C0010: C0010

C0010 was a cyber espionage campaign conducted by UNC3890 that targeted Israeli shipping, government, aviation, energy, and healthcare organizations. Security researcher assess UNC3890 conducts operations in support of Iranian interests, and noted several limited technical connections to Iran, including PDB strings and Farsi language artifacts. C0010 began by at least late 2020, and was still ongoing as of mid-2022.[1]

EnterpriseC0010CampaignObject v1.0ModifiedJul 31, 2026, 18:47 UTC (UTC+00:00)

C0010: C0010 describes [C0010](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0010) was a cyber espionage campaign conducted by UNC3890 that targeted Israeli shipping, government, aviation, energy, and healthcare organizations. Security researcher assess UNC3890 conducts operations in support of Iranian interests, and noted several limited technical connections to Iran, including PDB strings and Farsi language artifacts. [C0010](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0010) began by at least late 2020, and was still ongoing as of mid-2022.(Citation: Ma...

Executive priority

C0010: C0010 is an official MITRE ATT&CK campaign. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate C0010: C0010 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

Validate whether C0010: C0010 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

C0010

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques9 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1584.001	DomainsSub-technique	During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely compromised the domain of a legitimate Israeli shipping company.[1]
Enterprise	T1608.001	Upload MalwareSub-technique	For C0010, UNC3890 actors staged malware on their infrastructure for direct download onto a compromised system.[1]
Enterprise	T1189	Drive-by Compromise	During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely established a watering hole that was hosted on a login page of a legitimate Israeli shipping company that was active until at least November 2021.[1]
Enterprise	T1608.004	Drive-by TargetSub-technique	For C0010, the threat actors compromised the login page of a legitimate Israeli shipping company and likely established a watering hole that collected visitor information.[1]
Enterprise	T1587.001	MalwareSub-technique	For C0010, UNC3890 actors used unique malware, including SUGARUSH and SUGARDUMP.[1]
Enterprise	T1583.001	DomainsSub-technique	For C0010, UNC3890 actors established domains that appeared to be legitimate services and entities, such as LinkedIn, Facebook, Office 365, and Pfizer.[1]
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	During C0010, UNC3890 actors downloaded tools and malware onto a compromised host.[1]
Enterprise	T1608.002	Upload ToolSub-technique	For C0010, UNC3890 actors staged tools on their infrastructure to download directly onto a compromised system.[1]
Enterprise	T1588.002	ToolSub-technique	For C0010, UNC3890 actors obtained multiple publicly-available tools, including METASPLOIT, UNICORN, and NorthStar C2.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

S1042: SUGARDUMP

SUGARDUMP is a proprietary browser credential harvesting tool that was used by UNC3890 during the C0010 campaign. The first known SUGARDUMP version was used since at least early 2021, a second SMTP C2 version was used from late 2021-early 2022, and a third HTTP C2 variant was used since at least April 2022.[1]

Windows

S1049: SUGARUSH

SUGARUSH is a small custom backdoor that can establish a reverse shell over TCP to a hard coded C2 address. SUGARUSH was first identified during analysis of UNC3890's C0010 campaign targeting Israeli companies, which began in late 2020.[1]

Windows

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.0
Created: Sep 21, 2022, 22:16 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Jul 31, 2026, 18:47 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: eb6d1b0785b243fe...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Jul 31, 2026, 18:47 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`eb6d1b0785b2…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 16, 2025, 20:37 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`3ada8a2ce610…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Mandiant UNC3890 Aug 2022
Mandiant Israel Research Team. (2022, August 17). Suspected Iranian Actor Targeting Israeli Shipping, Healthcare, Government and Energy Sectors. Retrieved September 21, 2022.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackC0010
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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