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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0659: Diavol

Diavol is a ransomware variant first observed in June 2021 that is capable of prioritizing file types to encrypt based on a pre-configured list of extensions defined by the attacker. The Diavol Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS) program is managed by Wizard Spider and it has been observed being deployed by Bazar.[1][2][3][4]

EnterpriseS0659MalwareObject v2.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0659: Diavol describes [Diavol](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0659) is a ransomware variant first observed in June 2021 that is capable of prioritizing file types to encrypt based on a pre-configured list of extensions defined by the attacker. The [Diavol](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0659) Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS) program is managed by [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) and it has been observed being deployed by [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534).(Citation: Fortinet Diavol July 2021)(Ci...

Executive priority

S0659: Diavol is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0659: Diavol by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0659: Diavol appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Diavol

Diavol is a ransomware variant first observed in June 2021 that is capable of prioritizing file types to encrypt based on a pre-configured list of extensions defined by the attacker. The Diavol Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS) program is managed by Wizard Spider and it has been observed being deployed by Bazar.[1][2][3][4]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

19 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1485Data Destruction

Diavol can delete specified files from a targeted system.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Diavol can collect the username from a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1486Data Encrypted for Impact

Diavol has encrypted files using an RSA key though the `CryptEncrypt` API and has appended filenames with ".lock64". [1]

EnterpriseT1489Service Stop

Diavol will terminate services using the Service Control Manager (SCM) API.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Diavol has a command to traverse the files and directories in a given path.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Diavol has used HTTP GET and POST requests for C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Diavol has used `CreateToolhelp32Snapshot`, `Process32First`, and `Process32Next` API calls to enumerate the running processes in the system.[1]

EnterpriseT1135Network Share Discovery

Diavol has a `ENMDSKS` command to enumerates available network shares.[1]

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

Diavol can attempt to stop security software.[1]

EnterpriseT1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesSub-technique

Diavol can spread throughout a network via SMB prior to encryption.[1]

EnterpriseT1491.001Internal DefacementSub-technique

After encryption, Diavol will capture the desktop background window, set the background color to black, and change the desktop wallpaper to a newly created bitmap image with the text “All your files are encrypted! For more information see “README-FOR-DECRYPT.txt".[1]

EnterpriseT1027.003SteganographySub-technique

Diavol has obfuscated its main code routines within bitmap images as part of its anti-analysis techniques.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Diavol can enumerate victims' local and external IPs when registering with C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

Diavol has Base64 encoded the RSA public key used for encrypting files.[1]

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

Diavol can use the ARP table to find remote hosts to scan.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Diavol has used several API calls like `GetLogicalDriveStrings`, `SleepEx`, `SystemParametersInfoAPI`, `CryptEncrypt`, and others to execute parts of its attack.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Diavol can collect the computer name and OS version from the system.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Diavol can receive configuration updates and additional payloads including wscpy.exe from C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1490Inhibit System Recovery

Diavol can delete shadow copies using the `IVssBackupComponents` COM object to call the `DeleteSnapshots` method.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0102: Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of TrickBot since at least 2016. Wizard Spider possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.[1][2][3]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0102: Wizard SpiderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1485: Data DestructionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1486: Data Encrypted for ImpactEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1489: Service StopEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1135: Network Share DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1685: Disable or Modify ToolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1021.002: SMB/Windows Admin SharesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1491.001: Internal DefacementEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.003: SteganographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1018: Remote System DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1490: Inhibit System RecoveryEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
c4676cdc5e553792...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.0Current bundlec4676cdc5e55…
19.12.0Older bundlec4676cdc5e55…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Fortinet Diavol July 2021

    Neeamni, D., Rubinfeld, A.. (2021, July 1). Diavol - A New Ransomware Used By Wizard Spider?. Retrieved November 12, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    FBI Flash Diavol January 2022

    FBI. (2022, January 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Diavol. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    DFIR Diavol Ransomware December 2021

    DFIR Report. (2021, December 13). Diavol Ransomware. Retrieved March 9, 2022.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Diavol

    (Citation: Fortinet Diavol July 2021)

  6. [6]
    mitre-attackS0659
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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