T1608.001: Upload Malware
Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.
Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin; hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult; or saved on the blockchain as smart contracts, which are resilient against takedowns that would affect traditional infrastructure.[1][2][3][4]
Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as software packages, application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores, package libraries, extension marketplaces, or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub, PyPi, NPM).[5] By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via User Execution. Masquerading, including typosquatting legitimate software, may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.
Security context for executives and security teams
Upload Malware is a pre-compromise behavior: adversaries stage payloads, droppers, backdoors, or backdoored packages somewhere victims or victim systems can later reach them. The business issue is that the first visible sign may not be malware creation, but a user, server, build process, or cloud/container workflow pulling content from public infrastructure, software repositories, IPFS, blockchain-hosted content, or attacker-controlled web servers.
Executive priority
Treat this as an early-warning and resilience problem, not only an endpoint malware problem. Leaders should ask whether the organization can identify risky externally hosted payloads before execution, govern downloads from public repositories and marketplaces, and produce audit evidence for pre-compromise monitoring. The ATT&CK relationships show this behavior across espionage and financially motivated groups and campaigns, including sectors such as energy, government, defense, aviation, healthcare, education, finance, hospitality, and cloud/container environments, so prioritization should reflect sector exposure and dependency on third-party software sources.
Technical view
This sub-technique sits under Stage Capabilities in the Resource Development tactic and has platform PRE, meaning much of the behavior may occur outside enterprise-owned infrastructure. SOC and IR teams should validate visibility where staged malware becomes observable: user downloads, command-line or application retrieval from Internet-accessible servers, access to public code/package repositories, container or VM image pulls, extension marketplace installs, DNS/proxy connections to staging locations, and downstream Ingress Tool Transfer context. ATT&CK provides no official detection text here; the related DET0824 detection strategy indicates a detection relationship exists, but its details were not supplied.
Likely telemetry
- DNS and web proxy logs for access to newly observed or suspicious staging domains, URLs, IPFS gateways, paste sites, code repositories, and package indexes
- Endpoint and EDR records for downloaded files, script interpreters, archive extraction, installer execution, and follow-on payload retrieval
- Email, collaboration, and browser telemetry for links or attachments that lead users to externally staged malware
- Developer and supply-chain logs for package installs, dependency updates, repository clones, container image pulls, VM image usage, and extension installs
- Cloud and container control-plane logs where public images, community images, or external artifacts are introduced
Detection direction
- Separate pre-compromise staging from internal execution: detection often depends on observing retrieval, installation, or user execution rather than the adversary’s original upload.
- Tune for unusual external artifact sources used by business processes, especially public package libraries, software stores, repositories, container registries, community VM images, paste services, IPFS, and blockchain-hosted content referenced in the ATT&CK description.
- Correlate downloads with subsequent execution, script activity, persistence, or ingress tool transfer to reduce false positives from legitimate developer and administrative activity.
- Maintain allowlists and baselines for approved repositories, package namespaces, images, and update channels; alert on typosquatting-like names, unexpected maintainers, or first-seen sources when local telemetry supports it.
- Account for blind spots: decentralized storage and blockchain-hosted content may resist takedown, and uploads to third-party infrastructure may not be visible in internal logs until a user, endpoint, workload, or build pipeline retrieves the content.
Mitigation priorities
- Prioritize M1056 Pre-compromise measures: reduce exposed attack paths, monitor adversarial preparation indicators, and make staged payload delivery harder before intrusion occurs.
- Establish policy and technical controls for approved software sources, public package repositories, extension marketplaces, container images, VM images, and developer dependencies.
- Use web, DNS, endpoint, and cloud controls to restrict or scrutinize retrieval from untrusted staging locations while preserving documented business exceptions.
- Add supply-chain validation for packages, binaries, images, and repositories before production use, especially where automated builds or cloud/container deployments pull public artifacts.
- Prepare response playbooks for staged-malware discoveries: scope who accessed the content, what executed, whether credentials or build systems were exposed, and whether third-party reporting or takedown is appropriate.
