C0047: RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations

C0047: RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations describes [RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0047) was executed by [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) from mid-2023 through the end of 2024 against multiple entities in East and Southeast Asia. [RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0047) involved phishing to deliver malicious files or links to users prompting follow-on installer downloads to load [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) on vict...

Executive priority

C0047: RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations is an official MITRE ATT&CK campaign. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate C0047: RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

Validate whether C0047: RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations

RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations was executed by Mustang Panda from mid-2023 through the end of 2024 against multiple entities in East and Southeast Asia. RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations involved phishing to deliver malicious files or links to users prompting follow-on installer downloads to load PlugX on victim machines in a persistent state.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques22 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1059.001	PowerShellSub-technique	Mustang Panda used LNK files to execute PowerShell commands leading to eventual PlugX installation during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	Mustang Panda used HTTP POST messages for command and control from PlugX installations during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1553.002	Code SigningSub-technique	Mustang Panda used legitimate, signed binaries such as `inkform.exe` or `ExcelRepairToolboxLauncher.exe` for follow-on execution of malicious DLLs through DLL search order hijacking in RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1090	Proxy	Mustang Panda proxied communication through the Cloudflare CDN service during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1608.001	Upload MalwareSub-technique	Mustang Panda staged malware on adversary-controlled domains and cloud storage instances during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1574.001	DLLSub-technique	Mustang Panda used DLL search order hijacking on vulnerable applications to install PlugX payloads during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1095	Non-Application Layer Protocol	Mustang Panda communicated over TCP 5000 from adversary administrative servers to adversary command and control nodes during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1480	Execution Guardrails	Mustang Panda included the use of Cloudflare geofencing mechanisms to limit payload download activity during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	Mustang Panda captured victim operating system type via User Agent analysis during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1547.001	Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique	Mustang Panda used Run registry keys with names such as `OneNote Update` to execute legitimate executables that would load through search-order hijacking malicious DLLS to ensure persistence during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1203	Exploitation for Client Execution	Mustang Panda used the GrimResource exploitation technique via specially crafted MSC files for arbitrary code execution during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1566.002	Spearphishing LinkSub-technique	Mustang Panda distributed malicious links in phishing emails leading to HTML files that would direct the victim to malicious MSC files if running Windows based on User Agent fingerprinting during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique	Mustang Panda stored installation payloads as encrypted files in hidden folders during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1566.001	Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique	Mustang Panda leveraged malicious attachments in spearphishing emails for initial access to victim environments in RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1204.002	Malicious FileSub-technique	Mustang Panda distributed malicious LNK objects for user execution during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1036.004	Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique	Mustang Panda masqueraded Registry run keys as legitimate-looking service names such as `OneNote Update` during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1564.001	Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique	Mustang Panda stored encrypted payloads associated with PlugX installation in hidden directories during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1588.004	Digital CertificatesSub-technique	Mustang Panda acquired Cloudflare Origin CA TLS certificates during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1218.007	MsiexecSub-technique	Mustang Panda initial payloads downloaded a Windows Installer MSI file that in turn dropped follow-on files leading to installation of PlugX during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1583.001	DomainsSub-technique	Mustang Panda registered adversary-controlled domains during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations that were re-registrations of expired domains.[1]
Enterprise	T1218.014	MMCSub-technique	Mustang Panda used Microsoft Management Console Snap-In Control files, or MSC files, executed via MMC to run follow-on PowerShell commands during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1204.001	Malicious LinkSub-technique	Mustang Panda distributed hyperlinks that would result in an MSC file running a PowerShell command to download and install a remotely-hosted MSI file during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0129: Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been conducting operations since at least 2012. Mustang Panda has been known to use tailored phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious payloads. Mustang Panda has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmental organizations, including think tanks, religious institutions, and research entities, across the United States, Europe, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

S0596: ShadowPad

ShadowPad is a modular backdoor that was first identified in a supply chain compromise of the NetSarang software in mid-July 2017. The malware was originally thought to be exclusively used by APT41, but has since been observed to be used by various Chinese threat activity groups. [1][2][3]

Windows

S0013: PlugX

PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) with modular plugins that has been used by multiple threat groups.[1][2][3][4]

Windows

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.0
Created: Jan 14, 2025, 22:38 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Jul 31, 2026, 18:47 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 7e3cfb3f55bd3d2b...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Jul 31, 2026, 18:47 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`7e3cfb3f55bd…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 2, 2025, 15:50 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`f8608e36216a…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Recorded Future RedDelta 2025
Insikt Group. (2025, January 9). Chinese State-Sponsored RedDelta Targeted Taiwan, Mongolia, and Southeast Asia with Adapted PlugX Infection Chain. Retrieved January 14, 2025.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackC0047
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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