G1020: Mustard Tempest
Mustard Tempest is an initial access broker that has operated the SocGholish distribution network since at least 2017. Mustard Tempest has partnered with Indrik Spider to provide access for the download of additional malware including LockBit, WastedLocker, and remote access tools.[1][2][3][4]
Security context for executives and security teams
G1020: Mustard Tempest describes [Mustard Tempest](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1020) is an initial access broker that has operated the [SocGholish](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1124) distribution network since at least 2017. [Mustard Tempest](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1020) has partnered with [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) to provide access for the download of additional malware including LockBit, [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612), and remote access tools.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomwa...
Executive priority
G1020: Mustard Tempest is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G1020: Mustard Tempest by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G1020: Mustard Tempest appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Mustard Tempest
Mustard Tempest is an initial access broker that has operated the SocGholish distribution network since at least 2017. Mustard Tempest has partnered with Indrik Spider to provide access for the download of additional malware including LockBit, WastedLocker, and remote access tools.[1][2][3][4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1583.008 | MalvertisingSub-technique | Mustard Tempest has posted false advertisements including for software packages and browser updates in order to distribute malware.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1608.001 | Upload MalwareSub-technique | Mustard Tempest has hosted payloads on acquired second-stage servers for periods of either days, weeks, or months.CitationSentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | Mustard Tempest has used the filename `AutoUpdater.js` to mimic legitimate update files and has also used the Cyrillic homoglyph characters С `(0xd0a1)` and а `(0xd0b0)`, to produce the filename `Сhrome.Updаte.zip`.CitationRed Canary SocGholish March 2024[4] |
| Enterprise | T1566.002 | Spearphishing LinkSub-technique | Mustard Tempest has sent victims emails containing links to compromised websites.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1584.001 | DomainsSub-technique | Mustard Tempest operates a global network of compromised websites that redirect into a traffic distribution system (TDS) to select victims for a fake browser update page.[3][4]CitationSentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022CitationRed Canary SocGholish March 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1608.006 | SEO PoisoningSub-technique | Mustard Tempest has poisoned search engine results to return fake software updates in order to distribute malware.[1][4] |
| Enterprise | T1608.004 | Drive-by TargetSub-technique | Mustard Tempest has injected malicious JavaScript into compromised websites to infect victims via drive-by download.[4]CitationSentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022CitationRed Canary SocGholish March 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | Mustard Tempest has used drive-by downloads for initial infection, often using fake browser updates as a lure.[4]CitationSentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022CitationRed Canary SocGholish March 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1204.001 | Malicious LinkSub-technique | Mustard Tempest has lured users into downloading malware through malicious links in fake advertisements and spearphishing emails.[1][4] |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | Mustard Tempest has used implants to perform system reconnaissance on targeted systems.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1583.004 | ServerSub-technique | Mustard Tempest has acquired servers to host second-stage payloads that remain active for a period of either days, weeks, or months.CitationSentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Mustard Tempest has deployed secondary payloads and third stage implants to compromised hosts.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S1124: SocGholish
SocGholish is a JavaScript-based loader malware that has been used since at least 2017. It has been observed in use against multiple sectors globally for initial access, primarily through drive-by-downloads masquerading as software updates. SocGholish is operated by Mustard Tempest and its access has been sold to groups including Indrik Spider for downloading secondary RAT and ransomware payloads.[1][2][3][4]
S0154: Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]
In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | c1308e776f7d… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | d8e84132cd2a… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Microsoft Ransomware as a Service
Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.
Open source URL - [2]Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023
Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.
Open source URL - [3]Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile
Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD PRELUDE . Retrieved March 22, 2024.
Open source URL - [4]SocGholish-update
Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.
Open source URL - [5]DEV-0206
(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)
- [6]GOLD PRELUDE
(Citation: Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile)
- [7]TA569
(Citation: Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile)
- [8]UNC1543
(Citation: Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile)
- [9]mitre-attackG1020Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.