Additional notes and limits
This object is valuable because it bridges threat intelligence, SOC monitoring, vulnerability/supply-chain governance, cloud security, and incident response readiness. Its PRE platform means local detection coverage is usually indirect and depends on whether the enterprise can observe retrieval paths and software-source trust decisions. Relationship context includes many campaigns and groups, so it should inform risk modeling, but those relationships should not be interpreted as evidence of current targeting of any specific organization.
MITRE does not provide official detection text for T1608.001 in the supplied fields. The related DET0824 strategy is named but not described here. No claim is made that any listed actor is currently using this technique against a specific sector or organization. Effective detection and mitigation require local baselines for allowed repositories, web destinations, developer workflows, cloud images, and user execution patterns.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Upload Malware
Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.
Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin; hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult; or saved on the blockchain as smart contracts, which are resilient against takedowns that would affect traditional infrastructure.[1][2][3][4]
Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as software packages, application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores, package libraries, extension marketplaces, or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub, PyPi, NPM).[5] By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via User Execution. Masquerading, including typosquatting legitimate software, may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1608 | Stage Capabilities | This object subtechnique of Stage Capabilities. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0034: Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]
In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]
G1018: TA2541
TA2541 is a cybercriminal group that has been targeting the aviation, aerospace, transportation, manufacturing, and defense industries since at least 2017. TA2541 campaigns are typically high volume and involve the use of commodity remote access tools obfuscated by crypters and themes related to aviation, transportation, and travel.[1][2]
G1006: Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca is a suspected China-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least April 2019. Earth Lusca has targeted organizations in Australia, China, Hong Kong, Mongolia, Nepal, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Germany, France, and the United States. Targets included government institutions, news media outlets, gambling companies, educational institutions, COVID-19 research organizations, telecommunications companies, religious movements banned in China, and cryptocurrency trading platforms; security researchers assess some Earth Lusca operations may be financially motivated.[1]
Earth Lusca has used malware commonly used by other Chinese threat groups, including APT41 and the Winnti Group cluster, however security researchers assess Earth Lusca's techniques and infrastructure are separate.[1]
G0129: Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been conducting operations since at least 2012. Mustang Panda has been known to use tailored phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious payloads. Mustang Panda has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmental organizations, including think tanks, religious institutions, and research entities, across the United States, Europe, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
G1014: LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth is a Chinese-speaking cyber espionage group that has been active since at least October 2020. LuminousMoth has targeted high-profile organizations, including government entities, in Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Some security researchers have concluded there is a connection between LuminousMoth and Mustang Panda based on similar targeting and TTPs, as well as network infrastructure overlaps.[1][2]
G0090: WIRTE
WIRTE is a cyberespionage actor, believed to be a subgroup of the Hamas-affiliated Gaza Cybergang, that has been active since at least August 2018. WIRTE has targeted diplomatic, financial, military, legal, and technology organizations across the Middle East, North Africa, and in Europe to gather intelligence. WIRTE has remained persistently active despite the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict and has expanded their operations to include wiper malware attacks against Israeli targets.[1][2][3][4]
G0094: Kimsuky
Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]
DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.
