Live Active security incident? Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0050: APT32

APT32 is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseG0050GroupObject v3.0 Modified
Discuss defensive coverage Back to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence Medium

APT32 is an ATT&CK group entry for a suspected Vietnam-based threat group active since at least 2014, associated with targeting private sector organizations, foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists, especially in Southeast Asia. For defenders, the practical issue is not just the name: the ATT&CK relationships show a mix of strategic web compromise, credential dumping, discovery, SMB-based lateral movement, command/file obfuscation, and multiple Windows, macOS, and Linux backdoors. This makes APT32 useful as a planning case for validating whether endpoint, identity, network, and web telemetry can connect early access to post-compromise movement.

Executive priority

Prioritize this entry if the organization operates in or supports Southeast Asia, works with government, media, civil society, or sensitive regional business interests, or has executives and users exposed to external web-based targeting. Leadership should ask whether incident response can quickly answer: which users browsed to suspicious compromised sites, which endpoints exposed credentials, which accounts moved over SMB/admin shares, and whether macOS/Linux assets are covered as well as Windows. The value is in resilience and evidence readiness, not assuming this group is currently targeting the organization.

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this group, so validation should be relationship-driven. The supplied relationships connect APT32 to Mimikatz and OS Credential Dumping including LSASS Memory, Windows discovery via registry and network utilities such as Net, Arp, ipconfig, and netsh, Remote System Discovery, SMB/Windows Admin Shares, and stealth techniques including command obfuscation, fileless storage, and encrypted/encoded files. Related malware includes several Windows backdoors, a macOS backdoor, and a Linux backdoor, so SOC coverage should be checked across endpoint platforms where those assets exist. Detection engineering should focus on behavioral chains: suspicious web-origin execution or payload delivery followed by discovery commands, credential access attempts, abnormal SMB/admin-share use, and persistence or backdoor-like process/network activity.

Likely telemetry

  • Web proxy, secure web gateway, browser, and DNS logs for strategic web compromise investigation context
  • Endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry for Net, Arp, ipconfig, netsh, registry queries, and obfuscated commands
  • Windows security and EDR telemetry related to LSASS access, credential dumping behavior, and Mimikatz-like activity
  • Authentication, account use, and lateral movement logs, especially SMB and Windows admin share access
  • Registry, WMI repository, event log, and other fileless-storage-relevant endpoint evidence where collected

Detection direction

  • Do not rely on the group name as a detection strategy; validate coverage for the ATT&CK techniques and software relationships supplied for APT32.
  • Correlate discovery utilities and registry queries with preceding suspicious web activity, new processes, or unusual user context to reduce false positives from normal administration.
  • Tune detections for LSASS access and credential dumping with attention to legitimate security tools and administrator activity that can resemble Mimikatz testing.
  • Review SMB/admin-share detections against identity context: rare source-to-destination pairs, unusual accounts, off-hours access, or access following credential-related alerts are higher value than raw SMB events alone.
  • Expect obfuscation and encoded/encrypted files to weaken simple signature matching; prioritize command-line normalization, behavioral analytics, and endpoint evidence preservation.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with credential protection and privileged access controls, because the relationships include OS credential dumping, LSASS Memory, Mimikatz, and SMB/admin-share lateral movement.
  • Restrict and monitor administrative shares, remote administration pathways, and unnecessary SMB exposure between workstations and sensitive systems.
  • Improve endpoint hardening and EDR visibility for Windows, macOS, and Linux assets where present, with special attention to command execution, registry activity, fileless storage locations, and suspicious network connections.
  • Strengthen web browsing defenses and user-risk processes for populations exposed to strategic web compromise risk, including executives, regional staff, journalists, civil society contacts, and government-facing teams where applicable.
  • Maintain incident response playbooks that preserve endpoint memory/process data, authentication logs, web logs, DNS, and network metadata needed to reconstruct credential theft and lateral movement.
Analyst notes and limits

This take is based only on the supplied ATT&CK group description, external references, and relationship context. The strongest decision value comes from the pattern of associated behaviors: web compromise leading into discovery, credential access, SMB lateral movement, and backdoor activity across multiple endpoint operating systems. Local prioritization should be driven by geography, sector, sensitive populations, and actual telemetry coverage.

