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MITRE ATT&CK® Campaign

C0005: Operation Spalax

Operation Spalax was a campaign that primarily targeted Colombian government organizations and private companies, particularly those associated with the energy and metallurgical industries. The Operation Spalax threat actors distributed commodity malware and tools using generic phishing topics related to COVID-19, banking, and law enforcement action. Security researchers noted indicators of compromise and some infrastructure overlaps with other campaigns dating back to April 2018, including at least one separately attributed to APT-C-36, however identified enough differences to report this as separate, unattributed activity.[1]

EnterpriseC0005CampaignObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

C0005: Operation Spalax describes [Operation Spalax](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0005) was a campaign that primarily targeted Colombian government organizations and private companies, particularly those associated with the energy and metallurgical industries. The [Operation Spalax](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0005) threat actors distributed commodity malware and tools using generic phishing topics related to COVID-19, banking, and law enforcement action. Security researchers noted indicators of compromise and some infrastructure ove...

Executive priority

C0005: Operation Spalax is an official MITRE ATT&CK campaign. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate C0005: Operation Spalax by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether C0005: Operation Spalax appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Operation Spalax

Operation Spalax was a campaign that primarily targeted Colombian government organizations and private companies, particularly those associated with the energy and metallurgical industries. The Operation Spalax threat actors distributed commodity malware and tools using generic phishing topics related to COVID-19, banking, and law enforcement action. Security researchers noted indicators of compromise and some infrastructure overlaps with other campaigns dating back to April 2018, including at least one separately attributed to APT-C-36, however identified enough differences to report this as separate, unattributed activity.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

17 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

For Operation Spalax, the threat actors obtained packers such as CyaX.[1]

EnterpriseT1583.001DomainsSub-technique

For Operation Spalax, the threat actors registered hundreds of domains using Duck DNS and DNS Exit.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.003SteganographySub-technique

For Operation Spalax, the threat actors used packers that read pixel data from images contained in PE files' resource sections and build the next layer of execution from the data.[1]

EnterpriseT1588.001MalwareSub-technique

For Operation Spalax, the threat actors obtained malware, including Remcos, njRAT, and AsyncRAT.[1]

EnterpriseT1568Dynamic Resolution

For Operation Spalax, the threat actors used dynamic DNS services, including Duck DNS and DNS Exit, as part of their C2 infrastructure.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

For Operation Spalax, the threat actors used a variety of packers and droppers to decrypt malicious payloads.[1]

EnterpriseT1059Command and Scripting Interpreter

For Operation Spalax, the threat actors used Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) scripts to install malware.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

During Operation Spalax, the threat actors relied on a victim to click on a malicious link distributed via phishing emails.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

During Operation Spalax, the threat actors sent phishing emails to victims that contained a malicious link.[1]

EnterpriseT1102Web Service

During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used OneDrive and MediaFire to host payloads.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

For Operation Spalax, the threat actors used a variety of packers, including CyaX, to obfuscate malicious executables.[1]

EnterpriseT1608.001Upload MalwareSub-technique

For Operation Spalax, the threat actors staged malware and malicious files in legitimate hosting services such as OneDrive or MediaFire.[1]

EnterpriseT1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used droppers that would run anti-analysis checks before executing malware on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

During Operation Spalax, the threat actors relied on a victim to open a PDF document and click on an embedded malicious link to download malware.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

During Operation Spalax, the threat actors sent phishing emails that included a PDF document that in some cases led to the download and execution of malware.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used `rundll32.exe` to execute malicious installers.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

For Operation Spalax, the threat actors used XOR-encrypted payloads.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S0385: njRAT

njRAT is a remote access tool (RAT) that was first observed in 2012. It has been used by threat actors in the Middle East.[1]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0332: Remcos

Remcos is a closed-source tool that is marketed as a remote control and surveillance software by a company called Breaking Security. Remcos has been observed being used in malware campaigns.[1][2]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1588.002: ToolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1583.001: DomainsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.003: SteganographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1588.001: MalwareEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1568: Dynamic ResolutionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059: Command and Scripting InterpreterEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.001: Malicious LinkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.002: Spearphishing LinkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1102: Web ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.002: Software PackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1608.001: Upload MalwareEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497: Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0385: njRATEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.011: Rundll32Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · ToolS0332: RemcosEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
8f425129ce900794...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle8f425129ce90…
19.11.1Older bundle2957287bf4de…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ESET Operation Spalax Jan 2021

    M. Porolli. (2021, January 21). Operation Spalax: Targeted malware attacks in Colombia. Retrieved September 16, 2022.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackC0005
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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