LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0099: APT-C-36

APT-C-36 is a suspected South American threat group that has engaged in espionage and financially motivated operations since at least 2018. APT-C-36 has targeted government institutions and entities in the financial, energy, and professional manufacturing sectors across Colombia and other Latin American countries.[1][2][3][4]

EnterpriseG0099GroupObject v2.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0099: APT-C-36 describes [APT-C-36](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0099) is a suspected South American threat group that has engaged in espionage and financially motivated operations since at least 2018. [APT-C-36](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0099) has targeted government institutions and entities in the financial, energy, and professional manufacturing sectors across Colombia and other Latin American countries.(Citation: QiAnXin APT-C-36 Feb2019)(Citation: Kaspersky BlindEagle AUG 2024)(Citation: Check Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025)(C...

Executive priority

G0099: APT-C-36 is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0099: APT-C-36 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0099: APT-C-36 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

APT-C-36

APT-C-36 is a suspected South American threat group that has engaged in espionage and financially motivated operations since at least 2018. APT-C-36 has targeted government institutions and entities in the financial, energy, and professional manufacturing sectors across Colombia and other Latin American countries.[1][2][3][4]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

38 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1583.001DomainsSub-technique

APT-C-36 has acquired domains to host malicious payloads.[2][3]CitationLevelBlue Blind Eagle Proton66 JUN 2025[4][4]CitationZscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

APT-C-36 has prompted victims to open attachments and to accept macros in order to execute the subsequent payload.[1][4] APT-C-36 has also lured victims into opening malicious files hosted on Google Drive that triggered WebDAV requests to download malware.[3]CitationZscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025

EnterpriseT1683.001Written ContentSub-technique

APT-C-36 has generated email content impersonating official notifications and documents that direct victims to execute malicious payloads.[2]

EnterpriseT1027.016Junk Code InsertionSub-technique

APT-C-36 has used junk characters to obfuscate malicious scripts.[4]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

APT-C-36 has used WMI to execute PowerShell.CitationZscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025

EnterpriseT1059.007JavaScriptSub-technique

APT-C-36 has used a fileless attack chain composed of three JavaScript code snippets to execute subsequent payloads.CitationZscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025

EnterpriseT1684.001ImpersonationSub-technique

APT-C-36 has impersonated banks including Banco Davivienda, Bancolombia, and BBVA as well as government institutions such as Colombia’s National Directorate of Taxes and Customs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Office of the Attorney General.[2]CitationLevelBlue Blind Eagle Proton66 JUN 2025[4]CitationZscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025

EnterpriseT1588.001MalwareSub-technique

APT-C-36 has utilized well known malware including the Packer-as-a-Service HeartCrypt, PureCrypter, and open-source RATs such as Remcos.[3]CitationLevelBlue Blind Eagle Proton66 JUN 2025[4]

EnterpriseT1584.005BotnetSub-technique

APT-C-36 has used a botnet management interface to control large numbers of compromised hosts.CitationLevelBlue Blind Eagle Proton66 JUN 2025

EnterpriseT1583.006Web ServicesSub-technique

APT-C-36 campaign architecture has included image hosting sites, Pastebin, Discord, GitHub, Google Drive, BitBucket, and Dropbox.[2][3][4]CitationZscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025

EnterpriseT1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique

APT-C-36 has disguised its scheduled tasks as those used by Google.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

APT-C-36 has used encoded and obfuscated files, images, and executables.[2]

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

APT-C-36 utilizes tools well known in crime communities and has obtained and used a modified variant of Imminent Monitor.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1587.001MalwareSub-technique

APT-C-36 has customized existing malware with new capabilities including njRAT, AsyncRAT, LimeRAT, and BitRAT.[2]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

APT-C-36 has used ConfuserEx to obfuscate its variant of Imminent Monitor, compressed payloads and RAT packages, and password protected encrypted email attachments to avoid detection.[1] APT-C-36 has also compressed initial droppers into ZIP, LHA and UUE formats.[2]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

APT-C-36 has disguised malicious executables to appear as legitimate files.[2]

EnterpriseT1534Internal Spearphishing

APT-C-36 has used a compromised account to send a phishing email to an address likely used and monitored by the IT team within the same targeted organization.CitationZscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

APT-C-36 has used malicious links in emails, often impersonating official notifications and documents, to direct users to execute malicious payloads.[2]

EnterpriseT1683.002Audio-Visual ContentSub-technique

APT-C-36 has used phishing pages appearing like legitimate banking login portals to compromise credentials.CitationLevelBlue Blind Eagle Proton66 JUN 2025

EnterpriseT1586.002Email AccountsSub-technique

APT-C-36 has regularly used compromised email accounts in spearphishing campaigns.[4]CitationZscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

APT-C-36 has used a macro function to set scheduled tasks, disguised as those used by Google.[1]

EnterpriseT1480Execution Guardrails

APT-C-36 has used geolocation filtering in malware delivery to redirect traffic not coming from a targeted region or country, such as Ecuador or Colombia, to legitimate sites.[2][4]

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

APT-C-36 has sent emails containing a link that appear to lead to an urgent notification from a government institution, at times using URL shorteners like cort[.]as, acortaurl[.]com, and gtly[.]to.[2][3][3][4]

EnterpriseT1133External Remote Services

APT-C-36 has used VPNs in their operational infrastructure.[4]

