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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G1020: Mustard Tempest

Mustard Tempest is an initial access broker that has operated the SocGholish distribution network since at least 2017. Mustard Tempest has partnered with Indrik Spider to provide access for the download of additional malware including LockBit, WastedLocker, and remote access tools.[1][2][3][4]

EnterpriseG1020GroupObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Mustard Tempest matters because ATT&CK describes it as an initial access broker tied to the SocGholish distribution network and downstream malware delivery. For leaders, the key risk is not just one malware family; it is the handoff model where an initial foothold can enable additional remote access tools or ransomware-related activity by other actors.

Executive priority

Prioritize validation of controls around web browsing, phishing links, fake update lures, malware download prevention, and early incident escalation. This object is useful for risk discussions because it connects initial access activity to business-continuity concerns: if early access is missed, responders may face a broader intrusion involving secondary tooling. Evidence of coverage should come from email, web, endpoint, DNS/proxy, and incident-response workflows rather than from a single alert type.

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no official detection text for Mustard Tempest, so SOC teams should derive coverage from the related software and techniques: SocGholish, Cobalt Strike, Drive-by Compromise, Spearphishing Link, Malicious Link, Ingress Tool Transfer, System Information Discovery, and resource-development behaviors such as malvertising, SEO poisoning, domains, servers, drive-by targets, and uploaded malware. Validate whether telemetry can connect the chain from user web or email interaction to script/loader execution, outbound download activity, suspicious domain or ad-driven referral patterns, and any follow-on remote access tooling.

Likely telemetry

  • Email security logs for messages containing links and user click events
  • Web proxy, secure web gateway, browser, and DNS logs for drive-by, fake update, malvertising, SEO, and download activity
  • Endpoint detection telemetry for script execution, loader behavior, file creation, process ancestry, and system discovery commands
  • Network telemetry for outbound connections, file transfer, and command-and-control-like sessions
  • Threat intelligence records for domains, servers, and staged malware infrastructure observed in local incidents

Detection direction

  • Do not rely on a Mustard Tempest group label alone; map detections to observable behaviors from the ATT&CK relationships.
  • Tune for linked sequences: link click or browsing event, JavaScript/loader execution, external payload retrieval, system information discovery, and follow-on tool transfer.
  • Review blind spots in unmanaged browsers, personal webmail, ad traffic, encrypted web traffic, DNS visibility, and endpoints without EDR coverage.
  • Treat fake software update activity and unusual downloads after ad/search referrals as higher-priority triage context, while accounting for legitimate software update noise.
  • Correlate any Cobalt Strike-like or remote access tooling alerts with preceding SocGholish-like web or email access events where telemetry exists.

Mitigation priorities

  • Strengthen web and email filtering for malicious links, suspicious redirects, and download lures.
  • Maintain endpoint controls that inspect script execution, downloaded files, and suspicious process chains.
  • Harden user-facing software and browsers through patching and controlled update paths, especially where fake update lures could be effective.
  • Limit the impact of initial access with least privilege, network segmentation, and rapid containment procedures.
  • Ensure IR playbooks explicitly investigate downstream access brokering risk when SocGholish-like activity or related initial access behaviors are found.
Additional notes and limits

The most decision-relevant point is the access-broker role described by ATT&CK: early activity may be a precursor to other malware or remote access tooling. Detection engineering should therefore focus on behavior-chain coverage and escalation criteria, not only static indicators or aliases such as DEV-0206, TA569, GOLD PRELUDE, or UNC1543.

ATT&CK does not provide official detection guidance, tactics, or platforms directly on the Mustard Tempest intrusion-set object. Platform and behavior context here comes from supplied relationships to software and techniques. Local telemetry, exposure, and confirmed activity must be validated in the customer environment.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Mustard Tempest

Mustard Tempest is an initial access broker that has operated the SocGholish distribution network since at least 2017. Mustard Tempest has partnered with Indrik Spider to provide access for the download of additional malware including LockBit, WastedLocker, and remote access tools.[1][2][3][4]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

12 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1583.008MalvertisingSub-technique

Mustard Tempest has posted false advertisements including for software packages and browser updates in order to distribute malware.[1]

EnterpriseT1608.001Upload MalwareSub-technique

Mustard Tempest has hosted payloads on acquired second-stage servers for periods of either days, weeks, or months.[5]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Mustard Tempest has used the filename `AutoUpdater.js` to mimic legitimate update files and has also used the Cyrillic homoglyph characters С `(0xd0a1)` and а `(0xd0b0)`, to produce the filename `Сhrome.Updаte.zip`.[6][4]

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

Mustard Tempest has sent victims emails containing links to compromised websites.[4]

EnterpriseT1584.001DomainsSub-technique

Mustard Tempest operates a global network of compromised websites that redirect into a traffic distribution system (TDS) to select victims for a fake browser update page.[3][4][5][6]

EnterpriseT1608.006SEO PoisoningSub-technique

Mustard Tempest has poisoned search engine results to return fake software updates in order to distribute malware.[1][4]

EnterpriseT1608.004Drive-by TargetSub-technique

Mustard Tempest has injected malicious JavaScript into compromised websites to infect victims via drive-by download.[4][5][6][3]

EnterpriseT1189Drive-by Compromise

Mustard Tempest has used drive-by downloads for initial infection, often using fake browser updates as a lure.[4][5][6][3]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

