T1189: Drive-by Compromise
Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:
* A legitimate website is compromised, allowing adversaries to inject malicious code * Script files served to a legitimate website from a publicly writeable cloud storage bucket are modified by an adversary * Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers (i.e., Malvertising) * Built-in web application interfaces that allow user-controllable content are leveraged for the insertion of malicious scripts or iFrames (e.g., cross-site scripting)
Browser push notifications may also be abused by adversaries and leveraged for malicious code injection via User Execution. By clicking "allow" on browser push notifications, users may be granting a website permission to run JavaScript code on their browser.[1][2][3]
Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or a particular region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.[4]
Typical drive-by compromise process:
1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content. 2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting, notifications, or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes. 3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser. 4. If exploitation is successful, the adversary will gain code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place. In some cases, a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.
Unlike Exploit Public-Facing Application, the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.
Security context for executives and security teams
T1189: Drive-by Compromise describes Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)), including: * A legitimate website is compromised, allowing adversaries to inject malicious code * Script files served to a legitimate website from a publicly writeable cloud storage bucket are modified by an adversary * Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate...
Executive priority
T1189: Drive-by Compromise is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1189: Drive-by Compromise by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (initial-access), supported platforms (Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1189: Drive-by Compromise appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Drive-by Compromise
Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:
* A legitimate website is compromised, allowing adversaries to inject malicious code * Script files served to a legitimate website from a publicly writeable cloud storage bucket are modified by an adversary * Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers (i.e., Malvertising) * Built-in web application interfaces that allow user-controllable content are leveraged for the insertion of malicious scripts or iFrames (e.g., cross-site scripting)
Browser push notifications may also be abused by adversaries and leveraged for malicious code injection via User Execution. By clicking "allow" on browser push notifications, users may be granting a website permission to run JavaScript code on their browser.[1][2][3]
Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or a particular region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.[4]
Typical drive-by compromise process:
1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content. 2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting, notifications, or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes. 3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser. 4. If exploitation is successful, the adversary will gain code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place. In some cases, a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.
Unlike Exploit Public-Facing Application, the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0134: Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe is a suspected Pakistan-based threat group that has been active since at least 2013, primarily targeting diplomatic, defense, and research organizations in India and Afghanistan.[1][2][3]
G0048: RTM
G0068: PLATINUM
G0112: Windshift
G1006: Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca is a suspected China-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least April 2019. Earth Lusca has targeted organizations in Australia, China, Hong Kong, Mongolia, Nepal, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Germany, France, and the United States. Targets included government institutions, news media outlets, gambling companies, educational institutions, COVID-19 research organizations, telecommunications companies, religious movements banned in China, and cryptocurrency trading platforms; security researchers assess some Earth Lusca operations may be financially motivated.[1]
Earth Lusca has used malware commonly used by other Chinese threat groups, including APT41 and the Winnti Group cluster, however security researchers assess Earth Lusca's techniques and infrastructure are separate.[1]
G0082: APT38
APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1] Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, Bancomext [2] and Banco de Chile [2], along with software supply chain compromises and destructive malware attacks.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
G0001: Axiom
Axiom is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerospace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors since at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of overlap between Axiom and Winnti Group but the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on TTPs and targeting.[1][2][3]
G0073: APT19
APT19 is a Chinese-based threat group that has targeted a variety of industries, including defense, finance, energy, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, high tech, education, manufacturing, and legal services. In 2017, a phishing campaign was used to target seven law and investment firms. [1] Some analysts track APT19 and Deep Panda as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same. [2] [3] [4]
G0012: Darkhotel
Darkhotel is a suspected South Korean threat group that has targeted victims primarily in East Asia since at least 2004. The group's name is based on cyber espionage operations conducted via hotel Internet networks against traveling executives and other select guests. Darkhotel has also conducted spearphishing campaigns and infected victims through peer-to-peer and file sharing networks.[1][2][3]
G0138: Andariel
Andariel is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that has been active since at least 2009. Andariel has primarily focused its operations--which have included destructive attacks--against South Korean government agencies, military organizations, and a variety of domestic companies; they have also conducted cyber financial operations against ATMs, banks, and cryptocurrency exchanges. Andariel's notable activity includes Operation Black Mine, Operation GoldenAxe, and Campaign Rifle.[1][2][3][4][5]
Andariel is considered a sub-set of Lazarus Group, and has been attributed to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau.[6]
North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
G0007: APT28
APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.
