G0050: APT32
APT32 is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.[1][2][3]
Security context for executives and security teams
G0050: APT32 describes [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanL...
Executive priority
G0050: APT32 is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0050: APT32 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0050: APT32 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
APT32
APT32 is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.[1][2][3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1550.002 | Pass the HashSub-technique | APT32 has used pass the hash for lateral movement.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | APT32 has disguised a Cobalt Strike beacon as a Flash Installer.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1059.007 | JavaScriptSub-technique | APT32 has used JavaScript for drive-by downloads and C2 communications.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017CitationVolexity Ocean Lotus November 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | APT32 used WMI to deploy their tools on remote machines and to gather information about the Outlook process.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1072 | Software Deployment Tools | |
| Enterprise | T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer | APT32 has deployed tools after moving laterally using administrative accounts.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1564.004 | NTFS File AttributesSub-technique | APT32 used NTFS alternate data streams to hide their payloads.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1552.002 | Credentials in RegistrySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | APT32 malware has injected a Cobalt Strike beacon into Rundll32.exe.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1216.001 | PubPrnSub-technique | APT32 has used PubPrn.vbs within execution scripts to execute malware, possibly bypassing defenses.CitationTwitter ItsReallyNick Status Update APT32 PubPrn |
| Enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1135 | Network Share Discovery | APT32 used the |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1571 | Non-Standard Port | |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | APT32 has collected the OS version and computer name from victims. One of the group's backdoors can also query the Windows Registry to gather system information, and another macOS backdoor performs a fingerprint of the machine on its first connection to the C&C server. APT32 executed shellcode to identify the name of the infected host.[3][6]CitationESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019CitationFireEye APT32 April 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1583.001 | DomainsSub-technique | APT32 has set up and operated websites to gather information and deliver malware.CitationVolexity Ocean Lotus November 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry | |
| Enterprise | T1027.010 | Command ObfuscationSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | APT32 has used cmd.exe for execution.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1048.003 | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1566.002 | Spearphishing LinkSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1598.003 | Spearphishing LinkSub-technique | APT32 has used malicious links to direct users to web pages designed to harvest credentials.CitationVolexity Ocean Lotus November 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1087.001 | Local AccountSub-technique | APT32 enumerated administrative users using the commands |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1003.001 | LSASS MemorySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery | APT32 performed network scanning on the network to search for open ports, services, OS finger-printing, and other vulnerabilities.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1608.004 | Drive-by TargetSub-technique | APT32 has stood up websites containing numerous articles and content scraped from the Internet to make them appear legitimate, but some of these pages include malicious JavaScript to profile the potential victim or infect them via a fake software update.CitationVolexity Ocean Lotus November 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | |
| Enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1003 | OS Credential Dumping | |
| Enterprise | T1078.003 | Local AccountsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1589 | Gather Victim Identity Information | |
| Enterprise | T1070.006 | TimestompSub-technique | APT32 has used scheduled task raw XML with a backdated timestamp of June 2, 2016. The group has also set the creation time of the files dropped by the second stage of the exploit to match the creation time of kernel32.dll. Additionally, APT32 has used a random value to modify the timestamp of the file storing the clientID.[1][6]CitationESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | |
| Enterprise | T1218.011 | Rundll32Sub-technique | APT32 malware has used rundll32.exe to execute an initial infection process.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | APT32 has used COM scriptlets to download Cobalt Strike beacons.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | |
| Enterprise | T1071.003 | Mail ProtocolsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1560 | Archive Collected Data | |
| Enterprise | T1204.001 | Malicious LinkSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | APT32's macOS backdoor can receive a “delete” command.CitationESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1027.011 | Fileless StorageSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1036.003 | Rename Legitimate UtilitiesSub-technique | APT32 has moved and renamed pubprn.vbs to a .txt file to avoid detection.CitationTwitter ItsReallyNick APT32 pubprn Masquerade |