Mustard Tempest has lured users into downloading malware through malicious links in fake advertisements and spearphishing emails.[1][4]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Mustard Tempest has used implants to perform system reconnaissance on targeted systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1583.004ServerSub-technique

Mustard Tempest has acquired servers to host second-stage payloads that remain active for a period of either days, weeks, or months.[5]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Mustard Tempest has deployed secondary payloads and third stage implants to compromised hosts.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S1124: SocGholish

SocGholish is a JavaScript-based loader malware that has been used since at least 2017. It has been observed in use against multiple sectors globally for initial access, primarily through drive-by-downloads masquerading as software updates. SocGholish is operated by Mustard Tempest and its access has been sold to groups including Indrik Spider for downloading secondary RAT and ransomware payloads.[1][2][3][4]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0154: Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]

In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
d8e84132cd2a5a84...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.0Current bundled8e84132cd2a…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile

    Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD PRELUDE . Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    SentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022

    Milenkoski, A. (2022, November 7). SocGholish Diversifies and Expands Its Malware Staging Infrastructure to Counter Defenders. Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Red Canary SocGholish March 2024

    Red Canary. (2024, March). Red Canary 2024 Threat Detection Report: SocGholish. Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    DEV-0206

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  8. [8]
    DEV-0206

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  9. [9]
    DEV-0206

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  10. [10]
    GOLD PRELUDE

    (Citation: Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile)

  11. [11]
    GOLD PRELUDE

    (Citation: Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile)

  12. [12]
    GOLD PRELUDE

    (Citation: Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile)

  13. [13]
    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile

    Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD PRELUDE . Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile

    Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD PRELUDE . Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    TA569

    (Citation: Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile)

  22. [22]
    TA569

    (Citation: Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile)

  23. [23]
    TA569

    (Citation: Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile)

  24. [24]
    UNC1543

    (Citation: Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile)

  25. [25]
    UNC1543

    (Citation: Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile)

  26. [26]
    UNC1543

    (Citation: Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile)

  27. [27]
    mitre-attackG1020
    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    mitre-attackG1020
    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    mitre-attackG1020
    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    SentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022

    Milenkoski, A. (2022, November 7). SocGholish Diversifies and Expands Its Malware Staging Infrastructure to Counter Defenders. Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    Red Canary SocGholish March 2024

    Red Canary. (2024, March). Red Canary 2024 Threat Detection Report: SocGholish. Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Red Canary SocGholish March 2024

    Red Canary. (2024, March). Red Canary 2024 Threat Detection Report: SocGholish. Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    Red Canary SocGholish March 2024

    Red Canary. (2024, March). Red Canary 2024 Threat Detection Report: SocGholish. Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile

    Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD PRELUDE . Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile

    Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD PRELUDE . Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    SentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022

    Milenkoski, A. (2022, November 7). SocGholish Diversifies and Expands Its Malware Staging Infrastructure to Counter Defenders. Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    SentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022

    Milenkoski, A. (2022, November 7). SocGholish Diversifies and Expands Its Malware Staging Infrastructure to Counter Defenders. Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    Red Canary SocGholish March 2024

    Red Canary. (2024, March). Red Canary 2024 Threat Detection Report: SocGholish. Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  51. [51]
    Red Canary SocGholish March 2024

    Red Canary. (2024, March). Red Canary 2024 Threat Detection Report: SocGholish. Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  52. [52]
    Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile

    Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD PRELUDE . Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  53. [53]
    Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile

    Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD PRELUDE . Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  54. [54]
    SentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022

    Milenkoski, A. (2022, November 7). SocGholish Diversifies and Expands Its Malware Staging Infrastructure to Counter Defenders. Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  55. [55]
    SentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022

    Milenkoski, A. (2022, November 7). SocGholish Diversifies and Expands Its Malware Staging Infrastructure to Counter Defenders. Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  56. [56]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  57. [57]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  58. [58]
    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  59. [59]
    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  60. [60]
    Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile

    Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD PRELUDE . Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  61. [61]
    Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile

    Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD PRELUDE . Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  62. [62]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  63. [63]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  64. [64]
    Red Canary SocGholish March 2024

    Red Canary. (2024, March). Red Canary 2024 Threat Detection Report: SocGholish. Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  65. [65]
    Red Canary SocGholish March 2024

    Red Canary. (2024, March). Red Canary 2024 Threat Detection Report: SocGholish. Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  66. [66]
    Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile

    Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD PRELUDE . Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  67. [67]
    Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile

    Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD PRELUDE . Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  68. [68]
    SentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022

    Milenkoski, A. (2022, November 7). SocGholish Diversifies and Expands Its Malware Staging Infrastructure to Counter Defenders. Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
  69. [69]
    SentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022

    Milenkoski, A. (2022, November 7). SocGholish Diversifies and Expands Its Malware Staging Infrastructure to Counter Defenders. Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  71. [71]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  72. [72]
    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  73. [73]
    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  74. [74]
    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  75. [75]
    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  76. [76]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  77. [77]
    SocGholish-update

    Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.

    Open source URL
  78. [78]
    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  79. [79]
    SentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022

    Milenkoski, A. (2022, November 7). SocGholish Diversifies and Expands Its Malware Staging Infrastructure to Counter Defenders. Retrieved March 22, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.