G0035: Dragonfly
Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16.[1][2] Active since at least 2010, Dragonfly has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9]
S0215: KARAE
S0483: IcedID
S0482: Bundlore
S0606: Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit is a self-propagating ransomware that affected the Ukrainian transportation sector in 2017. Bad Rabbit has also targeted organizations and consumers in Russia. [1][2][3]
S0451: LoudMiner
S1124: SocGholish
SocGholish is a JavaScript-based loader malware that has been used since at least 2017. It has been observed in use against multiple sectors globally for initial access, primarily through drive-by-downloads masquerading as software updates. SocGholish is operated by Mustard Tempest and its access has been sold to groups including Indrik Spider for downloading secondary RAT and ransomware payloads.[1][2][3][4]
S0496: REvil
REvil is a ransomware family that has been linked to the GOLD SOUTHFIELD group and operated as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. REvil, which as been used against organizations in the manufacturing, transportation, and electric sectors, is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.[1][2][3]
S0531: Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro is a banking trojan written in Delphi that was first observed in 2016 and uses a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) business model. Grandoreiro has confirmed victims in Brazil, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain.[1][2]
S1086: Snip3
Snip3 is a sophisticated crypter-as-a-service that has been used since at least 2021 to obfuscate and load numerous strains of malware including AsyncRAT, Revenge RAT, Agent Tesla, and NETWIRE.[1][2]
S0216: POORAIM
S9050: Vidar
Vidar is a Windows infostealer that was first advertised in November 2018. Written in C++, Vidar collects PII, cryptocurrency wallets, documents and other data within the compromised machine. Version 2 of Vidar was published in October 2025, and has been used in numerous operations since its release. Vidar has been observed alongside other malware strains, including STOP/Djvu ransomware, Mina.exe (an XMRIG miner), and Clip1.exe (a Laplas Clipper sample).[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
C0057: 3CX Supply Chain Attack
The 3CX Supply Chain Attack was the first publicly reported case of one supply chain compromise triggering another, leading to a cascading, two-stage intrusion. The initial supply chain attack began when a 3CX employee downloaded and executed a trojanized, end-of-life version of the X_Trader trading software from Trading Technologies. This provided UNC4736, a threat cluster associated with AppleJeus, access to the 3CX environment. From there UNC4736 compromised the Windows and macOS build environments used to distribute the 3CX desktop application to their customers.[1] While 3CX serves more than 600,000 customers and 12 million users, only a subset of systems were affected. Subsequent targeting focused on victims in the defense and cryptocurrency sectors, where attackers deployed secondary payloads such as Gopuram for credential theft and persistence.[2] The campaign began in late 2022 and was disrupted after security vendors publicly reported the compromise in March 2023.[3][4]
C0016: Operation Dust Storm
Operation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.[1]
Operation Dust Storm threat actors also began to use Android backdoors in their operations by 2015, with all identified victims at the time residing in Japan or South Korea.[1]
C0010: C0010
C0010 was a cyber espionage campaign conducted by UNC3890 that targeted Israeli shipping, government, aviation, energy, and healthcare organizations. Security researcher assess UNC3890 conducts operations in support of Iranian interests, and noted several limited technical connections to Iran, including PDB strings and Farsi language artifacts. C0010 began by at least late 2020, and was still ongoing as of mid-2022.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.7 | Current bundle | 21eb6d481c70… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.7 | Older bundle | 21eb6d481c70… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.7 | Older bundle | 21eb6d481c70… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Push notifications - viruspositive
Gaurav Sethi. (2021, December 14). The Dark Side of Web Push Notifications. Retrieved March 14, 2025.
Open source URL - [2]push notification -mcafee
Craig Schmugar. (2021, May 17). Scammers Impersonating Windows Defender to Push Malicious Windows Apps. Retrieved March 14, 2025.
Open source URL - [3]push notifications - malwarebytes
Pieter Arntz. (2019, January 22). Browser push notifications: a feature asking to be abused. Retrieved March 14, 2025.
Open source URL - [4]Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise
Adair, S., Moran, N. (2012, May 15). Cyber Espionage & Strategic Web Compromises – Trusted Websites Serving Dangerous Results. Retrieved March 13, 2018.
- [5]mitre-attackT1189Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.