controls.
- Use Windows User Account Control appropriately as part of reducing unauthorized elevated actions; do not treat it as a standalone control for Pass the Hash.
- Test incident response procedures for hash-theft scenarios, including account containment, host scoping, and evidence preservation.
Additional notes and limits
The object is a current, non-revoked ATT&CK Enterprise sub-technique, replacing the older revoked T1075 entry. Relationship context shows use by multiple campaigns, groups, and software including Mimikatz, Pass-The-Hash Toolkit, and Cobalt Strike, which supports prioritizing defensive validation. Those relationships should not be interpreted as evidence of current activity in any specific environment.
Official ATT&CK detection text is not provided for this technique in the supplied object. Telemetry and detection recommendations therefore remain directional and require validation against the organization’s Windows logging, endpoint coverage, identity architecture, and administrative operating model.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Pass the Hash
Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash.
When performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems.
Adversaries may also use stolen password hashes to "overpass the hash." Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform Pass the Ticket attacks.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1550 | Use Alternate Authentication Material | This object subtechnique of Use Alternate Authentication Material. |
| Enterprise | T1075 | Pass the Hash | Pass the Hash revoked by this object. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0050: APT32
APT32 is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.[1][2][3]
G0007: APT28
APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.
G0143: Aquatic Panda
Aquatic Panda is a suspected China-based threat group with a dual mission of intelligence collection and industrial espionage. Active since at least May 2020, Aquatic Panda has primarily targeted entities in the telecommunications, technology, and government sectors.[1]
G0114: Chimera
G0006: APT1
G0102: Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of TrickBot since at least 2016. Wizard Spider possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.[1][2][3]
G0096: APT41
APT41 is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, APT41 has been observed targeting various industries, including but not limited to healthcare, telecom, technology, finance, education, retail and video game industries in 14 countries.[1] Notable behaviors include using a wide range of malware and tools to complete mission objectives. APT41 overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and Winnti Group.[2][3]
G0094: Kimsuky
Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]
DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.
G1016: FIN13
G1003: Ember Bear
Ember Bear is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155).[1] Ember Bear has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas.[2] Ember Bear conducted the WhisperGate destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.[3][4][1] There is some confusion as to whether Ember Bear overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as Saint Bear. At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.[2][5]
G0093: GALLIUM
GALLIUM is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2012, primarily targeting telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam. This group is particularly known for launching Operation Soft Cell, a long-term campaign targeting telecommunications providers.[1] Security researchers have identified GALLIUM as a likely Chinese state-sponsored group, based in part on tools used and TTPs commonly associated with Chinese threat actors.[1][2][3]
S0154: Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]
In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]
S0122: Pass-The-Hash Toolkit
Pass-The-Hash Toolkit is a toolkit that allows an adversary to "pass" a password hash (without knowing the original password) to log in to systems. [1]
S0376: HOPLIGHT
S0378: PoshC2
PoshC2 is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. The server-side components of the tool are primarily written in Python, while the implants are written in PowerShell. Although PoshC2 is primarily focused on Windows implantation, it does contain a basic Python dropper for Linux/macOS.[1]
S0002: Mimikatz
S0363: Empire
Empire is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure PowerShell for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. Empire was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.[1][2][3]
S1081: BADHATCH
S0488: CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec, or CME, is a post-exploitation tool developed in Python and designed for penetration testing against networks. CrackMapExec collects Active Directory information to conduct lateral movement through targeted networks.[1]
C0063: 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks
2025 Poland Wiper Attacks is a Russian state-sponsored campaign that conducted destructive cyberattacks against Polish energy infrastructure in December 2025. Targets included more than 30 wind and photovoltaic farms, a combined heat and power (CHP) plant, and a manufacturing sector company. The attacks on the distributed energy resources (DER) disrupted communications between affected facilities and the distribution system operator, but did not impact electricity generation or heat supply. Across the campaign, threat actors deployed two previously undocumented wiper tools, DynoWiper, a Windows-based wiper and LazyWiper, a PowerShell wiper, distributed via malicious Group Policy Objects. At the CHP plant, threat actors had maintained access since at least March 2025, using that foothold to obtain credentials and move laterally before attempting wiper deployment. Some reporting has assessed the activity to be consistent with Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) threat activity group Dragonfly, also tracked as STATIC TUNDRA, while other reporting attributes the destructive wiper activities to the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) threat activity group ELECTRUM, also tracked as Sandworm Team.[1][2][3][4]
C0002: Night Dragon
Night Dragon was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted oil, energy, and petrochemical companies, along with individuals and executives in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States. The unidentified threat actors searched for information related to oil and gas field production systems, financials, and collected data from SCADA systems. Based on the observed techniques, tools, and network activities, security researchers assessed the campaign involved a threat group based in China.[1]
C0061: Operation Digital Eye
Operation Digital Eye was conducted in June and July of 2024 by suspected People's Republic of China (PRC)-nexus threat actors targeting business-to-business IT service providers in Southern Europe. Operation Digital Eye activity included the use of Visual Studio Code tunnels for command and control (C2) and custom lateral movement capabilities. Overlaps in tooling between Digital Eye and previous China-nexus campaigns, Operation Soft Cell and Operation Tainted Love, indicate the potential use of shared vendors or digital quartermasters.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 8e25722c3635… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash
Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.
