T1584: Compromise Infrastructure
Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, network devices, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.[1][2][3][4] Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.
Use of compromised infrastructure allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. For example, adversaries may leverage compromised infrastructure (potentially also in conjunction with Digital Certificates) to further blend in and support staged information gathering and/or Phishing campaigns.[5] Adversaries may also compromise numerous machines to support Proxy and/or proxyware services or to form a botnet.[6][7] Additionally, adversaries may compromise infrastructure residing in close proximity to a target in order to gain Initial Access via Wi-Fi Networks.[8]
By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may enable follow-on malicious operations. Prior to targeting, adversaries may also compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.[9]
Security context for executives and security teams
T1584: Compromise Infrastructure describes Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, network devices, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, a...
Executive priority
T1584: Compromise Infrastructure is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1584: Compromise Infrastructure by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (resource-development), supported platforms (PRE), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1584: Compromise Infrastructure appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Compromise Infrastructure
Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, network devices, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.[1][2][3][4] Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.
Use of compromised infrastructure allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. For example, adversaries may leverage compromised infrastructure (potentially also in conjunction with Digital Certificates) to further blend in and support staged information gathering and/or Phishing campaigns.[5] Adversaries may also compromise numerous machines to support Proxy and/or proxyware services or to form a botnet.[6][7] Additionally, adversaries may compromise infrastructure residing in close proximity to a target in order to gain Initial Access via Wi-Fi Networks.[8]
By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may enable follow-on malicious operations. Prior to targeting, adversaries may also compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.[9]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1584.008 | Network DevicesSub-technique | Network Devices subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1584.003 | Virtual Private ServerSub-technique | Virtual Private Server subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1584.005 | BotnetSub-technique | Botnet subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1584.006 | Web ServicesSub-technique | Web Services subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1584.002 | DNS ServerSub-technique | DNS Server subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1584.007 | ServerlessSub-technique | Serverless subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1584.004 | ServerSub-technique | Server subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1584.001 | DomainsSub-technique | Domains subtechnique of this object. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
C0043: Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions
Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions is a sequence of intrusions from 2021 through early 2022 linked to People’s Republic of China (PRC) threat actors, particularly RedEcho and Threat Activity Group 38 (TAG38). The intrusions appear focused on IT system breach in Indian electric utility entities and logistics firms, as well as potentially managed service providers operating within India. Although focused on OT-operating entities, there is no evidence this campaign was able to progress beyond IT breach and information gathering to OT environment access.[1][2]
C0051: APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign
APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign was conducted by APT28 from early February 2022 to November 2024 against organizations and individuals with expertise on Ukraine. APT28 primarily leveraged living-off-the-land techniques, while leveraging the zero-day exploitation of CVE-2022-38028. Notably, APT28 leveraged Wi-Fi networks in close proximity to the intended target to gain initial access to the victim environment. By daisy-chaining multiple compromised organizations nearby the intended target, APT28 discovered dual-homed systems (with both a wired and wireless network connection) to enable Wi-Fi and use compromised credentials to connect to the victim network.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.6 | Current bundle | dfe5522238d1… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.6 | Older bundle | dfe5522238d1… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Mandiant APT1
Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
Open source URL - [2]ICANNDomainNameHijacking
ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018
Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
Open source URL - [4]FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2
Winters, R. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016.
Open source URL - [5]FireEye DNS Hijack 2019
Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
Open source URL - [6]amnesty_nso_pegasus
Amnesty International Security Lab. (2021, July 18). Forensic Methodology Report: How to catch NSO Group’s Pegasus. Retrieved February 22, 2022.
Open source URL - [7]Sysdig Proxyjacking
Crystal Morin. (2023, April 4). Proxyjacking has Entered the Chat. Retrieved July 6, 2023.
Open source URL - [8]Nearest Neighbor Volexity
Koessel, Sean. Adair, Steven. Lancaster, Tom. (2024, November 22). The Nearest Neighbor Attack: How A Russian APT Weaponized Nearby Wi-Fi Networks for Covert Access. Retrieved February 25, 2025.
Open source URL - [9]NSA NCSC Turla OilRig
NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
Open source URL - [10]Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021
Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
Open source URL - [11]Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020
Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [12]ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
Open source URL - [13]mitre-attackT1584Open source URL
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