ATT&CK provides no official detection text and the group object itself lists no platforms or tactics. Platform references here come from related software and techniques, not from the group-level platform field. The supplied relationship list may not be complete for all APT32 activity, and this summary should not be read as a claim of active targeting, active exploitation, or guaranteed detection coverage.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

APT32

APT32 is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

68 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1550.002 Pass the Hash Sub-technique

APT32 has used pass the hash for lateral movement.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1036 Masquerading

APT32 has disguised a Cobalt Strike beacon as a Flash Installer.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1059.007 JavaScript Sub-technique

APT32 has used JavaScript for drive-by downloads and C2 communications.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017CitationVolexity Ocean Lotus November 2020
Enterprise T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation

APT32 used WMI to deploy their tools on remote machines and to gather information about the Outlook process.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1072 Software Deployment Tools

APT32 compromised McAfee ePO to move laterally by distributing malware as a software deployment task.[1]
Enterprise T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer

APT32 has deployed tools after moving laterally using administrative accounts.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1564.004 NTFS File Attributes Sub-technique

APT32 used NTFS alternate data streams to hide their payloads.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1552.002 Credentials in Registry Sub-technique

APT32 used Outlook Credential Dumper to harvest credentials stored in Windows registry.[4]CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1055 Process Injection

APT32 malware has injected a Cobalt Strike beacon into Rundll32.exe.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1216.001 PubPrn Sub-technique

APT32 has used PubPrn.vbs within execution scripts to execute malware, possibly bypassing defenses.CitationTwitter ItsReallyNick Status Update APT32 PubPrn
Enterprise T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment Sub-technique

APT32 has sent spearphishing emails with a malicious executable disguised as a document or spreadsheet.[3][4]CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017[6]CitationFireEye APT32 April 2020[5]
Enterprise T1135 Network Share Discovery

APT32 used the net view command to show all shares available, including the administrative shares such as C$ and ADMIN$.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1033 System Owner/User Discovery

APT32 collected the victim's username and executed the whoami command on the victim's machine. APT32 executed shellcode to collect the username on the victim's machine. CitationFireEye APT32 April 2020[3]CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1571 Non-Standard Port

An APT32 backdoor can use HTTP over a non-standard TCP port (e.g 14146) which is specified in the backdoor configuration.[6]
Enterprise T1082 System Information Discovery

APT32 has collected the OS version and computer name from victims. One of the group's backdoors can also query the Windows Registry to gather system information, and another macOS backdoor performs a fingerprint of the machine on its first connection to the C&C server. APT32 executed shellcode to identify the name of the infected host.[3][6]CitationESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019CitationFireEye APT32 April 2020
Enterprise T1583.001 Domains Sub-technique

APT32 has set up and operated websites to gather information and deliver malware.CitationVolexity Ocean Lotus November 2020
Enterprise T1012 Query Registry

APT32's backdoor can query the Windows Registry to gather system information. [6]
Enterprise T1027.010 Command Obfuscation Sub-technique

APT32 has used the `Invoke-Obfuscation` framework to obfuscate their PowerShell.[1]CitationGitHub Invoke-ObfuscationCitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1059.003 Windows Command Shell Sub-technique

APT32 has used cmd.exe for execution.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol Sub-technique

APT32's backdoor can exfiltrate data by encoding it in the subdomain field of DNS packets.[6]
Enterprise T1574.001 DLL Sub-technique

APT32 ran legitimately-signed executables from Symantec and McAfee which load a malicious DLL. The group also side-loads its backdoor by dropping a library and a legitimate, signed executable (AcroTranscoder).[4]CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017[6]
Enterprise T1566.002 Spearphishing Link Sub-technique

APT32 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.[3][4]CitationFireEye APT32 April 2020CitationVolexity Ocean Lotus November 2020[5]
Enterprise T1598.003 Spearphishing Link Sub-technique

APT32 has used malicious links to direct users to web pages designed to harvest credentials.CitationVolexity Ocean Lotus November 2020
Enterprise T1087.001 Local Account Sub-technique

APT32 enumerated administrative users using the commands net localgroup administrators.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1059.001 PowerShell Sub-technique

APT32 has used PowerShell-based tools, PowerShell one-liners, and shellcode loaders for execution.[1][4]CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1003.001 LSASS Memory Sub-technique

APT32 used Mimikatz and customized versions of Windows Credential Dumper to harvest credentials.[4]CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1046 Network Service Discovery

APT32 performed network scanning on the network to search for open ports, services, OS finger-printing, and other vulnerabilities.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1608.004 Drive-by Target Sub-technique

APT32 has stood up websites containing numerous articles and content scraped from the Internet to make them appear legitimate, but some of these pages include malicious JavaScript to profile the potential victim or infect them via a fake software update.CitationVolexity Ocean Lotus November 2020
Enterprise T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

APT32's backdoor has exfiltrated data using the already opened channel with its C&C server.[6]
Enterprise T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service Sub-technique

