G0099: APT-C-36
APT-C-36 is a suspected South American threat group that has engaged in espionage and financially motivated operations since at least 2018. APT-C-36 has targeted government institutions and entities in the financial, energy, and professional manufacturing sectors across Colombia and other Latin American countries.[1][2][3][4]
Security context for executives and security teams
G0099: APT-C-36 describes [APT-C-36](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0099) is a suspected South American threat group that has engaged in espionage and financially motivated operations since at least 2018. [APT-C-36](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0099) has targeted government institutions and entities in the financial, energy, and professional manufacturing sectors across Colombia and other Latin American countries.(Citation: QiAnXin APT-C-36 Feb2019)(Citation: Kaspersky BlindEagle AUG 2024)(Citation: Check Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025)(C...
Executive priority
G0099: APT-C-36 is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0099: APT-C-36 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0099: APT-C-36 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
APT-C-36
APT-C-36 is a suspected South American threat group that has engaged in espionage and financially motivated operations since at least 2018. APT-C-36 has targeted government institutions and entities in the financial, energy, and professional manufacturing sectors across Colombia and other Latin American countries.[1][2][3][4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1583.001 | DomainsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1683.001 | Written ContentSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027.016 | Junk Code InsertionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | APT-C-36 has used WMI to execute PowerShell.CitationZscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1059.007 | JavaScriptSub-technique | APT-C-36 has used a fileless attack chain composed of three JavaScript code snippets to execute subsequent payloads.CitationZscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1684.001 | ImpersonationSub-technique | APT-C-36 has impersonated banks including Banco Davivienda, Bancolombia, and BBVA as well as government institutions such as Colombia’s National Directorate of Taxes and Customs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Office of the Attorney General.[2]CitationLevelBlue Blind Eagle Proton66 JUN 2025[4]CitationZscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1588.001 | MalwareSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1584.005 | BotnetSub-technique | APT-C-36 has used a botnet management interface to control large numbers of compromised hosts.CitationLevelBlue Blind Eagle Proton66 JUN 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1583.006 | Web ServicesSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | APT-C-36 utilizes tools well known in crime communities and has obtained and used a modified variant of Imminent Monitor.[1][3] |
| Enterprise | T1587.001 | MalwareSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | APT-C-36 has used ConfuserEx to obfuscate its variant of Imminent Monitor, compressed payloads and RAT packages, and password protected encrypted email attachments to avoid detection.[1] APT-C-36 has also compressed initial droppers into ZIP, LHA and UUE formats.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1534 | Internal Spearphishing | APT-C-36 has used a compromised account to send a phishing email to an address likely used and monitored by the IT team within the same targeted organization.CitationZscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1204.001 | Malicious LinkSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1683.002 | Audio-Visual ContentSub-technique | APT-C-36 has used phishing pages appearing like legitimate banking login portals to compromise credentials.CitationLevelBlue Blind Eagle Proton66 JUN 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1586.002 | Email AccountsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1480 | Execution Guardrails | |
| Enterprise | T1566.002 | Spearphishing LinkSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1133 | External Remote Services | |
| Enterprise | T1583.003 | Virtual Private ServerSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| Enterprise | T1608.001 | Upload MalwareSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027.003 | SteganographySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.005 | Visual BasicSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1568 | Dynamic Resolution | |
| Enterprise | T1564.003 | Hidden WindowSub-technique | APT-C-36 has set the ShowWindow property of the Win32_ProcessStartup object to zero to hide PowerShell execution.CitationZscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1571 | Non-Standard Port | |
| Enterprise | T1586.003 | Cloud AccountsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1593 | Search Open Websites/Domains | APT-C-36 has gathered information on Colombian financial institutions, including Bancolombia, BBVA, Banco Caja Social, and Davivienda to craft phishing pages.CitationLevelBlue Blind Eagle Proton66 JUN 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1055.012 | Process HollowingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0385: njRAT
S0434: Imminent Monitor
Imminent Monitor was a commodity remote access tool (RAT) offered for sale from 2012 until 2019, when an operation was conducted to take down the Imminent Monitor infrastructure. Various cracked versions and variations of this RAT are still in circulation.[1]
S9017: DCRAT
S9019: PureCrypter
PureCrypter is a fully-featured malware loader, developed by a threat actor called “PureCoder," that has been in use since at least 2021 to distribute a variety of remote access trojans and information stealers.[1]
S9016: Caminho
S0332: Remcos
S1087: AsyncRAT
S0262: QuasarRAT
S9018: HeartCrypt
HeartCrypt is a packer-as-a-service (PaaS) used to protect malware that has been available since at least 2024. HeartCrypt has been used to pack a variety of malware including Lumma Stealer, Remcos, and Rhadamanthys. In the HeartCrypt PaaS model, customers submit malware via private messaging services and it is then packed and returned by the operator as a new binary.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 53013b038cfc… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 81a0329b9c45… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]QiAnXin APT-C-36 Feb2019
QiAnXin Threat Intelligence Center. (2019, February 18). APT-C-36: Continuous Attacks Targeting Colombian Government Institutions and Corporations. Retrieved May 5, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]Kaspersky BlindEagle AUG 2024
Global Research & Analysis Team, Kaspersky. (2024, August 19). BlindEagle flying high in Latin America. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
Open source URL - [3]Check Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025
Check Point Research. (2025, March 10). Blind Eagle: …And Justice for All. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
Open source URL - [4]Recorded Future TAG-144 AUG 2025
Insikt Group. (2025, August 26). TAG-144’s Persistent Grip on South American Organizations. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
Open source URL - [5]APT-Q-98
(Citation: Recorded Future TAG-144 AUG 2025)
- [6]AguilaCiega
(Citation: Recorded Future TAG-144 AUG 2025)
- [7]Blind Eagle
(Citation: QiAnXin APT-C-36 Feb2019)(Citation: Recorded Future TAG-144 AUG 2025)
- [8]TAG-144
(Citation: Recorded Future TAG-144 AUG 2025)
- [9]mitre-attackG0099Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