G1020: Mustard Tempest
Mustard Tempest is an initial access broker that has operated the SocGholish distribution network since at least 2017. Mustard Tempest has partnered with Indrik Spider to provide access for the download of additional malware including LockBit, WastedLocker, and remote access tools.[1][2][3][4]
G0049: OilRig
OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
G0139: TeamTNT
TeamTNT is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]
G0140: LazyScripter
LazyScripter is threat group that has mainly targeted the airlines industry since at least 2018, primarily using open-source toolsets.[1]
G0047: Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group that has targeted military, law enforcement, judiciary, non-profit, and non-governmental organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name Gamaredon Group derives from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon," found in early campaigns.[1][2][3][4][5]
In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed Gamaredon Group to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18, an assessment later supported by multiple independent cybersecurity researchers. [6][5]
S9008: Shai-Hulud
Shai-Hulud is a supply chain worm, first reported in September 2025, that spreads through code repositories, including GitHub and NPM packages. It exploits CI/CD pipeline dependencies to propagate to victims and poisons the supply chain by publishing malicious packages. Once inside a victim environment, Shai-Hulud steals credentials and access tokens from compromised repository accounts and exfiltrates them to attacker-controlled servers via encoded GitHub Actions workflows.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
C0022: Operation Dream Job
Operation Dream Job was a cyber espionage operation likely conducted by Lazarus Group that targeted the defense, aerospace, government, and other sectors in the United States, Israel, Australia, Russia, and India. In at least one case, the cyber actors tried to monetize their network access to conduct a business email compromise (BEC) operation. In 2020, security researchers noted overlapping TTPs, to include fake job lures and code similarities, between Operation Dream Job, Operation North Star, and Operation Interception; by 2022 security researchers described Operation Dream Job as an umbrella term covering both Operation Interception and Operation North Star.[1][2][3][4]
C0002: Night Dragon
Night Dragon was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted oil, energy, and petrochemical companies, along with individuals and executives in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States. The unidentified threat actors searched for information related to oil and gas field production systems, financials, and collected data from SCADA systems. Based on the observed techniques, tools, and network activities, security researchers assessed the campaign involved a threat group based in China.[1]
C0011: C0011
C0011 was a suspected cyber espionage campaign conducted by Transparent Tribe that targeted students at universities and colleges in India. Security researchers noted this campaign against students was a significant shift from Transparent Tribe's historic targeting Indian government, military, and think tank personnel, and assessed it was still ongoing as of July 2022.[1]
C0047: RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations
RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations was executed by Mustang Panda from mid-2023 through the end of 2024 against multiple entities in East and Southeast Asia. RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations involved phishing to deliver malicious files or links to users prompting follow-on installer downloads to load PlugX on victim machines in a persistent state.[1]
C0005: Operation Spalax
Operation Spalax was a campaign that primarily targeted Colombian government organizations and private companies, particularly those associated with the energy and metallurgical industries. The Operation Spalax threat actors distributed commodity malware and tools using generic phishing topics related to COVID-19, banking, and law enforcement action. Security researchers noted indicators of compromise and some infrastructure overlaps with other campaigns dating back to April 2018, including at least one separately attributed to APT-C-36, however identified enough differences to report this as separate, unattributed activity.[1]
C0010: C0010
C0010 was a cyber espionage campaign conducted by UNC3890 that targeted Israeli shipping, government, aviation, energy, and healthcare organizations. Security researcher assess UNC3890 conducts operations in support of Iranian interests, and noted several limited technical connections to Iran, including PDB strings and Farsi language artifacts. C0010 began by at least late 2020, and was still ongoing as of mid-2022.[1]
C0013: Operation Sharpshooter
Operation Sharpshooter was a global cyber espionage campaign that targeted nuclear, defense, government, energy, and financial companies, with many located in Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Security researchers noted the campaign shared many similarities with previous Lazarus Group operations, including fake job recruitment lures and shared malware code.[1][2][3]
C0021: C0021
C0021 was a spearphishing campaign conducted in November 2018 that targeted public sector institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, and private-sector corporations in the oil and gas, chemical, and hospitality industries. The majority of targets were located in the US, particularly in and around Washington D.C., with other targets located in Europe, Hong Kong, India, and Canada. C0021's technical artifacts, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and targeting overlap with previous suspected APT29 activity.[1][2]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.3 | Current bundle | 5e003833572b… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020
Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]Talos IPFS 2022
Edmund Brumaghin. (2022, November 9). Threat Spotlight: Cyber Criminal Adoption of IPFS for Phishing, Malware Campaigns. Retrieved March 8, 2023.
Open source URL - [3]Guardio Etherhiding 2023
Nati Tal and Oleg Zaytsev. (2023, October 13). “EtherHiding” — Hiding Web2 Malicious Code in Web3 Smart Contracts. Retrieved May 22, 2025.
Open source URL - [4]Bleeping Computer Binance Smart Chain 2023
Bill Toulas. (2023, October 13). Hackers use Binance Smart Chain contracts to store malicious scripts. Retrieved May 22, 2025.
Open source URL - [5]Datadog Security Labs Malicious PyPi Packages 2024
Sebastian Obregoso and Christophe Tafani-Dereeper. (2024, May 23). Malicious PyPI packages targeting highly specific MacOS machines. Retrieved May 22, 2025.