Open source URL - [2]Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018.
Open source URL - [3]NSA Spotting
National Security Agency/Central Security Service Information Assurance Directorate. (2015, August 7). Spotting the Adversary with Windows Event Log Monitoring. Retrieved September 6, 2018.
Open source URL - [4]Cobalt Strike TTPs Dec 2017
Cobalt Strike. (2017, December 8). Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [5]Mandiant APT1
Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
Open source URL - [6]Microsoft SIR Vol 19
Anthe, C. et al. (2015, October 19). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 19. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
- [7]Crowdstrike HuntReport 2022
CrowdStrike. (2023). 2022 Falcon OverWatch Threat Hunting Report. Retrieved May 20, 2024.
Open source URL - [8]GitHub IAD Secure Host Baseline UAC Filtering
NSA IAD. (2017, January 24). MS Security Guide. Retrieved December 18, 2017.
Open source URL - [9]NCC Group Chimera January 2021
Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
Open source URL - [10]Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021
Shilko, J., et al. (2021, October 7). FIN12: The Prolific Ransomware Intrusion Threat Actor That Has Aggressively Pursued Healthcare Targets. Retrieved June 15, 2023.
Open source URL - [11]US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019
US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019.
Open source URL - [12]GitHub PoshC2
Nettitude. (2018, July 23). Python Server for PoshC2. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
Open source URL - [13]Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide
Metcalf, S. (2015, November 13). Unofficial Guide to Mimikatz & Command Reference. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
Open source URL - [14]NCSC Joint Report Public Tools
The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NZ NCSC), CERT New Zealand, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (UK NCSC) and the US National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). (2018, October 11). Joint report on publicly available hacking tools. Retrieved March 11, 2019.
Open source URL - [15]Cobalt Strike Manual 4.3 November 2020
Strategic Cyber LLC. (2020, November 5). Cobalt Strike: Advanced Threat Tactics for Penetration Testers. Retrieved April 13, 2021.
Open source URL - [16]CERT Polska
CERT Polska. (2026, January 30). Energy Sector Incident Report – 29 December. Retrieved April 22, 2026.
Open source URL - [17]Rostovcev APT41 2021
Nikita Rostovcev. (2022, August 18). APT41 World Tour 2021 on a tight schedule. Retrieved February 22, 2024.
Open source URL - [18]CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky
CISA, FBI, CNMF. (2020, October 27). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a. Retrieved November 4, 2020.
Open source URL - [19]Github PowerShell Empire
Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
Open source URL - [20]Mandiant FIN13 Aug 2022
Ta, V., et al. (2022, August 8). FIN13: A Cybercriminal Threat Actor Focused on Mexico. Retrieved February 9, 2023.
Open source URL - [21]CISA GRU29155 2024
US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency et al. (2024, September 5). Russian Military Cyber Actors Target U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 6, 2024.
Open source URL - [22]BitDefender BADHATCH Mar 2021
Vrabie, V., et al. (2021, March 10). FIN8 Returns with Improved BADHATCH Toolkit. Retrieved September 8, 2021.
Open source URL - [23]CME Github September 2018
byt3bl33d3r. (2018, September 8). SMB: Command Reference. Retrieved July 17, 2020.
