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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1204: User Execution

An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing.

While User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.

Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as:

* Enabling Remote Access Tools, allowing direct control of the system to the adversary * Running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to Steal Web Session Cookies[1][2] * Downloading and executing malware for User Execution * Coerceing users to copy, paste, and execute malicious code manually[3][4]

For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through Phishing, vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or Remote Access Tools.[5]

EnterpriseT1204TechniqueObject v1.8Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

User Execution matters because it turns human trust and routine work into the execution path for adversary code. The business issue is not only phishing awareness; it is whether the organization can prevent, observe, and respond when a user opens a malicious file or link, runs a questionable tool, deploys a malicious cloud/container image, installs a malicious library, or copies and pastes attacker-provided commands.

Executive priority

Treat T1204 as a cross-cutting execution risk that spans endpoints, browsers, email/web delivery paths, cloud images, containers, and developer/package workflows. Leaders should ask whether controls reduce the chance of unsafe user-driven execution, whether SOC teams can see the follow-on behavior after a click or open event, and whether incident response can quickly determine who executed what, from where, and what changed next. This technique is also useful for audit and resilience discussions because the relevant safeguards include user training, web-content restriction, limiting software installation, execution prevention, endpoint behavior prevention, and network intrusion prevention.

Technical view

ATT&CK lists this as an enterprise execution technique across Linux, Windows, macOS, IaaS, and Containers, with sub-techniques for malicious links, files, images, copy-and-paste execution, and libraries. Because MITRE provides no official detection text for the parent technique, teams should validate coverage around behavior chains rather than a single event: document or link interaction, helper or unpacker activity, suspicious child processes or command interpreters, remote access tool enablement, web/session theft indicators where applicable, package/image install or deployment events, and outbound network activity. The related detection strategy DET0478 specifically frames this as a multi-surface chain from documents/links to helper or unpacker, living-off-the-land binary or child process, and egress.

Likely telemetry

  • Email, web proxy, browser, and URL filtering logs for links, downloads, and unsafe web content
  • Endpoint process creation, parent-child process relationships, script execution, and file execution telemetry
  • File and attachment metadata, including user-opened documents, archives, executables, shortcuts, and downloaded files
  • Command and scripting interpreter activity, especially where user copy-and-paste execution is suspected
  • Remote access tool installation, launch, or enablement events

Detection direction

  • Validate behavior-chain detections rather than relying on a single phishing or malware alert: user interaction should be correlated with subsequent process, script, download, tool, or egress activity.
  • Tune detections for suspicious parent-child process relationships after documents, links, browsers, archive tools, or helper applications launch code or command interpreters.
  • For cloud and container environments, confirm whether image provenance, deployment source, and runtime behavior are logged; malicious image execution may not appear in traditional endpoint-only monitoring.
  • For developer and package workflows, confirm visibility into library installation events and repository/package sources; malicious library execution can bypass controls focused only on email attachments or browser downloads.
  • Account for false positives from legitimate software installation, administrative scripting, remote support, developer tooling, and container/image workflows by requiring context such as source, user role, timing, and follow-on network or execution behavior.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with user training focused on recognizing, reporting, and avoiding social engineering that asks users to open files, click links, enable tools, deploy images, install libraries, or paste commands.
  • Restrict web-based content through filtering, download controls, script controls, and browser/extension governance where appropriate.
  • Limit unauthorized software installation and apply least-privilege principles so user action alone is less likely to introduce unapproved code or tools.
  • Implement execution prevention and application control for unauthorized code, scripts, and binaries across supported endpoint platforms.
  • Use endpoint behavior prevention to block suspicious process, file, API, or script behavior after user interaction.
Additional notes and limits

The supplied ATT&CK relationships show this technique is broad and materially connected to multiple sub-techniques, including malicious links, files, images, copy-and-paste execution, and libraries. Related examples also include social engineering leading to remote access tool enablement, browser JavaScript abuse, tech support scam delivery, and manually executed code. Campaign, group, and software relationships indicate that ATT&CK has observed this behavior in multiple contexts, but local risk should be assessed from the organization’s own exposure, control coverage, and incident history.

MITRE does not provide official detection guidance for this parent object, so this take relies on the official description, platforms, tactics, external references, and supplied relationships. It does not assert active exploitation against any specific organization, guaranteed detection, or platform coverage beyond the listed ATT&CK platforms and related sub-techniques. Local telemetry availability, control configuration, user roles, and business workflows are required to determine actual coverage and priority.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

User Execution

An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing.

While User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.

Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as:

* Enabling Remote Access Tools, allowing direct control of the system to the adversary * Running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to Steal Web Session Cookies[1][2] * Downloading and executing malware for User Execution * Coerceing users to copy, paste, and execute malicious code manually[3][4]

For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through Phishing, vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or Remote Access Tools.[5]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

5 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1204.005Malicious LibrarySub-techniqueMalicious Library subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-techniqueMalicious File subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1204.003Malicious ImageSub-techniqueMalicious Image subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-techniqueMalicious Link subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1204.004Malicious Copy and PasteSub-techniqueMalicious Copy and Paste subtechnique of this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1015: Scattered Spider

Scattered Spider is a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since at least 2022. [1] [2] The group initially targeted customer relationship management (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, and telecommunications and technology companies before expanding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. [2] Scattered Spider relies heavily on social engineering, including impersonating IT and help-desk staff, to gain initial access, bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and compromise enterprise networks. The group has adapted its tooling to evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) defenses and used ransomware for financial gain. [3] [4] [5] Scattered Spider had expanded into hybrid cloud and identity environments, using help-desk impersonation and MFA bypass to obtain administrator access in Okta, AWS, and Office 365. [6]

GroupEnterprise

G1004: LAPSUS$

LAPSUS$ is cyber criminal threat group that has been active since at least mid-2021. LAPSUS$ specializes in large-scale social engineering and extortion operations, including destructive attacks without the use of ransomware. The group has targeted organizations globally, including in the government, manufacturing, higher education, energy, healthcare, technology, telecommunications, and media sectors.[1][2][3]

MalwareEnterprise

S1130: Raspberry Robin

Raspberry Robin is initial access malware first identified in September 2021, and active through early 2024. The malware is notable for spreading via infected USB devices containing a malicious LNK object that, on execution, retrieves remote hosted payloads for installation. Raspberry Robin has been widely used against various industries and geographies, and as a precursor to information stealer, ransomware, and other payloads such as SocGholish, Cobalt Strike, IcedID, and Bumblebee.[1][2][3] The DLL componenet in the Raspberry Robin infection chain is also referred to as "Roshtyak."[4] The name "Raspberry Robin" is used to refer to both the malware as well as the threat actor associated with its use, although the Raspberry Robin operators are also tracked as Storm-0856 by some vendors.[5]

Windows
CampaignEnterprise

C0037: Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution

Pikabot was distributed in Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution throughout 2023 by an entity linked to BlackBasta ransomware deployment via email attachments. This activity followed the take-down of QakBot, with several technical overlaps and similarities with QakBot, indicating a possible connection. The identified activity led to the deployment of tools such as Cobalt Strike, while coinciding with campaigns delivering DarkGate and IcedID en route to ransomware deployment.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.8
Created
Modified
Raw hash
61f237cfa163a90e...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.8Current bundle61f237cfa163…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Talos Roblox Scam 2023

    Tiago Pereira. (2023, November 2). Attackers use JavaScript URLs, API forms and more to scam users in popular online game “Roblox”. Retrieved January 2, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023

    Brian Krebs. (2023, May 30). Discord Admins Hacked by Malicious Bookmarks. Retrieved January 2, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Reliaquest-execution

    Reliaquest. (2024, May 31). New Execution Technique in ClearFake Campaign. Retrieved August 2, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    proofpoint-selfpwn

    Tommy Madjar, Dusty Miller, Selena Larson. (2024, June 17). From Clipboard to Compromise: A PowerShell Self-Pwn. Retrieved August 2, 2024.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Telephone Attack Delivery

    Selena Larson, Sam Scholten, Timothy Kromphardt. (2021, November 4). Caught Beneath the Landline: A 411 on Telephone Oriented Attack Delivery. Retrieved January 5, 2022.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    win10_asr

    Microsoft. (2021, July 2). Use attack surface reduction rules to prevent malware infection. Retrieved June 24, 2021.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    TrendMicro Pikabot 2024

    Shinji Robert Arasawa, Joshua Aquino, Charles Steven Derion, Juhn Emmanuel Atanque, Francisrey Joshua Castillo, John Carlo Marquez, Henry Salcedo, John Rainier Navato, Arianne Dela Cruz, Raymart Yambot & Ian Kenefick. (2024, January 9). Black Basta-Affiliated Water Curupira’s Pikabot Spam Campaign. Retrieved July 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    CISA Scattered Spider Advisory November 2023

    CISA. (2023, November 16). Cybersecurity Advisory: Scattered Spider (AA23-320A). Retrieved March 18, 2024.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022

    MSTIC, DART, M365 Defender. (2022, March 24). DEV-0537 Criminal Actor Targeting Organizations for Data Exfiltration and Destruction. Retrieved May 17, 2022.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Qualys LummaStealer 2024