Open source URL - [6]mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm
Roncone, G. et al. (n.d.). APT44: Unearthing Sandworm. Retrieved July 11, 2024.
Open source URL - [7]Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022
Larson, S. and Wise, J. (2022, February 15). Charting TA2541's Flight. Retrieved September 12, 2023.
Open source URL - [8]Cisco Operation Layover September 2021
Ventura, V. (2021, September 16). Operation Layover: How we tracked an attack on the aviation industry to five years of compromise. Retrieved September 15, 2023.
Open source URL - [9]ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020
ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 13). Operation 'Dream Job' Widespread North Korean Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
Open source URL - [10]ESET Lazarus Jun 2020
Breitenbacher, D and Osis, K. (2020, June 17). OPERATION IN(TER)CEPTION: Targeted Attacks Against European Aerospace and Military Companies. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
Open source URL - [11]McAfee Lazarus Jul 2020
Cashman, M. (2020, July 29). Operation North Star Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
Open source URL - [12]McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020
Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
Open source URL - [13]McAfee Night Dragon
McAfee® Foundstone® Professional Services and McAfee Labs™. (2011, February 10). Global Energy Cyberattacks: “Night Dragon”. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
Open source URL - [14]TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022
Chen, J., et al. (2022). Delving Deep: An Analysis of Earth Lusca’s Operations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [15]Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022
Raggi, M. et al. (2022, March 7). The Good, the Bad, and the Web Bug: TA416 Increases Operational Tempo Against European Governments as Conflict in Ukraine Escalates. Retrieved March 16, 2022.
Open source URL - [16]Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021
Lechtik, M, and etl. (2021, July 14). LuminousMoth APT: Sweeping attacks for the chosen few. Retrieved October 20, 2022.
Open source URL - [17]Palo Alto Ashen Lepus DEC 2025
Unit 42. (2025, December 11). Hamas-Affiliated Ashen Lepus Targets Middle Eastern Diplomatic Entities With New AshTag Malware Suite. Retrieved April 20, 2026.
Open source URL - [18]Cisco Talos Transparent Tribe Education Campaign July 2022
N. Baisini. (2022, July 13). Transparent Tribe begins targeting education sector in latest campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2022.
Open source URL - [19]Recorded Future RedDelta 2025
Insikt Group. (2025, January 9). Chinese State-Sponsored RedDelta Targeted Taiwan, Mongolia, and Southeast Asia with Adapted PlugX Infection Chain. Retrieved January 14, 2025.
Open source URL - [20]Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021
An, J and Malhotra, A. (2021, November 10). North Korean attackers use malicious blogs to deliver malware to high-profile South Korean targets. Retrieved December 29, 2021.
Open source URL - [21]Mandiant APT43 March 2024
Mandiant. (2024, March 14). APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations. Retrieved May 3, 2024.
Open source URL - [22]Securonix Kimsuky February 2025
Den Iuzvyk, Tim Peck. (2025, February 13). Analyzing DEEP#DRIVE: North Korean Threat Actors Observed Exploiting Trusted Platforms for Targeted Attacks. Retrieved August 19, 2025.
Open source URL - [23]SentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022
Milenkoski, A. (2022, November 7). SocGholish Diversifies and Expands Its Malware Staging Infrastructure to Counter Defenders. Retrieved March 22, 2024.
Open source URL - [24]ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017
ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017.
- [25]Lacework TeamTNT May 2021
Stroud, J. (2021, May 25). Taking TeamTNT's Docker Images Offline. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
Open source URL - [26]ESET Operation Spalax Jan 2021
M. Porolli. (2021, January 21). Operation Spalax: Targeted malware attacks in Colombia. Retrieved September 16, 2022.
Open source URL - [27]MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021
Jazi, H. (2021, February). LazyScripter: From Empire to double RAT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [28]Microsoft Actinium February 2022
Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2022, February 4). ACTINIUM targets Ukrainian organizations. Retrieved February 18, 2022.