APT32 has used hidden or non-printing characters to help masquerade service names, such as appending a Unicode no-break space character to a legitimate service name. APT32 has also impersonated the legitimate Flash installer file name "install_flashplayer.exe".[1]
Enterprise T1003 OS Credential Dumping

APT32 used GetPassword_x64 to harvest credentials.[4]CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1078.003 Local Accounts Sub-technique

APT32 has used legitimate local admin account credentials.[1]
Enterprise T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information

APT32 has conducted targeted surveillance against activists and bloggers.[5]
Enterprise T1070.006 Timestomp Sub-technique

APT32 has used scheduled task raw XML with a backdated timestamp of June 2, 2016. The group has also set the creation time of the files dropped by the second stage of the exploit to match the creation time of kernel32.dll. Additionally, APT32 has used a random value to modify the timestamp of the file storing the clientID.[1][6]CitationESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019
Enterprise T1189 Drive-by Compromise

APT32 has infected victims by tricking them into visiting compromised watering hole websites.[3]CitationVolexity Ocean Lotus November 2020
Enterprise T1218.011 Rundll32 Sub-technique

APT32 malware has used rundll32.exe to execute an initial infection process.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

APT32 has used COM scriptlets to download Cobalt Strike beacons.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1112 Modify Registry

APT32's backdoor has modified the Windows Registry to store the backdoor's configuration. [6]
Enterprise T1071.003 Mail Protocols Sub-technique

APT32 has used email for C2 via an Office macro.[4]CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1560 Archive Collected Data

APT32's backdoor has used LZMA compression and RC4 encryption before exfiltration.[6]
Enterprise T1204.001 Malicious Link Sub-technique

APT32 has lured targets to download a Cobalt Strike beacon by including a malicious link within spearphishing emails.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017CitationVolexity Ocean Lotus November 2020[5]
Enterprise T1071.001 Web Protocols Sub-technique

APT32 has used JavaScript that communicates over HTTP or HTTPS to attacker controlled domains to download additional frameworks. The group has also used downloaded encrypted payloads over HTTP.[2]CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location Sub-technique

APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update. APT32 has also renamed a Cobalt Strike beacon payload to install_flashplayers.exe. CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017CitationVolexity Ocean Lotus November 2020
Enterprise T1070.004 File Deletion Sub-technique

APT32's macOS backdoor can receive a “delete” command.CitationESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019
Enterprise T1027.011 Fileless Storage Sub-technique

APT32's backdoor has stored its configuration in a registry key.[6]
Enterprise T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

APT32 has added JavaScript to victim websites to download additional frameworks that profile and compromise website visitors.[2]
Enterprise T1053.005 Scheduled Task Sub-technique

APT32 has used scheduled tasks to persist on victim systems.[1][4]CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017[6]
Enterprise T1036.003 Rename Legitimate Utilities Sub-technique

APT32 has moved and renamed pubprn.vbs to a .txt file to avoid detection.CitationTwitter ItsReallyNick APT32 pubprn Masquerade
Enterprise T1543.003 Windows Service Sub-technique

APT32 modified Windows Services to ensure PowerShell scripts were loaded on the system. APT32 also creates a Windows service to establish persistence.[3]CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017[6]
Enterprise T1608.001 Upload Malware Sub-technique

APT32 has hosted malicious payloads in Dropbox, Amazon S3, and Google Drive for use during targeting.CitationVolexity Ocean Lotus November 2020
Enterprise T1222.002 Linux and Mac Permissions Sub-technique

APT32's macOS backdoor changes the permission of the file it wants to execute to 755.CitationESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019
Enterprise T1569.002 Service Execution Sub-technique

APT32's backdoor has used Windows services as a way to execute its malicious payload. [6]
Enterprise T1018 Remote System Discovery

APT32 has enumerated DC servers using the command net group "Domain Controllers" /domain. The group has also used the ping command.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1218.005 Mshta Sub-technique

APT32 has used mshta.exe for code execution.[4]CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1083 File and Directory Discovery

APT32's backdoor possesses the capability to list files and directories on a machine. [6]
Enterprise T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs Sub-technique

APT32 has cleared select event log entries.[1]
Enterprise T1059.005 Visual Basic Sub-technique

APT32 has used macros, COM scriptlets, and VBS scripts.[4]CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1588.002 Tool Sub-technique

APT32 has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz and Cobalt Strike, and a variety of other open-source tools from GitHub.[1][4]
Enterprise T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares Sub-technique

APT32 used Net to use Windows' hidden network shares to copy their tools to remote machines for execution.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1550.003 Pass the Ticket Sub-technique