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1608.001 | Upload MalwareSub-technique | APT32 has hosted malicious payloads in Dropbox, Amazon S3, and Google Drive for use during targeting.CitationVolexity Ocean Lotus November 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1222.002 | Linux and Mac PermissionsSub-technique | APT32's macOS backdoor changes the permission of the file it wants to execute to 755.CitationESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1569.002 | Service ExecutionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery | APT32 has enumerated DC servers using the command |
| Enterprise | T1218.005 | MshtaSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1685.005 | Clear Windows Event LogsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.005 | Visual BasicSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | APT32 has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz and Cobalt Strike, and a variety of other open-source tools from GitHub.[1][4] |
| Enterprise | T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin SharesSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1550.003 | Pass the TicketSub-technique | APT32 successfully gained remote access by using pass the ticket.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1583.006 | Web ServicesSub-technique | APT32 has set up Dropbox, Amazon S3, and Google Drive to host malicious downloads.CitationVolexity Ocean Lotus November 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1505.003 | Web ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1564.001 | Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique | APT32's macOS backdoor hides the clientID file via a chflags function.CitationESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | APT32 used the |
| Enterprise | T1027.016 | Junk Code InsertionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1049 | System Network Connections Discovery | APT32 used the |
| Enterprise | T1564.003 | Hidden WindowSub-technique | APT32 has used the WindowStyle parameter to conceal PowerShell windows. [1] CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | APT32 has performed code obfuscation, including encoding payloads using Base64 and using a framework called "Dont-Kill-My-Cat (DKMC). APT32 also encrypts the library used for network exfiltration with AES-256 in CBC mode in their macOS backdoor.[1]CitationGitHub Invoke-Obfuscation[3][4]CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017[6]CitationESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019 |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0002: Mimikatz
S0100: ipconfig
S0585: Kerrdown
S0154: Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]
In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]
S0157: SOUNDBITE
S0352: OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D is a macOS backdoor used by APT32. First discovered in 2015, APT32 has continued to make improvements using a plugin architecture to extend capabilities, specifically using `.dylib` files. OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can also determine it's permission level and execute according to access type (`root` or `user`).[1][2][3]
S0156: KOMPROGO
S0108: netsh
S1078: RotaJakiro
RotaJakiro is a 64-bit Linux backdoor used by APT32. First seen in 2018, it uses a plugin architecture to extend capabilities. RotaJakiro can determine it's permission level and execute according to access type (`root` or `user`).[1][2]
S0158: PHOREAL
S0099: Arp
S0155: WINDSHIELD
WINDSHIELD is a signature backdoor used by APT32. [1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 3.0 | Current bundle | 19c1bd926035… | ||
| 19.2 | 3.0 | Older bundle | 19c1bd926035… | ||
| 19.1 | 3.0 | Older bundle | 3e074c293359… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]FireEye APT32 May 2017
Carr, N.. (2017, May 14). Cyber Espionage is Alive and Well: APT32 and the Threat to Global Corporations. Retrieved June 18, 2017.
Open source URL - [2]Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017
Lassalle, D., et al. (2017, November 6). OceanLotus Blossoms: Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society. Retrieved November 6, 2017.
Open source URL - [3]ESET OceanLotus
Foltýn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018.
Open source URL - [4]Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017
Dahan, A. (2017, May 24). OPERATION COBALT KITTY: A LARGE-SCALE APT IN ASIA CARRIED OUT BY THE OCEANLOTUS GROUP. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
Open source URL - [5]Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021
Amnesty International. (2021, February 24). Vietnamese activists targeted by notorious hacking group. Retrieved March 1, 2021.
Open source URL - [6]ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019
Dumont, R. (2019, March 20). Fake or Fake: Keeping up with OceanLotus decoys. Retrieved April 1, 2019.
Open source URL - [7]APT-C-00
(Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)
- [8]APT32
(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)
- [9]BISMUTH
(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)
- [10]Canvas Cyclone
(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)
- [11]Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023
Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.
Open source URL - [12]OceanLotus
(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)
- [13]SeaLotus
(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)
- [14]mitre-attackG0050Open source URL
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