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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0016: APT29

APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]

EnterpriseG0016GroupObject v6.2Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0016: APT29 describes [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).(Citation: White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021)(Citation: UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021) They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer o...

Executive priority

G0016: APT29 is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0016: APT29 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0016: APT29 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

APT29

APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

49 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1621Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation

APT29 has used repeated MFA requests to gain access to victim accounts.CitationSuspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the GlobeCitationNCSC et al APT29 2024

EnterpriseT1003.002Security Account ManagerSub-technique

APT29 has used the `reg save` command to save registry hives.[19]

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

APT29 has obtained and used a variety of tools including Mimikatz, SDelete, Tor, meek, and Cobalt Strike.CitationMandiant No Easy Breach[3][19]

EnterpriseT1090.004Domain FrontingSub-technique

APT29 has used the meek domain fronting plugin for Tor to hide the destination of C2 traffic.CitationMandiant No Easy Breach

EnterpriseT1528Steal Application Access Token

APT29 uses stolen tokens to access victim accounts, without needing a password.CitationNCSC et al APT29 2024

EnterpriseT1568Dynamic Resolution

APT29 has used Dynamic DNS providers for their malware C2 infrastructure.[19]

EnterpriseT1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

APT29 has exploited CVE-2021-36934 to escalate privileges on a compromised host.CitationESET T3 Threat Report 2021

EnterpriseT1546.003Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionSub-technique

APT29 has used WMI event subscriptions for persistence.CitationMandiant No Easy Breach

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

APT29 added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.CitationMandiant No Easy Breach

EnterpriseT1136.003Cloud AccountSub-technique

APT29 can create new users through Azure AD.CitationMSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1098.005Device RegistrationSub-technique

APT29 has enrolled their own devices into compromised cloud tenants, including enrolling a device in MFA to an Azure AD environment following a successful password guessing attack against a dormant account.CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022CitationNCSC et al APT29 2024

EnterpriseT1587.003Digital CertificatesSub-technique

APT29 has created self-signed digital certificates to enable mutual TLS authentication for malware.[21][22]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

APT29 has stolen data from compromised hosts.[19]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

APT29 has downloaded additional tools and malware onto compromised networks.CitationMandiant No Easy Breach[21][3][19]

EnterpriseT1651Cloud Administration Command

APT29 has used Azure Run Command and Azure Admin-on-Behalf-of (AOBO) to execute code on virtual machines.CitationMSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

APT29 has used spearphishing emails with an attachment to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.[3][23]CitationESET T3 Threat Report 2021[17]

EnterpriseT1078.004Cloud AccountsSub-technique

APT29 has gained access to a global administrator account in Azure AD and has used `Service Principal` credentials in Exchange.CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022[19]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

APT29 has used named and hijacked scheduled tasks to establish persistence.CitationMandiant No Easy Breach

EnterpriseT1016.001Internet Connection DiscoverySub-technique

APT29 has ensured web servers in a victim environment are Internet accessible before copying tools or malware to it.[19]

EnterpriseT1587.001MalwareSub-technique

APT29 has used unique malware in many of their operations.[3]CitationMandiant No Easy Breach[20][19]

EnterpriseT1583.006Web ServicesSub-technique

APT29 has registered algorithmically generated Twitter handles that are used for C2 by malware, such as HAMMERTOSS. APT29 has also used legitimate web services such as Dropbox and Constant Contact in their operations.CitationFireEye APT29[23]

EnterpriseT1090.003Multi-hop ProxySub-technique

A backdoor used by APT29 created a Tor hidden service to forward traffic from the Tor client to local ports 3389 (RDP), 139 (Netbios), and 445 (SMB) enabling full remote access from outside the network and has also used TOR.CitationMandiant No Easy BreachCitationMSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1037Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts

APT29 has hijacked legitimate application-specific startup scripts to enable malware to execute on system startup.[19]

EnterpriseT1027.006HTML SmugglingSub-technique

APT29 has embedded an ISO file within an HTML attachment that contained JavaScript code to initiate malware execution.CitationESET T3 Threat Report 2021

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

APT29 has used SDelete to remove artifacts from victim networks.CitationMandiant No Easy Breach

EnterpriseT1203Exploitation for Client Execution

APT29 has used multiple software exploits for common client software, like Microsoft Word, Exchange, and Adobe Reader, to gain code execution.[3][13][23]

EnterpriseT1550.003Pass the TicketSub-technique

APT29 used Kerberos ticket attacks for lateral movement.CitationMandiant No Easy Breach