EnterpriseT1583.003Virtual Private ServerSub-technique

APT-C-36 has incorporated virtual private servers (VPS) into its operational infrastructure.[4]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

APT-C-36 has downloaded binary data from a specified domain after the malicious document is opened.[1]

EnterpriseT1608.001Upload MalwareSub-technique

APT-C-36 has staged malware implants on group-owned repositories and sites.[2]CitationLevelBlue Blind Eagle Proton66 JUN 2025

EnterpriseT1027.003SteganographySub-technique

APT-C-36 has used steganography to hide malicious code, typically in the resource section of executable files.[2][4][4]CitationZscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

APT-C-36 has used VBScript for initial malware deployment including within a malicious Word document which is executed upon the document opening.[1][2]CitationLevelBlue Blind Eagle Proton66 JUN 2025

EnterpriseT1568Dynamic Resolution

APT-C-36 has used DDNS services such as DuckDNS, noip[.]com, and con-ip[.]com to redirect victims to sites or repositories hosting malware implants.[2][3]CitationLevelBlue Blind Eagle Proton66 JUN 2025[4]CitationZscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025

EnterpriseT1564.003Hidden WindowSub-technique

APT-C-36 has set the ShowWindow property of the Win32_ProcessStartup object to zero to hide PowerShell execution.CitationZscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025

EnterpriseT1571Non-Standard Port

APT-C-36 has used port 4050 for C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1586.003Cloud AccountsSub-technique

APT-C-36 has used compromised Google Drive accounts including one associated with a Colombian government organization.[4]

EnterpriseT1593Search Open Websites/Domains

APT-C-36 has gathered information on Colombian financial institutions, including Bancolombia, BBVA, Banco Caja Social, and Davivienda to craft phishing pages.CitationLevelBlue Blind Eagle Proton66 JUN 2025

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

APT-C-36 has used spearphishing emails with malicious .pdf and .docx files and password protected RAR attachments to avoid being detected by the email gateway.[1][2][4][4]

EnterpriseT1055.012Process HollowingSub-technique

APT-C-36 has used process hollowing to execute malware in the memory of legitimate processes.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

APT-C-36 has used PowerShell in malware execution including as part of fileless attack chains to download additional payloads.[2]CitationZscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

APT-C-36 has used side-loading to execute the HijackLoader payload.[2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S0385: njRAT

njRAT is a remote access tool (RAT) that was first observed in 2012. It has been used by threat actors in the Middle East.[1]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0434: Imminent Monitor

Imminent Monitor was a commodity remote access tool (RAT) offered for sale from 2012 until 2019, when an operation was conducted to take down the Imminent Monitor infrastructure. Various cracked versions and variations of this RAT are still in circulation.[1]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S9017: DCRAT

DCRAT is a variant of the open-source AsyncRAT developed in C# with additional capabilities such as patching Microsoft’s Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI).[1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S9019: PureCrypter

PureCrypter is a fully-featured malware loader, developed by a threat actor called “PureCoder," that has been in use since at least 2021 to distribute a variety of remote access trojans and information stealers.[1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S9016: Caminho

Caminho is a downloader that has been used by threat actors since at least 2025 to deliver various strains of malware such as XWorm.[1]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0332: Remcos

Remcos is a closed-source tool that is marketed as a remote control and surveillance software by a company called Breaking Security. Remcos has been observed being used in malware campaigns.[1][2]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S1087: AsyncRAT

AsyncRAT is an open-source remote access tool originally available through the NYANxCAT Github repository that has been used in malicious campaigns.[1][2][3]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S9018: HeartCrypt

HeartCrypt is a packer-as-a-service (PaaS) used to protect malware that has been available since at least 2024. HeartCrypt has been used to pack a variety of malware including Lumma Stealer, Remcos, and Rhadamanthys. In the HeartCrypt PaaS model, customers submit malware via private messaging services and it is then packed and returned by the operator as a new binary.[1]

LinuxWindows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
53013b038cfc2b0f...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.0Current bundle53013b038cfc…
19.12.0Older bundle81a0329b9c45…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    QiAnXin APT-C-36 Feb2019

    QiAnXin Threat Intelligence Center. (2019, February 18). APT-C-36: Continuous Attacks Targeting Colombian Government Institutions and Corporations. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Kaspersky BlindEagle AUG 2024

    Global Research & Analysis Team, Kaspersky. (2024, August 19). BlindEagle flying high in Latin America. Retrieved April 16, 2026.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Check Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025

    Check Point Research. (2025, March 10). Blind Eagle: …And Justice for All. Retrieved April 16, 2026.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Recorded Future TAG-144 AUG 2025

    Insikt Group. (2025, August 26). TAG-144’s Persistent Grip on South American Organizations. Retrieved April 16, 2026.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    APT-Q-98

    (Citation: Recorded Future TAG-144 AUG 2025)

  6. [6]
    AguilaCiega

    (Citation: Recorded Future TAG-144 AUG 2025)

  7. [7]
    Blind Eagle

    (Citation: QiAnXin APT-C-36 Feb2019)(Citation: Recorded Future TAG-144 AUG 2025)

  8. [8]
    TAG-144

    (Citation: Recorded Future TAG-144 AUG 2025)

  9. [9]
    mitre-attackG0099
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.