    Vishwajeet Kumar, Qualys. (2024, October 20). Unmasking Lumma Stealer: Analyzing Deceptive Tactics with Fake CAPTCHA. Retrieved March 22, 2025.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Cybereason LumaStealer Undated

    Cybereaon Security Services Team. (n.d.). Your Data Is Under New Lummanagement: The Rise of LummaStealer. Retrieved March 22, 2025.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    Netskope LummaStealer 2025

    Leandro Fróes, Netskope. (2025, January 23). Lumma Stealer: Fake CAPTCHAs & New Techniques to Evade Detection. Retrieved March 22, 2025.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Microsoft RaspberryRobin 2022

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2022, October 27). Raspberry Robin worm part of larger ecosystem facilitating pre-ransomware activity. Retrieved May 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023

    Brian Krebs. (2023, May 30). Discord Admins Hacked by Malicious Bookmarks. Retrieved January 2, 2024.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023

    Brian Krebs. (2023, May 30). Discord Admins Hacked by Malicious Bookmarks. Retrieved January 2, 2024.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Reliaquest-execution

    Reliaquest. (2024, May 31). New Execution Technique in ClearFake Campaign. Retrieved August 2, 2024.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Reliaquest-execution

    Reliaquest. (2024, May 31). New Execution Technique in ClearFake Campaign. Retrieved August 2, 2024.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Talos Roblox Scam 2023

    Tiago Pereira. (2023, November 2). Attackers use JavaScript URLs, API forms and more to scam users in popular online game “Roblox”. Retrieved January 2, 2024.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Talos Roblox Scam 2023

    Tiago Pereira. (2023, November 2). Attackers use JavaScript URLs, API forms and more to scam users in popular online game “Roblox”. Retrieved January 2, 2024.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Telephone Attack Delivery

    Selena Larson, Sam Scholten, Timothy Kromphardt. (2021, November 4). Caught Beneath the Landline: A 411 on Telephone Oriented Attack Delivery. Retrieved January 5, 2022.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Telephone Attack Delivery

    Selena Larson, Sam Scholten, Timothy Kromphardt. (2021, November 4). Caught Beneath the Landline: A 411 on Telephone Oriented Attack Delivery. Retrieved January 5, 2022.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    mitre-attackT1204
    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    mitre-attackT1204
    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    mitre-attackT1204
    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    proofpoint-selfpwn

    Tommy Madjar, Dusty Miller, Selena Larson. (2024, June 17). From Clipboard to Compromise: A PowerShell Self-Pwn. Retrieved August 2, 2024.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    proofpoint-selfpwn

    Tommy Madjar, Dusty Miller, Selena Larson. (2024, June 17). From Clipboard to Compromise: A PowerShell Self-Pwn. Retrieved August 2, 2024.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    win10_asr

    Microsoft. (2021, July 2). Use attack surface reduction rules to prevent malware infection. Retrieved June 24, 2021.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    TrendMicro Pikabot 2024

    Shinji Robert Arasawa, Joshua Aquino, Charles Steven Derion, Juhn Emmanuel Atanque, Francisrey Joshua Castillo, John Carlo Marquez, Henry Salcedo, John Rainier Navato, Arianne Dela Cruz, Raymart Yambot & Ian Kenefick. (2024, January 9). Black Basta-Affiliated Water Curupira’s Pikabot Spam Campaign. Retrieved July 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    CISA Scattered Spider Advisory November 2023

    CISA. (2023, November 16). Cybersecurity Advisory: Scattered Spider (AA23-320A). Retrieved March 18, 2024.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022

    MSTIC, DART, M365 Defender. (2022, March 24). DEV-0537 Criminal Actor Targeting Organizations for Data Exfiltration and Destruction. Retrieved May 17, 2022.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    Cybereason LumaStealer Undated

    Cybereaon Security Services Team. (n.d.). Your Data Is Under New Lummanagement: The Rise of LummaStealer. Retrieved March 22, 2025.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    Netskope LummaStealer 2025

    Leandro Fróes, Netskope. (2025, January 23). Lumma Stealer: Fake CAPTCHAs & New Techniques to Evade Detection. Retrieved March 22, 2025.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    Qualys LummaStealer 2024

    Vishwajeet Kumar, Qualys. (2024, October 20). Unmasking Lumma Stealer: Analyzing Deceptive Tactics with Fake CAPTCHA. Retrieved March 22, 2025.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    Microsoft RaspberryRobin 2022

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2022, October 27). Raspberry Robin worm part of larger ecosystem facilitating pre-ransomware activity. Retrieved May 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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