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to click on a malicious link.[23]CitationSecureworks IRON RITUAL USAID Phish May 2021

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

APT29 has renamed malicious DLLs with legitimate names to appear benign; they have also created an Azure AD certificate with a Common Name that matched the display name of the compromised service principal.[25]CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022

EnterpriseT1110.003Password SprayingSub-technique

APT29 has conducted brute force password spray attacks.[26]CitationMSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021CitationNCSC et al APT29 2024

EnterpriseT1114.002Remote Email CollectionSub-technique

APT29 has collected emails from targeted mailboxes within a compromised Azure AD tenant and compromised Exchange servers, including via Exchange Web Services (EWS) API requests.CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022[19]

EnterpriseT1027.001Binary PaddingSub-technique

APT29 used large size files to avoid detection by security solutions with hardcoded size limits.[25]

EnterpriseT1556.007Hybrid IdentitySub-technique

APT29 has edited the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost.exe.config` file to load a malicious DLL into the AD FS process, thereby enabling persistent access to any service federated with AD FS for a user with a specified User Principal Name.CitationMagicWeb

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

APT29 has used encoded PowerShell scripts uploaded to CozyCar installations to download and install SeaDuke.CitationSymantec Seaduke 2015CitationMandiant No Easy BreachCitationESET T3 Threat Report 2021[17]

EnterpriseT1133External Remote Services

APT29 has used compromised identities to access networks via VPNs and Citrix.[16]CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022

EnterpriseT1037.004RC ScriptsSub-technique

APT29 has installed a run command on a compromised system to enable malware execution on system startup.[19]

EnterpriseT1021.007Cloud ServicesSub-technique

APT29 has leveraged compromised high-privileged on-premises accounts synced to Office 365 to move laterally into a cloud environment, including through the use of Azure AD PowerShell.CitationMandiant Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365

EnterpriseT1595.002Vulnerability ScanningSub-technique

APT29 has conducted widespread scanning of target environments to identify vulnerabilities for exploit.[13]

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

APT29 has used spearphishing with a link to trick victims into clicking on a link to a zip file containing malicious files.CitationMandiant No Easy Breach[23]CitationSecureworks IRON RITUAL USAID Phish May 2021

EnterpriseT1070.006TimestompSub-technique

APT29 has used timestomping to alter the Standard Information timestamps on their web shells to match other files in the same directory.[19]

EnterpriseT1586.003Cloud AccountsSub-technique

APT29 has used residential proxies, including Azure Virtual Machines, to obfuscate their access to victim environments.CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022

EnterpriseT1090.002External ProxySub-technique

APT29 uses compromised residential endpoints as proxies for defense evasion and network access.CitationNCSC et al APT29 2024

EnterpriseT1573Encrypted Channel

APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication.[17]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

APT29 used WMI to steal credentials and execute backdoors at a future time.CitationMandiant No Easy Breach

EnterpriseT1110.001Password GuessingSub-technique

APT29 has successfully conducted password guessing attacks against a list of mailboxes.CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022

EnterpriseT1199Trusted Relationship

APT29 has compromised IT, cloud services, and managed services providers to gain broad access to multiple customers for subsequent operations.CitationMSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceSub-technique

APT29 has used the legitimate mailing service Constant Contact to send phishing e-mails.[23]

EnterpriseT1078Valid Accounts

APT29 has used a compromised account to access an organization's VPN infrastructure.CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022

EnterpriseT1505.003Web ShellSub-technique

APT29 has installed web shells on exploited Microsoft Exchange servers.[13][19]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

ToolEnterprise

S0684: ROADTools

ROADTools is a framework for enumerating Azure Active Directory environments. The tool is written in Python and publicly available on GitHub.[1]

Identity Provider
MalwareEnterprise

S0046: CozyCar

CozyCar is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality. [1]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0002: Mimikatz

Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. [1] [2]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0175: meek

meek is an open-source Tor plugin that tunnels Tor traffic through HTTPS connections.