Open source URL - [29]Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022
Unit 42. (2022, February 3). Russia’s Gamaredon aka Primitive Bear APT Group Actively Targeting Ukraine. Retrieved February 21, 2022.
Open source URL - [30]Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024
Shields, W. (2024, January 18). Russian threat group COLDRIVER expands its targeting of Western officials to include the use of malware. Retrieved June 13, 2024.
Open source URL - [31]Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020
Lunghi, D. et al. (2020, February). Uncovering DRBControl. Retrieved November 12, 2021.
Open source URL - [32]MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021
Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
Open source URL - [33]Mandiant UNC3890 Aug 2022
Mandiant Israel Research Team. (2022, August 17). Suspected Iranian Actor Targeting Israeli Shipping, Healthcare, Government and Energy Sectors. Retrieved September 21, 2022.
Open source URL - [34]McAfee Sharpshooter December 2018
Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A., et. al.. (2018, December 18). Operation Sharpshooter Campaign Targets Global Defense, Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 14, 2020.
Open source URL - [35]Korean FSI TA505 2020
Financial Security Institute. (2020, February 28). Profiling of TA505 Threat Group That Continues to Attack the Financial Sector. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
Open source URL - [36]Microsoft BlackByte 2023
Microsoft Incident Response. (2023, July 6). The five-day job: A BlackByte ransomware intrusion case study. Retrieved December 16, 2024.
Open source URL - [37]Forcepoint BITTER Pakistan Oct 2016
Dela Paz, R. (2016, October 21). BITTER: a targeted attack against Pakistan. Retrieved June 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [38]FireEye APT29 Nov 2018
Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018.
Open source URL - [39]Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018
Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019.
Open source URL - [40]ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021
ClearSky Cyber Security . (2021, August). New Iranian Espionage Campaign By “Siamesekitten” - Lyceum. Retrieved June 6, 2022.
Open source URL - [41]Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022
Unit 42. (2022, February 25). Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot. Retrieved June 9, 2022.
Open source URL - [42]Aikido Shai-Hulud September 2025
Charlie Eriksen. (2025, September 16). S1ngularity/nx attackers strike again. Retrieved April 9, 2026.
Open source URL - [43]Socket Shai-Hulud Trufflehog September 2025
Socket Research Team. (2025, September 15). Popular Tinycolor npm Package Compromised in Supply Chain Attack Affecting 40+ Packages. Retrieved April 9, 2026.
Open source URL - [44]Netskope Shai-Hulud November 2025
Gianpietro Cutolo. (2025, November 26). Shai-Hulud 2.0: Aggressive, Automated, and Fast Spreading. Retrieved April 9, 2026.
Open source URL - [45]Wiz Shai-Hulud September 2025
Merav Bar, Rami McCarthy, Barak Sharoni. (2025, September 16). Shai-Hulud: Ongoing Package Supply Chain Worm Delivering Data-Stealing Malware. Retrieved April 9, 2026.
Open source URL - [46]Microsoft Moonstone Sleet 2024
Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, May 28). Moonstone Sleet emerges as new North Korean threat actor with new bag of tricks. Retrieved August 26, 2024.
Open source URL - [47]Sentinel One Contagious Interview ClickFix September 2025
Aleksandar Milenkoski, Sreekar Madabushi, Kenneth Kinion. (2025, September 4). Contagious Interview | North Korean Threat Actors Reveal Plans and Ops by Abusing Cyber Intel Platforms. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
Open source URL - [48]Validin Contagious Interview North Korea ClickFix January 2025
Efstratios Lontzetidis. (2025, January 16). Lazarus APT: Techniques for Hunting Contagious Interview. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
Open source URL - [49]Esentire ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024
eSentire Threat Response Unit (TRU). (2024, November 14). Bored BeaverTail & InvisibleFerret Yacht Club – A Lazarus Lure Pt.2. Retrieved October 17, 2025.
Open source URL - [50]Recorded Future Contagious Inteview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret OtterCookie February 2025
Insikt Group. (2025, February 13). Inside the Scam: North Korea’s IT Worker Threat. Retrieved October 17, 2025.
