T1558.001: Golden Ticket
Adversaries who have the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), also known as a golden ticket.[1] Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory.[2]
Using a golden ticket, adversaries are then able to request ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, which enable access to specific resources. Golden tickets require adversaries to interact with the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in order to obtain TGS.[3]
The KDC service runs all on domain controllers that are part of an Active Directory domain. KRBTGT is the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) service account and is responsible for encrypting and signing all Kerberos tickets.[4] The KRBTGT password hash may be obtained using OS Credential Dumping and privileged access to a domain controller.
Security context for executives and security teams
T1558.001: Golden Ticket describes Adversaries who have the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), also known as a golden ticket.(Citation: AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015) Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection) Using a golden ticket, adversaries are then able to request ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, which enable access to specific resources. Golden tickets require adversaries to interact wi...
Executive priority
T1558.001: Golden Ticket is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1558.001: Golden Ticket by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (credential-access), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Identity, privilege, and authentication events
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1558.001: Golden Ticket appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Golden Ticket
Adversaries who have the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), also known as a golden ticket.[1] Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory.[2]
Using a golden ticket, adversaries are then able to request ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, which enable access to specific resources. Golden tickets require adversaries to interact with the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in order to obtain TGS.[3]
The KDC service runs all on domain controllers that are part of an Active Directory domain. KRBTGT is the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) service account and is responsible for encrypting and signing all Kerberos tickets.[4] The KRBTGT password hash may be obtained using OS Credential Dumping and privileged access to a domain controller.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1558 | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | This object subtechnique of Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0004: Ke3chang
S0633: Sliver
S0363: Empire
Empire is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure PowerShell for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. Empire was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.[1][2][3]
S0002: Mimikatz
S1071: Rubeus
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 127fded18f19… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | 127fded18f19… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015
Metcalf, S. (2015, August 7). Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now More Golden. Retrieved December 1, 2017.
Open source URL - [2]CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection
Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
Open source URL - [3]ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets
Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
Open source URL - [4]ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT
Sean Metcalf. (2014, November 10). Kerberos & KRBTGT: Active Directory’s Domain Kerberos Service Account. Retrieved January 30, 2020.
Open source URL - [5]Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket
Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.
Open source URL - [6]Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019
Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.
Open source URL - [7]mitre-attackT1558.001Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