LinuxWindowsmacOS
ToolEnterprise

S0057: Tasklist

The Tasklist utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface. [1]

MalwareEnterprise

S0150: POSHSPY

POSHSPY is a backdoor that has been used by APT29 since at least 2015. It appears to be used as a secondary backdoor used if the actors lost access to their primary backdoors. [1]

Windows
CampaignEnterprise

C0023: Operation Ghost

Operation Ghost was an APT29 campaign starting in 2013 that included operations against ministries of foreign affairs in Europe and the Washington, D.C. embassy of a European Union country. During Operation Ghost, APT29 used new families of malware and leveraged web services, steganography, and unique C2 infrastructure for each victim.[1]

CampaignEnterprise

C0024: SolarWinds Compromise

The SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.[1] Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[2][3][4][5][1][6][7][8]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[9][10][11] The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds’ Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on APT29 activity on their systems.[12]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

attributed to · CampaignC0023: Operation GhostEnterpriseattributed to · CampaignC0024: SolarWinds CompromiseEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0048: PinchDukeEnterpriseuses · ToolS0684: ROADToolsEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0515: WellMailEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0046: CozyCarEnterpriseuses · ToolS0002: MimikatzEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1621: Multi-Factor Authentication Request GenerationEnterpriseuses · ToolS0175: meekEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0682: TrailBlazerEnterpriseuses · ToolS0057: TasklistEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0052: OnionDukeEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1003.002: Security Account ManagerEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1588.002: ToolEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0512: FatDukeEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1090.004: Domain FrontingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1528: Steal Application Access TokenEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1568: Dynamic ResolutionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1068: Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0150: POSHSPYEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0634: EnvyScoutEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1546.003: Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0516: SoreFangEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
6.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
d0ee7035952b0594...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.26.2Current bundled0ee7035952b…
19.16.2Older bundle66bfb5ded9ef…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021

    White House. (2021, April 15). Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities by the Russian Government. Retrieved April 16, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021

    UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK and US expose global campaign of malign activity by Russian intelligence services . Retrieved April 16, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    F-Secure The Dukes

    F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR

    Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Crowdstrike DNC June 2016

    Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021

    UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK exposes Russian involvement in SolarWinds cyber compromise . Retrieved April 16, 2021.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021

    NSA, FBI, DHS. (2021, April 15). Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks. Retrieved April 16, 2021.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021

    UK NCSC. (2021, April 15). UK and US call out Russia for SolarWinds compromise. Retrieved April 16, 2021.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021

    Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021

    CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    Volexity SolarWinds

    Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021

    NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2021, May 7). Further TTPs associated with SVR cyber actors. Retrieved July 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020

    Unit 42. (2020, December 23). SolarStorm Supply Chain Attack Timeline. Retrieved March 24, 2023.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    ESET Dukes October 2019

    Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    NCSC APT29 July 2020

    National Cyber Security Centre. (2020, July 16). Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development. Retrieved September 29, 2020.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Secureworks IRON HEMLOCK Profile

    Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON HEMLOCK. Retrieved February 22, 2022.

  18. [18]
    CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022

    CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22

    Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021

    MSTIC. (2021, May 28). Breaking down NOBELIUM’s latest early-stage toolset. Retrieved August 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    PWC WellMess July 2020

    PWC. (2020, July 16). How WellMess malware has been used to target COVID-19 vaccines. Retrieved September 24, 2020.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    PWC WellMess C2 August 2020

    PWC. (2020, August 17). WellMess malware: analysis of its Command and Control (C2) server. Retrieved September 29, 2020.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Secureworks IRON RITUAL Profile

    Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON RITUAL. Retrieved February 24, 2022.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021

    Guerrero-Saade, J. (2021, June 1). NobleBaron | New Poisoned Installers Could Be Used In Supply Chain Attacks. Retrieved August 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    MSRC Nobelium June 2021

    MSRC. (2021, June 25). New Nobelium activity. Retrieved August 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    APT29

    (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)

  28. [28]
    Blue Kitsune

    (Citation: PWC WellMess July 2020)(Citation: PWC WellMess C2 August 2020)

  29. [29]
    Cozy Bear

    (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)

  30. [30]
    CozyDuke

    (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)

  31. [31]
    Dark Halo

    (Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)

  32. [32]
    FireEye APT29 Nov 2018

    Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    IRON HEMLOCK

    (Citation: Secureworks IRON HEMLOCK Profile)

  34. [34]
    IRON RITUAL

    (Citation: Secureworks IRON RITUAL Profile)

  35. [35]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018

    Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Midnight Blizzard

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  38. [38]
    NOBELIUM

    (Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)(Citation: MSRC Nobelium June 2021)

  39. [39]
    NobleBaron

    (Citation: SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021)

  40. [40]
    SolarStorm

    (Citation: Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020)

  41. [41]
    The Dukes

    (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)

  42. [42]
    UNC2452

    (Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)

  43. [43]
    UNC3524

    (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22)

  44. [44]
    YTTRIUM

    (Citation: Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018)

  45. [45]
    mitre-attackG0016
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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