Open source URL - [51]Socket Contagious Interview NPM April 2025
Kirill Boychenko. (2025, April 4). Lazarus Expands Malicious npm Campaign: 11 New Packages Add Malware Loaders and Bitbucket Payloads. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
Open source URL - [52]Socket BeaverTail XORIndex HexEval Contagious Interview July 2025
Kirill Boychenko. (2025, July 14). Contagious Interview Campaign Escalates With 67 Malicious npm Packages and New Malware Loader. Retrieved October 19, 2025.
Open source URL - [53]Socket HexEval BeaverTail Contagious Interview June 2025
Kirill Boychenko. (2025, June 25). Another Wave: North Korean Contagious Interview Campaign Drops 35 New Malicious npm Packages. Retrieved October 19, 2025.
Open source URL - [54]ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025
Matej Havranek. (2025, February 20). DeceptiveDevelopment targets freelance developers. Retrieved October 17, 2025.
Open source URL - [55]SecurityScorecard Contagious Interview October 2024
Ryan Sherstobitoff. (2024, October 29). Inside a North Korean Phishing Operation Targeting DevOps Employees. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
Open source URL - [56]Securonix Contagious Interview DEVPOPPER April 2024
Securonix Threat Research, D.Iuzvyk, T. Peck, O.Kolesnikov. (2024, April 24). Analysis of DEV#POPPER: New Attack Campaign Targeting Software Developers Likely Associated With North Korean Threat Actors. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
Open source URL - [57]Zscaler ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024
Seongsu Park. (2024, November 4). From Pyongyang to Your Payroll: The Rise of North Korean Remote Workers in the West. Retrieved October 17, 2025.
Open source URL - [58]PaloAlto ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2023
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Charlie Eriksen. (2025, September 16). S1ngularity/nx attackers strike again. Retrieved April 9, 2026.
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Gianpietro Cutolo. (2025, November 26). Shai-Hulud 2.0: Aggressive, Automated, and Fast Spreading. Retrieved April 9, 2026.
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Merav Bar, Rami McCarthy, Barak Sharoni. (2025, September 16). Shai-Hulud: Ongoing Package Supply Chain Worm Delivering Data-Stealing Malware. Retrieved April 9, 2026.
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Ryan Sherstobitoff. (2024, October 29). Inside a North Korean Phishing Operation Targeting DevOps Employees. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
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Securonix Threat Research, D.Iuzvyk, T. Peck, O.Kolesnikov. (2024, April 24). Analysis of DEV#POPPER: New Attack Campaign Targeting Software Developers Likely Associated With North Korean Threat Actors. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
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Aleksandar Milenkoski, Sreekar Madabushi, Kenneth Kinion. (2025, September 4). Contagious Interview | North Korean Threat Actors Reveal Plans and Ops by Abusing Cyber Intel Platforms. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
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Kirill Boychenko. (2025, July 14). Contagious Interview Campaign Escalates With 67 Malicious npm Packages and New Malware Loader. Retrieved October 19, 2025.
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Kirill Boychenko. (2025, April 4). Lazarus Expands Malicious npm Campaign: 11 New Packages Add Malware Loaders and Bitbucket Payloads. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
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Kirill Boychenko. (2025, June 25). Another Wave: North Korean Contagious Interview Campaign Drops 35 New Malicious npm Packages. Retrieved October 19, 2025.
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Efstratios Lontzetidis. (2025, January 16). Lazarus APT: Techniques for Hunting Contagious Interview. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
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Seongsu Park. (2024, November 4). From Pyongyang to Your Payroll: The Rise of North Korean Remote Workers in the West. Retrieved October 17, 2025.
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Global Research & Analysis Team, Kaspersky. (2024, August 19). BlindEagle flying high in Latin America. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
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Melnyk, S. (2025, June 27). Tracing Blind Eagle to Proton66. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
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Cocomazzi, Antonio. (2024, July 17). FIN7 Reboot | Cybercrime Gang Enhances Ops with New EDR Bypasses and Automated Attacks. Retrieved September 24, 2025.
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Abdo, B., et al. (2022, April 4). FIN7 Power Hour: Adversary Archaeology and the Evolution of FIN7. Retrieved April 5, 2022.
Open source URL
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