APT32 successfully gained remote access by using pass the ticket.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1583.006 Web Services Sub-technique

APT32 has set up Dropbox, Amazon S3, and Google Drive to host malicious downloads.CitationVolexity Ocean Lotus November 2020
Enterprise T1505.003 Web Shell Sub-technique

APT32 has used Web shells to maintain access to victim websites.[2]
Enterprise T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories Sub-technique

APT32's macOS backdoor hides the clientID file via a chflags function.CitationESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019
Enterprise T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery

APT32 used the ipconfig /all command to gather the IP address from the system.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1027.016 Junk Code Insertion Sub-technique

APT32 includes garbage code to mislead anti-malware software and researchers.[3][6]
Enterprise T1049 System Network Connections Discovery

APT32 used the netstat -anpo tcp command to display TCP connections on the victim's machine.CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1564.003 Hidden Window Sub-technique

APT32 has used the WindowStyle parameter to conceal PowerShell windows. [1] CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
Enterprise T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File Sub-technique

APT32 has performed code obfuscation, including encoding payloads using Base64 and using a framework called "Dont-Kill-My-Cat (DKMC). APT32 also encrypts the library used for network exfiltration with AES-256 in CBC mode in their macOS backdoor.[1]CitationGitHub Invoke-Obfuscation[3][4]CitationCybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017[6]CitationESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Tool Enterprise

S0002: Mimikatz

Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. [1] [2]

Windows
Tool Enterprise

S0100: ipconfig

ipconfig is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system's TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration. [1]

Malware Enterprise

S0154: Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]

In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows
Tool Enterprise

S0108: netsh

netsh is a scripting utility used to interact with networking components on local or remote systems. [1]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S1078: RotaJakiro

RotaJakiro is a 64-bit Linux backdoor used by APT32. First seen in 2018, it uses a plugin architecture to extend capabilities. RotaJakiro can determine it's permission level and execute according to access type (`root` or `user`).[1][2]

Linux
Tool Enterprise

S0099: Arp

Arp displays and modifies information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache. [1]

LinuxWindowsmacOS
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Tool S0002: Mimikatz Enterprise uses · Technique T1550.002: Pass the Hash Enterprise uses · Technique T1036: Masquerading Enterprise uses · Technique T1059.007: JavaScript Enterprise uses · Technique T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation Enterprise uses · Tool S0100: ipconfig Enterprise uses · Technique T1072: Software Deployment Tools Enterprise uses · Technique T1570: Lateral Tool Transfer Enterprise uses · Technique T1564.004: NTFS File Attributes Enterprise uses · Technique T1552.002: Credentials in Registry Enterprise uses · Malware S0585: Kerrdown Enterprise uses · Technique T1055: Process Injection Enterprise uses · Technique T1216.001: PubPrn Enterprise uses · Technique T1566.001: Spearphishing Attachment Enterprise uses · Technique T1135: Network Share Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1033: System Owner/User Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1571: Non-Standard Port Enterprise uses · Technique T1082: System Information Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1583.001: Domains Enterprise uses · Technique T1012: Query Registry Enterprise uses · Technique T1027.010: Command Obfuscation Enterprise uses · Technique T1059.003: Windows Command Shell Enterprise uses · Technique T1048.003: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol Enterprise uses · Malware S0154: Cobalt Strike Enterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
3.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
3e074c2933599d8d...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 3.0 Current bundle 3e074c293359…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    FireEye APT32 May 2017

    Carr, N.. (2017, May 14). Cyber Espionage is Alive and Well: APT32 and the Threat to Global Corporations. Retrieved June 18, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017

    Lassalle, D., et al. (2017, November 6). OceanLotus Blossoms: Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society. Retrieved November 6, 2017.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    ESET OceanLotus

    Foltýn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017

    Dahan, A. (2017, May 24). OPERATION COBALT KITTY: A LARGE-SCALE APT IN ASIA CARRIED OUT BY THE OCEANLOTUS GROUP. Retrieved November 5, 2018.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021

    Amnesty International. (2021, February 24). Vietnamese activists targeted by notorious hacking group. Retrieved March 1, 2021.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019

    Dumont, R. (2019, March 20). Fake or Fake: Keeping up with OceanLotus decoys. Retrieved April 1, 2019.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    APT-C-00

    (Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)

  8. [8]
    APT32

    (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)

  9. [9]
    BISMUTH

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  10. [10]
    Canvas Cyclone

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  11. [11]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    OceanLotus

    (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)

  13. [13]
    SeaLotus

    (Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)

  14. [14]
    mitre-attack G0050
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK site Official STIX data repository MITRE ATT&CK terms of use