Open source URL - [24]McAfee Night Dragon
McAfee® Foundstone® Professional Services and McAfee Labs™. (2011, February 10). Global Energy Cyberattacks: “Night Dragon”. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
Open source URL - [25]Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019
Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 25). Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against Telecommunications Providers. Retrieved July 18, 2019.
Open source URL - [26]sentinelone operationDigitalEye Dec 2024
Aleksandar Milenkoski, Luigi Martire. (2024, December 10). Operation Digital Eye | Chinese APT Compromises Critical Digital Infrastructure via Visual Studio Code Tunnels. Retrieved February 27, 2025.
Open source URL - [27]Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash
Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.
Open source URL - [28]Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash
Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.
Open source URL - [29]mitre-attackT1550.002Open source URL
- [30]mitre-attackT1550.002Open source URL
- [31]mitre-attackT1550.002Open source URL
- [32]Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018.
Open source URL - [33]NSA Spotting
National Security Agency/Central Security Service Information Assurance Directorate. (2015, August 7). Spotting the Adversary with Windows Event Log Monitoring. Retrieved September 6, 2018.
Open source URL - [34]Cobalt Strike TTPs Dec 2017
Cobalt Strike. (2017, December 8). Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [35]Mandiant APT1
Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
Open source URL - [36]Microsoft SIR Vol 19
Anthe, C. et al. (2015, October 19). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 19. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
- [37]Crowdstrike HuntReport 2022
CrowdStrike. (2023). 2022 Falcon OverWatch Threat Hunting Report. Retrieved May 20, 2024.
Open source URL - [38]GitHub IAD Secure Host Baseline UAC Filtering
NSA IAD. (2017, January 24). MS Security Guide. Retrieved December 18, 2017.
Open source URL - [39]NCC Group Chimera January 2021
Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
Open source URL - [40]Mandiant APT1
Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
Open source URL - [41]Mandiant APT1
Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
Open source URL - [42]Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021
Shilko, J., et al. (2021, October 7). FIN12: The Prolific Ransomware Intrusion Threat Actor That Has Aggressively Pursued Healthcare Targets. Retrieved June 15, 2023.
Open source URL - [43]US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019
US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019.
Open source URL - [44]GitHub PoshC2
Nettitude. (2018, July 23). Python Server for PoshC2. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
Open source URL - [45]Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide
Metcalf, S. (2015, November 13). Unofficial Guide to Mimikatz & Command Reference. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
Open source URL - [46]Cobalt Strike Manual 4.3 November 2020
Strategic Cyber LLC. (2020, November 5). Cobalt Strike: Advanced Threat Tactics for Penetration Testers. Retrieved April 13, 2021.
Open source URL - [47]NCSC Joint Report Public Tools
The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NZ NCSC), CERT New Zealand, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (UK NCSC) and the US National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). (2018, October 11). Joint report on publicly available hacking tools. Retrieved March 11, 2019.
Open source URL - [48]CERT Polska
CERT Polska. (2026, January 30). Energy Sector Incident Report – 29 December. Retrieved April 22, 2026.
Open source URL - [49]Rostovcev APT41 2021
Nikita Rostovcev. (2022, August 18). APT41 World Tour 2021 on a tight schedule. Retrieved February 22, 2024.
Open source URL - [50]CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky
CISA, FBI, CNMF. (2020, October 27). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a. Retrieved November 4, 2020.
Open source URL - [51]Github PowerShell Empire
Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
Open source URL - [52]Mandiant FIN13 Aug 2022
Ta, V., et al. (2022, August 8). FIN13: A Cybercriminal Threat Actor Focused on Mexico. Retrieved February 9, 2023.
Open source URL - [53]CISA GRU29155 2024
US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency et al. (2024, September 5). Russian Military Cyber Actors Target U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 6, 2024.
Open source URL - [54]BitDefender BADHATCH Mar 2021
Vrabie, V., et al. (2021, March 10). FIN8 Returns with Improved BADHATCH Toolkit. Retrieved September 8, 2021.
Open source URL - [55]CME Github September 2018
byt3bl33d3r. (2018, September 8). SMB: Command Reference. Retrieved July 17, 2020.
Open source URL - [56]McAfee Night Dragon
McAfee® Foundstone® Professional Services and McAfee Labs™. (2011, February 10). Global Energy Cyberattacks: “Night Dragon”. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
